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This dissertation examines the factors associated with sustainable privatization of 
infrastructure projects. Privatization offers a way for governments to make infrastructure 
delivery more effective and efficient than exclusively public provision, but often the 
promise is fraught with peril. The three essays that constitute this dissertation seek to use 
empirical data and analysis to answer three selected questions regarding sustainable 
privatization: 
 What causes the private sector to exit from infrastructure projects?  
 Do Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) provide value for money to governments?  
 Does privatization lead to benign outcomes?  
The first essay of this dissertation takes the broadest view, looking at cross-country, 
cross-sector regression analysis to unearth patterns in infrastructure privatization failures 
- with a view to understand as well the factors that lead to success. The second essay 
takes a further step from the broad overview of the first essay by looking in detail at 
 
 
individual projects and examining what factors could lead to better value for money to 
governments. Finally, the third essay looks at the choice between asset sales and share 
issue privatization as two specific methods for privatization and their subsequent impact 
on the performance of the privatized company.  The three essays thus represent a 
progression from survival to good health and finally to growth. 
My major conclusions are: 
 Project cancellation rates, though rising, are still low. Although ownership may 
change hands, for the most part, the private sector is staying in private 
infrastructure projects.   
 Although trends in cancellation may not be an issue for private infrastructure 
projects as a whole, it is a concern in the water and sewerage sector.  The high 
probability of cancellation and relatively low level of fresh investment in the 
sector suggests a declining role for the private sector in making available this 
essential service.  
 There is value for money to governments from entering into Public-Private 
Partnerships in infrastructure.  
 Divestment leads to significant improvement in profitability, efficiency, and real 
output of firms, besides providing some fiscal boost to the government. However, 
























Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 






Professor Carol Graham, Chair 
Dr Mark Lopez 
Dr Nagpurnanda Prabhala 
Professor Peter Murrell 
Dr Tracy Gordon 






















©Copyright by  
 







I wish to acknowledge the invaluable help rendered by a number of my dissertation 
committee members without which it would not have been possible to produce this work. 
Mr Clive Harris (Practice Manager, Public-Private Partnerships, World Bank Institute) 
collaborated in preparation of part of Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Dr Tracy Gordon and 
Dr Nagpurnananda Prabhala (both of the University of Maryland, College Park) provided 
helpful comments on all the chapters in this dissertation. Professor Carol Graham (Senior 
Fellow and Charles Robinson Chair, The Brookings Institution & College Park Professor, 
University of Maryland) provided support in the entire process of earning this doctorate. 
She was extremely prompt in addressing all my concerns despite an extremely busy 
schedule. Dr Mark Lopez (Associate Director, Pew Hispanic Center) aided with 
observations on earlier drafts of the thesis. A childhood friend, Dr Suhas Parandekar of 
the World Bank, helped with the quantitative analysis in the dissertation. All remaining 























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Overall Theme…………………………………………………………………………1 
Chapter 1: What drives private sector exit from infrastructure? An analysis of the 
cancellation of private infrastructure projects………………………………… 14 
1: Introduction: The boom, bust and slow recovery of private participation in 
infrastructure……………………………………………………………… 14 
 
2: Trends in the Cancellation of Infrastructure Projects with Private 
Participation……………………………………………………………….. 17 
 
3: Literature Review………………………………………………………. 20 
 
4: Data description………………………………………………………… 30 
 
5: Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………. 37 
6: The Model and Results………………………………………………….. 40 
 
7: What happens to canceled projects?.......................................................... 64 
8: Conclusion………………………………………………………………. 74 
Annex 1: Case Studies of Canceled Private Infrastructure Projects……….. 77 
Case Study 1: Mexican Toll Roads - Their Cancellation and  
Re-privatization……………………………………………………………. 77 
Case Study 2: The cancellation of Dieng, Patuha, and Karaha Bodas power 
projects (Indonesia)………………………………………………………… 80 
Case Study 3: The cancellation of Aguas Argentinas project (Argentina)… 82 
Case Study 4: The cancellation of Dar-es-Salaam Water and Sewerage  
(Tanzania)…………………………………………………………………..  86 
Case Study 5: Dabhol Power Company (India)…………………………… 88 
 
Annex 2: Correlation Matrix……………………………………………….. 92 
 
Annex 3: Canceled infrastructure projects that have been revived with private 




Chapter 2: Value for Money in Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure 100 
 




2: Theoretical Framework………………………………………………… 101 
3: Literature Review………………………………………………………. 112 
4: Data description………………………………………………………… 128 
5: Methodology……………………………………………………………. 130 
6. Sector-wise calculation of Value for Money in Indian PPPs…………… 133 
7: Conclusion: Overall Value for Money in Indian PPPs…………………. 169 
References………………………………………………………………… 172 
 
Chapter 3: Does privatization lead to benign outcomes? Case study of privatization 
in India…………………………………………………………………………….. 176 
 
1: Introduction……………………………………………………………… 176 
2: Literature Review……………………………………………………….. 180 
3: History of Privatization in India interpreted through Models of Political 
Economy…………………………………………………………………… 189 
 
4: Data description………………………………………………………… 202
 5: Methodology……………………………………………………………. 205 
6: Results of Privatization…………………………………………………. 211 
7: Conclusion………………………………………………………………. 247  










Table 1: Canceled infrastructure projects with private participation in developing 
countries, by sector, 1990-2006……………………………………………. 19 
 
Table 2: Canceled infrastructure projects with private participation in developing 
countries, by region, 1990-2006…………………………………………… 20 
 
Table 3: Cost of Equity and Average Profitability, by Sector, of Privatized and 
Concessioned Firms in Latin America and Caribbean Countries, 1990-2000…25 
 
Table 4: Incidence of Renegotiation and Cancellation, total and by sector.. 28 
 
Table 5: PPI Project Cancellation: Variable Description………………….. 36 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for project-level variables………………… 38 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for sector-level variables………………… 39 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for country-level variables………………… 39 
 
Table 9: Model results with binary dependent variable: Model (1) is a Linear 
Probability Model; Model (2) is a Probit with marginal effects………….. 44 
 
Table 10: Robustness Table: Main Independent Variable – Project-specific 
Macroeconomic shock……………………………………………………. 51 
 
Table 11: Robustness Table: Main Independent Variable – Water and Sewerage 
sector………………………………………………………………………. 53 
 
Table 12: Model Results with binary dependent variable (including distressed 
projects on the LHS): Model (1) is a Linear Probability Model; Model (2) is a 
Probit with marginal effects……………………………………………….. 55 
 
Table 13: Description of the Dataset in Duration Analysis format……… 57 
Table 14: Model results with Cox regression – exact marginal likelihood  
model…………………………………………………………………….. 62 
 
Table 15: Project ownership status subsequent to cancellation, by sector, 1990-
2007………………………………………………………………………. 66 
 
Table 16: Privatization, cancellation, and re-privatization of infrastructure 




Appendix Table 1: Correlation Matrix…………………………………… 92 
 
Appendix Table 2: Correlation among institutional variables …………… 92 
 
Annex 3: Canceled infrastructure projects that have been revived with private 




Table 1: Types of risk and their normative allocation in a typical infrastructure 
PPP project………………………………………………………………… 110 
 
Table 2: Private Participation in Infrastructure in India (1990-2007)…….. 127 
 
Table 3: BOT (Annuity) based projects in India………………………… 137 
 
Table 4: Value for Money in NHDP Phase I for BOT (annuity) projects… 139 
 
Table 5: Construction cost overrun (conventional procurement vs PPPs) 
consolidated over 14 studies………………………………………………. 142 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis of Value for Money in BOT (annuity) 
projects………………………………………………………………. 143 
 
Table 7: Value for Money in NHDP Phase I BOT (toll) projects……….. 146 
 
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis of Value for Money in BOT (toll) projects… 149 
 
Table 9: Value for money in Power sector PPPs………………………… 153 
 
Table 10: Tariffs in Ultra-Mega Power Projects…………………………. 155 
 
Table 11: Return on equity (%) in Nhava Sheva International Container  
Terminal………………………………………………………………….. 157 
 
Table 12: Charges for Normal Containers (From Ship to Container yard or vice 
versa) [Rate per TEU (in Rs.)]…………………………………………… 159 
 
Table 13: Value for Money in the Airport Sector………………………... 165 
 









Table 2: Privatization revenues in India, by method of sale (1991-2008)…. 211 
 
Table 3: Privatization revenues in India compared to the fiscal deficit……. 212 
 
Table 4: Under-pricing of privatization offer for sale - illustrative cases…. 216 
 
Table 5: Price to Earnings Ratio in recent Indian SOE share issues……… 217 
 
Table 6: Estimated cost to the government on account of sale of shares to 
employees at discounted prices……………………………………………. 217 
 
Table 7: Valuation of companies sold through asset sale…………………. 218 
 
Table 8: Summary Results of Privatization in India (full sample)………… 220 
 
Table 9: Comparison of Performance Changes for Privatization Through Methods 
Other Than Asset Sale Versus Privatization Through Asset Sale………… 221 
 
Table 10: Summary Results of Privatization in India (full sample and long time 
period)…………………………………………………………………….. 230 
 
Table 11: Comparison of Performance Changes for Privatization through Methods 
Other Than Asset Sale Versus Privatization Through Asset Sale (longer time 
period)…………………………………………………………………….. 232 
 
Table 12: Summary Results of Privatization in India (full sample after adjustment 
with industry ratio)……………………………………………………….. 235 
 
Table 13: Comparison of Performance Changes for Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than Asset Sale Versus Privatization Through Asset Sale 
(industry-adjusted)………………………………………………………… 237 
 
Table 14: OLS Regression Results for Difference-in-Differences analysis 239 
 
Table 15: OLS Regression Results with Firm Fixed Effects……………… 241 
 
Table 16: Comparison of industry-adjusted privatization performance of BALCO 
and NALCO……………………………………………………………….. 242 
 
Table 17: Comparison of Findings of Some Privatization Studies……….. 243 
 











Figure 1: Investment commitments to infrastructure projects with private 
participation in developing countries, by sector, 1990-2006…………….. 14  
 
Figure 2: Percentage of canceled infrastructure projects with private participation in 
developing countries, by year, 1990-2006……………………………………… 18 
 
Figure 3: A facet of regulatory issues in privatization of infrastructure…. 22 
 
Figure 4: Cost Recovery by Public Utilities in Developing Countries: The Early 
1990s……………………………………………………………………… 25 
Figure 5: Hazard estimate for infrastructure projects…………………….. 58 
 
Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate………………………………… 59 
Figure 7: Different survival estimates of projects that experience macro-economic 
shock vis-à-vis those that do not………………………………………….. 60 




Figure 1: Spectrum of PPP Arrangements………………………………… 102 
 
Figure 2: Project Finance Contractual Structure…………………………… 105 
 
Figure 3: Value for Money in BOT (annuity) road projects……………….. 130 
 




Figure 1: Privatization revenues in India (1990-2008)…………………….. 189 
 













This dissertation examines the factors associated with sustainable privatization of 
infrastructure projects. Privatization offers a way for governments to make infrastructure 
delivery more effective and efficient than exclusively public provision, but often the 
promise is fraught with peril. A huge literature on privatization points to the salience of 
this key public policy issue as well as to the contention and controversy that often 
surrounds privatization projects.  
 
Privatization of infrastructure projects has become popular in recent years. The UK has 
been the pioneer in private provision of infrastructure where it began in 1992 as Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) and this became the preferred option for public procurement 
since 1994. Till end-2004, the total investment in PFI projects was £43 billion and now 
typically constitutes 15-20% of the UK government's capital budget each year. In Korea, 
Public-Private Partnership investment is 10-15% of total public investment1. In India, the 
contribution of the private sector to total infrastructure investment in the Tenth Plan 
period (2002-07) was 25%. This percentage is likely to go up to 36% in the Eleventh Plan 
period (2007-12)2 and projected to be 50% in the Twelfth Plan period (2012-17).   
 
The three essays that constitute this dissertation seek to use empirical data and analysis to 
answer three selected questions regarding sustainable privatization: 
                                                 
1 Government of India, Planning Commission (Secretariat for Infrastructure). 2010. Report of the Task 
Force on Ceiling for Annuity Commitments. 
 
2 Haldea, Gajendra. 2010. Presentation on Building Transmission Systems: Challenges and Opportunities 





1. What causes the private sector to exit from infrastructure projects?  
2. Do Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) provide value for money to governments?  
3. Does privatization lead to benign outcomes?  
 
The unifying strand to the three research questions is provided by the political economy 
of privatization. Since politicians like to remain in power and enjoy the perquisites of 
their office, a significant goal of any government is to maintain political support. In 
democracies, such political support usually takes the form of votes. In this context, it is 
important for the researcher to incorporate political economy considerations in the 
empirical analysis of policy issues like privatization3. In addition, since privatization very 
often is only one component of economic reforms, the success of privatization would 
influence the support to and outcomes of other reform measures. Therefore, managing the 
political economy of privatization, which is a major determinant of its success, is 
essential both for its own sustenance and for continuing with broader economic reforms. 
 
The first essay of this dissertation takes the broadest view, looking at cross-country, 
cross-sector regression analysis to unearth patterns in infrastructure privatization failures 
- with a view to understand as well the factors that lead to success. The second essay 
takes a further step from the broad overview of the first essay by looking in detail at 
individual projects and examining what factors could lead to better value for money to 
government. Finally, the third essay looks at the choice between asset sales and share 
                                                 
3 Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. 1994. The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the 




issue privatization as two specific methods for privatization and their subsequent impact 
on the performance of the privatized company.  The three essays thus represent a 
progression as well from survival to good health and finally to growth. 
 
I begin my analysis by looking closely at the determinants of failure of private 
infrastructure projects - when projects that have been privatized are later cancelled. My 
major finding is that macro-economic shocks and water and sewerage projects are 
strongly associated with private infrastructure project cancellation. With macro-economic 
shocks, domestic currency loses value rapidly, inflation rate rises, and demand declines 
causing financial stress to private infrastructure projects, especially those that have used 
foreign financing. At the same time, governments find it difficult to raise user charges to 
mitigate the financial stress due to political economy reasons. The political economy 
considerations are more pronounced in the water and sewerage sector that I discuss next.     
 
High project cancellation associated with water and sewerage projects 
 
Water and sewerage projects are disproportionately prone to project cancellation. Water 
and sewerage are essential public services and have traditionally been provided free or at 
user fees much below costs by governments. Privatization is usually associated with a 
tendency towards an increase in user charges for the concessionaire to be able to run a 
sustainable operation, though a well designed concession will have staggered user fee 
increase for making the process politically palatable and as a means for being equitable 
through protecting the interests of poor families. Even if the public systems are not 
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working at all or providing unpredictable and low quality services, this does not impede 
political opposition to reforms.4 The very presence of the private sector in provision of 
these “essential” services raises major concerns and it is also easy to sensationalize issues 
around water for activists and political agents. If the control of privatized water and 
sewerage services is passed on to foreigners, it is seen as sale of essential services to 
foreigners for profit-making and exploitation of the masses, that creates further problems 
to such projects. The history of private project failures in the water sector in Latin 
America (exemplified by Aguas Argentinas in Argentina and Cochabamba in Bolivia) 
emphasizes the need for political sustainability of privatization of essential services.   
 
This also suggests a method by which private water projects can be sustained, especially 
when the overall outcomes are benign. Looking at the celebrated privatization of water 
services in Manila (Philippines), it is interesting how Manila Water and Maynilad Water, 
the two private concessionaires in Manila for water services, mobilized unserved 
communities to overcome resistance to tariff increases. In the public hearings on the tariff 
increases, people who represented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and groups 
that were against tariff increases were often outnumbered by representatives of unserved 
communities that had been programmed for connection in the business plan justifying the 
tariff increase. 
 
                                                 
4 One recent study found no conclusive evidence of a change in consumer prices as a result of private sector 
participation in the water sector, highlighting “the economic and political difficulties to align prices with 
costs in a large number of developing countries” (see Gassner Katharina, Alexander Popov and Nataliya 
Pushak 2007. An Empirical Assessment of Private Sector Participation in Electricity and Water 




While privatization of essential services is itself politically problematic, it becomes more 
difficult to sustain when the private operators are remiss in their functions. This may 
mean that the effective water tariff may increase without any improvement in its quality, 
which may lead to significant political opposition resulting in the eventual cancellation of 
such projects. This is especially clear from the case study of privatization of Dar-es-
Salaam Water in Tanzania that I have looked at in Chapter 1 of my dissertation.    
 
Moving from analysis of failure of private infrastructure projects, Chapter 2 of my 
dissertation analyzes success of such projects. These projects perform functions that have 
traditionally been performed by the public sector. The primary reason for politicians to let 
go of direct control on infrastructure services is the resource crunch facing governments. 
Therefore, it is essential to examine whether PPP projects provide net benefits to 
government or they merely move liabilities to the future.  Studies show that the average 
value for money to the government from public-private partnership (PPP) projects in UK 
was 17 percent as compared to 9 percent in Australia. However, no such analysis of value 
for money from PPP projects has been done for developing countries. I look at the PPP 
experience of India, which is among the first five developing countries with regard to the 
size of the PPP portfolio, to help make up for the dearth of such studies for developing 
countries as well as facilitate evaluation of PPPs on an objective basis.  
 




Across the world, many governments, faced with limited funds but growing demand for 
infrastructure services such as airports, roads, power, and telecommunications networks, 
have begun to engage the private sector to invest in and build large infrastructure 
projects. Typically, these PPPs involve the private sector agreeing to build a project and 
then recouping its investment by running the infrastructure project for a fixed number of 
years, thus benefitting from user charges or availability based payments from the 
government.  
 
PPPs seem to work against political incentives. There is a much larger scope of 
corruption in cost-plus contracts implemented by the public sector and therefore self-
seeking politicians would not want a change to fixed-price PPP contracts in project 
procurement and maintenance. Since cost-plus contracts often deliver other political 
benefits such as new high wage jobs, giving suppliers incentives for cost minimization in 
PPP contracts only gets them to reduce these political benefits5. We also know that in 
politically important projects, there is under-estimation of costs so as to include the 
project in the budget, owing to which time and cost-overruns are a regular occurrence in 
conventional procurement. In PPPs, in principle, this is not the case6, and so this is one 
more reason why such projects work against political incentives.  
 
                                                 
5 Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1994. Politicians and Firms. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Vol. 109, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 995-1025. 
 
6 With the private sector implementing projects, any given project is less likely to be selected only for 





However, it also needs to be kept in mind that governments do not have the resources to 
implement infrastructure projects on a scale required to meet the huge unmet 
infrastructure needs of the population, which might lead to a political backlash. So, 
forward thinking politicians choose PPPs to deliver infrastructure services, as they could 
be good for politics as well, since they are not expected to cause an immediate drain on 
fiscal resources. 
 
In support of the PPP arrangements, it has been opined that as long as it is possible to 
write enforceable contracts with the private sector, it should not matter whether the 
government is actually providing the services or contracting it out to the private sector. 
Similarly, if there is concern about usurious private monopoly players exploiting users, 
impartial regulation can help deliver the goods and services without undue duress to the 
consumers while at the same time providing reasonable returns to the private sector. In 
other words, with perfect contracting and regulation, in principle, there may not be much 
of a concern with private provision of infrastructure services7.  
 
However, short-term incentives for political gain may adversely impact PPP 
implementation. Politicians may be tempted to offer excessive incentives to the private 
sector through reckless revenue guarantees and agree for pass through in tariffs on 
account of foreign exchange depreciation or domestic inflation to make the PPP project 
virtually risk-free to the private sector. However, in many cases, governments may find 
such projects too expensive to service when they become operational. For example, 
                                                 
7 Shleifer, Andrei. 1998. State versus Private Ownership. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, 




excessive incentives to the private sector was the primary reason for the cancellation of 
the Dabhol Power Project in India. Since there is a gestation period of a few years in most 
infrastructure projects, the government at the helm may change by the time the project 
becomes operational. Thus, there may be an incentive for incumbent governments to 
indulge in reckless contracting with the private sector and show huge returns on paper 
without bearing the responsibility of seeing these projects come to fruition. Thus, in 
practice, there are many instances of improper contracts, frequent renegotiations, and 
regulatory capture by the private sector, raising apprehensions about returns to the 
government from private participation in infrastructure.      
  
In light of the above concerns, I have analyzed a sample of PPP projects in India to find 
whether such projects actually represent value for money to the government. My finding 
is that PPP projects in India provide substantial net benefits to the government in the base 
case scenario, which are augmented further if we factor in low risk of cost overruns and 
smaller time overruns vis-à-vis the public sector.  
 
Outcomes of privatization   
 
Reform measures like privatization of public assets have drastic distributional 
consequences - it undoubtedly hurts some people who have a strong interest in the status 
quo. Losers include some employees of the public sector companies who have got used to 
receiving their pay without working and some politicians and bureaucrats who have been 
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using these public sector companies for bestowing patronage to favored constituencies8. 
When the times are good, the power of the vested interests tends to be strong as well9. 
Crises often raise the cost of maintaining the status quo, while also imposing a sense of 
urgency for reforms as they serve to increase awareness about inefficiencies, including 
that of public sector enterprises. These factors weaken the resistance of the coalitions 
supporting the status quo10. Therefore, it is only to be expected that difficult policy 
measures like divestment of public assets are launched in periods of grave crisis, as in 
India in 1991 when inflation was above 15 percent per annum and the foreign exchange 
reserves were dangerously low.   
 
Divestment is the form of privatization where it is most clear to see that the losers are 
concentrated and most able to organize a halt to reforms. The gainers from privatization 
are diffused across the population: general public who would see that their tax 
contributions are no longer being wasted on inefficient State Owned Enterprises, which is 
expected to have an impact on the price level in the medium term. However, “modest 
average real price declines thrill economists, but not voters.”11 So, for sustaining these 
                                                 
8 It has been widely documented that State-owned enterprises are an important source of political rent for 
elected politicians, who can interfere in the operating activity of the company in order to cater to specific 
interest groups (for example, see Bortolotti, Bernardo and Paolo Pinotti. 2003. The Political Economy of 
Privatization). 
 
9 As Rodrik (1994) observes, resistance to reform can generally be expected to increase with the “political 
cost-benefit ratio” – the relationship between a reform’s redistributive impact and the efficiency gains it 
yields. Thus, the greater the degree of redistribution implied by a reform, the harder it will be to realize, 
other things being equal. 
 
10 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2010. Making Reform Happen: Lessons from 
OECD countries 
 
11 Nellis John. 2006.  Back to the Future for African Infrastructure? Why State-Ownership is no more 




reforms, their benefits have to be broadly shared, making them inclusive. Governments 
try to do this by making the important constituencies of employees and retail investors 
'stakeholders' in reforms even if that means losing some revenue12.  
 
Employees are an especially important constituency to cultivate given that privatization, 
whether partial or full, is often associated with job losses. Since politicians have 
considered the public sector enterprises as instrumentalities for bestowing patronage on 
favored constituencies, the public sector companies are generally overmanned13. So, 
privatization is associated with job losses either before the act of privatization when the 
government tries to rid the company of surplus labor to realize a higher price, or after 
privatization when the new management tries employment attrition and retrenchment to 
improve productivity and profitability. In order to manage the opposition to privatization 
from trade unions and employees, often a certain percentage of the shares of companies 
undergoing privatization are reserved for the employees who are sold these shares at a 
discount to the prevailing price thus providing them an opportunity to make a capital gain 
immediately after allotment.  
 
Related to the employment issue is the choice between alternative methods of 
privatization: asset sales and share issue privatization14. Worldwide experience shows 
                                                 
12 Graham, Carol. 1998. Private Markets for Public Goods: Raising the Stakes in Economic Reform. 
Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 
 
13 Most public enterprises are encouraged by politicians seeking votes to employ too many people (see, for 
example, Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1994. Politicians and Firms. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Vol. 109, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 995-1025). 
 
14 Asset sale refer to the sale of a SOE to an existing private company or a small group of investors while 
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that for smaller loss-making companies, asset sales represent a more popular method of 
privatization15. However, asset sales are, by definition, privatization with a change in 
management control, and so the new privatized management has more incentives and 
authority to right-size the company. This may be the factor responsible for unanimous job 
losses in assets sales especially in the short-run as in the Indian case study (see Chapter 
3). In an environment where formal jobs, both public and private, are extremely scarce as 
in India, where less than 3 percent of the population have formal employment, the 
impending job losses associated with asset sales may be an important factor making this 
variant of privatization excessively politically sensitive and, therefore, not favored by the 
government.  
 
The extensive use of share issue privatization in India is also related to potential political 
benefits such as the opportunity to develop support for privatization by preferentially 
allocating shares to domestic voters16 at discounted prices. Successful applicants would 
then have a financial interest in re-electing a market-oriented government17. This is 
consistent with the finding in a large number of studies that privatizing governments 
frequently are willing to sacrifice revenue in order to achieve broader political and 
                                                                                                                                                 
share issue privatization refers to sale of an SOE to retail and institutional investors. This is akin to sale in 
private and public capital markets respectively. While there is change in management control of the SOE in 
the case of asset sale, the control remains with the government in the case of share issue privatization. 
  
15 Megginson, William L, Robert C. Nash, Jeffry M. Netter, and Annette B Poulsen. 2004.  The Choice of 
Private versus Public Capital Markets: Evidence from Privatizations. The Journal of Finance, Vol. LIX, 
no. 6, December 2004.  
 
16 Jones, Steven L, William L. Megginson, Robert C. Nash, Jeffry M. Netter. 1999. Share issue 
privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends. Journal of Financial Economics 53 (1999) 
217-253 
 
17 Bortolotti, Bernardo and Paolo Pinotti. 2003. The Political Economy of Privatization 
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economic objectives. Through these measures, in effect, employees and retail investors 
become new 'stakeholders' in reforms helping to make privatization irreversible. 
 
As Carol Graham says “… to sustain reforms, governments usually must build political 
coalitions to support the measures…public enterprise workers in Bolivia, for instance – in 
which potential opponents of reform were transformed into supporters via stakeholders 
strategies… One interpretation of East Asia’s economic success over several decades is 
that institutions that spread the benefits of growth policies widely made the reversibility 
of policies costly…”18  
 
'Stakeholder' strategies may not always be efficient from a pure economics perspective, 
but they may be necessary to make privatization politically feasible. Societies might 
reasonably choose an initially less efficiency-oriented approach, in order to diminish 
long-run risks to efficiency and growth that initial resulting inequities would cause 
(through job losses, for example). It must also be remembered that there is relatively 
robust evidence on the inverse relationship between initial income inequality and 
subsequent economic growth19. Widespread ownership of shares (as is the case in share 
issue privatization) is much more equitable than asset sales. So, share issue privatization 
may produce better results in terms of growth rate over the longer term. Minimizing the 
                                                 
18 Graham, Carol. 1998. Private Markets for Public Goods: Raising the Stakes in Economic Reform. 
Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 
 
19 For example, see Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. 1994. The Political Economy of Growth: A 




sometimes real unfairness produced by privatization20, and––just as important––
countering the misperception that privatization is always and inevitably unfair, is 
worthwhile, so as to preserve the political possibility of deepening and extending 
reforms. In the end, a democratic government cannot implement reforms when masses of 
people are in the streets attacking that reform21.   
 
                                                 
20 For example, see Birdsall Nancy and John Nellis. 2003. Winners and Losers: Assessing the 
Distributional Impact of Privatization. World Development. Vol. 31 (1), 1617-1633. They opine that "At 
the heart of popular criticism is a perception that privatization is fundamentally unfair in both concept and 
implementation: it is seen as harming the poor, the disenfranchised, the workers, and even the middle class; 
throwing people out of good jobs and into poor ones or unemployment; raising prices for essential services; 
giving away national treasures – and all this to the benefit of the local elite, agile or corrupt politicians, and 
foreign corporations and investors. The complaint is that, even if privatization contributes to improved 
efficiency and financial performance (some question this as well), it has a negative effect on the 
distribution of wealth, income and political power.” 
 
21 Birdsall Nancy and John Nellis. 2003. Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impact of 




Chapter 1: What drives private sector exit from infrastructure? An analysis of the 
cancellation of private infrastructure projects22 
 
1: Introduction: The boom, bust and slow recovery of private participation in 
infrastructure 
 
Fiscal crunch is a persistent reality with governments around the world. As the fiscal 
deficit becomes large, governments look for ways to divest responsibilities that do not 
belong to the core function of governance. It is in this context that privatization of non-
core activities including provision of infrastructure has received a fillip across the world. 
Figure 1 shows the remarkable growth in private participation in infrastructure 
(traditionally a public sector stronghold) in developing countries where it added up to 
about $1.1 trillion over the period 1990-2006.  
 
 
As the figure above shows, the trend in privatization is not uniform across years. While 
private investment in infrastructure projects was close to $20 billion in 1990, it quickly 
                                                 





increased during the first part of that decade to peak at $140 billion in 1997.  This rapid 
rise was driven by investment in power projects in East Asia and privatization of 
telecommunications and electricity utilities in Latin America.  The decline in investment 
began with the East Asian Financial Crisis, which impacted many of the independent 
power projects that had commenced.  Further crises in Russia and Latin America led to a 
decline almost as swift as the earlier increase.  After a period with no real discernible 
trends, investment levels have increased again over the last 3 years of the period 
considered (1990-2006). If we look at the composition of the increase, however, we see 
that the entire increase has come from transport and telecommunication sectors.  The 
level of investment commitments in these two sectors increased from $34.3 billion to 
$92.8 billion in the period 2003-06, accounting for almost the entire increase across all 
infrastructure sectors during this period. Energy and water sectors, in particular, have 
seen little consistent rebound since the beginning of the millennium. 
 
The downswing in investment that occurred in the late 1990s was also accompanied by a 
number of high profile cancellations of private infrastructure projects. Klein and Roger 
(1994), observing the surge in private infrastructure in the early 1990s, noted that there 
had been substantial private investments in infrastructure in the 19th and early 20th 
century but that, outside of the USA, most of this had ultimately been nationalized.  In 
particular, they highlighted the fact that much of infrastructure was still a “natural 
monopoly” and that a sustainable regulatory approach that allowed investors satisfactory 
returns whilst being perceived to charge fair prices to consumers would be challenging.  
This might over time lead to the exit of the private sector, as a cycle of political pressure 
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on prices leads to less investment, lower quality of services, further downward pressure 
on prices and so on until the government steps in to take over the assets and service 
responsibility.  Some of these apprehensions proved credible as private investment in 
infrastructure showed a downward trend from 1997 to 2003.  Subsequently, it stabilized 
and began to increase, but has not done so in energy and water sectors, where the political 
economy problems associated with pricing are often the greatest.   
 
Trends in investments are only one side of the story.  It is also important to look at 
whether the private sector is staying on in the projects that it commences: increased levels 
of exit could indicate concerns about the policy framework, institutional quality, 
contractual arrangements and risk-sharing, and the impact these factors have on project 
viability. These project cancellations produce an excessively negative sentiment for 
privatization, totally disproportionate to the actual number of projects cancelled, besides 
putting an onerous burden on already stretched public finances, a result dramatically 
opposite to what was originally envisaged. So, we begin our study of sustainable 
privatization by looking at the factors that lead to the exit of private sector from 
infrastructure. 
 
In this chapter we look at trends in the cancellation of infrastructure projects with private 
participation, and look for factors that might explain why some projects are more likely 
than others to see cancellation.  Section 2 presents information on trends in cancellation 
and variations by sector and region. Section 3 presents a review of the literature on 
private sector exit from infrastructure projects in developing countries.  Section 4 
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describes the data used in the analysis, which has been sourced from various publications 
of the World Bank. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables and 
includes preliminary analysis. Section 6 explains the model, presents the model results 
and examines robustness of the main explanatory variables. Section 7 investigates what 
happens to cancelled projects. While most of the projects devolve on the government, 
about 15% of them are able to find private partners again. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2: Trends in the Cancellation of Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation 
 
The World Bank-PPIAF Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database shows that 
out of the 3,835 private infrastructure projects in developing countries that are covered in 
the Database, 179 projects were canceled23 up to 2006, representing 4.7% of all projects 
by number, and 4.9% by investment commitments.  On average, projects were cancelled 
5.3 years after the date of financial closure. 
 
The percentage of total projects that have been cancelled (by year) is shown in Figure 2.  
There is an upward trend in the percentage of projects that have been cancelled although 
there have been variations in the proportion over time. There is a spike in project 
cancellations in 1997 and 2001-03, both periods corresponding to macroeconomic crises 
in major regions of the world. It is significant to note that although the rate of 
cancellation is low (under 5%), it has doubled over the last 5 years of the period 
considered. 
                                                 
23 We use the same definition of project cancellation that has been used in the World Bank-PPIAF Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Database. As per the Database, a project is deemed to have been canceled if 
one or more of the following events occur before the end of the contract period: the private company 
physically abandons the project (such as withdrawing all staff); the private company ceases operation or 
halts construction for 15% or more of the contract's expected life following the revocation of the license or 
repudiation of the contract by the relevant authority; the private company sells or transfers its economic 




Figure 2: Percentage of canceled infrastructure projects with private participation in 


































Source: World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project database 
 
There are important inter-sectoral variations in project cancellation as Table 1 shows. 
Water and sewerage sector projects are most prone to cancellation, both in terms of 
numbers and investment commitments. About 9% of water projects were cancelled by 
2006, representing over a quarter of investment commitments in the sector.  This was 
significantly higher than the overall rate of cancellation for private infrastructure projects 
in the Database.  Distribution and bulk water treatment plants had similar rates of private 
sector exit. 
 
Transport sector projects have a cancellation rate similar to the overall average, although 
the ports sub-sector has a low rate of cancellation. On the other hand, energy and telecom 
projects are least likely to be cancelled (in terms of number of projects and investment 
commitments respectively).  Breaking down the energy sector into sub-sectors, we find 
that distribution or integrated utility power projects has a relatively high incidence of 
 18
 
cancellation – at over 6%, almost double the average for all energy projects.  On the other 
hand, natural gas projects see very low rates of private sector exit.   
 
Table 1: Canceled infrastructure projects with private participation in developing 
countries, by sector, 1990-2006 
 
Projects reaching financial 
closure  
Projects Canceled  













Energy 1498 322.8 49 11.5 3.3** 3.6** 
Electricity generation 836 190.2 23 9.7  2.8** 5.1 
Electricity distribution 
or integrated utilities 
328 76.8 20 1.2  6.1 1.6** 
Natural gas 334 55.8 6 0.6  1.8** 1.1** 
Telecommunications 797 537.3 35 11.2  4.4 2.1** 
Transport 994 180.2 47 15.3  4.7 8.5** 
Airports 118 25.6 4 0.9  3.4 3.6 
Ports 298 33.1 4 0.5  1.3** 1.5** 
Railways 101 36.8 7 4.6  6.9 12.6* 
Roads 477 84.7 32 9.3  6.7 10.9** 
Water and sewerage 546 53.9 48 15.3  8.8** 28.4** 
Treatment plant 257 11.0 23 1.1  8.9* 9.8** 
Utility 289 42.9 25 14.2  8.7* 33.1** 
Total 3835 1094.2 179 53.4  4.7 4.9 
a in current US $ billion 
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
* indicates a significant difference at the 5% level of statistical significance 
Source: World Bank, PPI Project database 
 
Analyzing rates of cancellation by region (Table 2), we find that Sub-Saharan Africa sees 
the highest rate of cancellation by number of projects, at 8.2% being significantly more 
than for all low- and middle-income countries. The regional picture is a little different if 
we look at cancellation in terms of share of investment commitments, since the average 
size of projects is small in Sub-Saharan Africa. The East Asia and Pacific region saw the 
highest percentage of investment commitments being cancelled. South Asia, and Europe 
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and Central Asia, on the other hand, see the lowest rates of cancellation of projects (by 
number of projects and investment commitments respectively). 
Table 2: Canceled infrastructure projects with private participation in developing 
countries, by region, 1990-2006 
 
Projects reaching financial 
closure  
Projects Canceled  













East Asia and Pacific  1,096 253.5 63 26.3  5.7  10.4** 
Europe and Central Asia 745 206.9 20 4.0  2.7** 1.9** 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
1,212 435.5 58 16.7  
4.8  3.8  
Middle East and North 
Africa 
111 52.3 6 1.0  
5.4  2.0* 
South Asia 331 93.5 4 3.2  1.2**  3.4  
Sub-Saharan Africa 340 50.6 28 1.5  8.2*  3.0* 
Total 3,835 1,092.3 179 52.7 4.7  4.8  
a in current US $ billion 
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
* indicates a significant difference at the 5% level of statistical significance 
Note: Total may not correspond to Table 1 owing to multi-sectoral projects being classified in more than 
one sector. 
Source: World Bank, PPI Project database 
 
3: Literature Review 
 
There has been relatively little systematic analysis of the cancellation of private 
infrastructure projects reflecting the still low overall cancellation rate.  However, some 
light on relevant factors is shed by case studies of individual projects or groups of 
projects as well as the more general literature on foreign investment and privatization. 
 
Vernon24 (1971) developed the concept of the “obsolescing bargain” to explain why 
foreign investments are vulnerable to expropriation.  He argued that foreign investment is 
                                                 




welcomed initially for bringing in new technologies, good management and capital.  Over 
time, as the recipient country becomes wealthier, and develops better technological and 
management skills, its perception of the bargain changes in nature.  Outright 
expropriation may occur, though creeping expropriation, for example, through emphasis 
on local inputs, might be more likely. 
 
Gomez-Ibanez25 (1999) reviewed the nationalization of electric utilities in Latin America 
over the period 1943-1979, covering the experience of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela.  Foreign private investment in their power sectors was often 
associated with the development of complex engineering projects (hydroelectric plants) 
or the large scale of infrastructure finance required. As cities were initially electrified, the 
investment was welcomed.  However, as access to electricity became more widespread, 
concerns about natural monopolies, and perceptions that investors, in particular foreign 
investors, were making excess profits grew and began to impact the regulatory 
framework.  He notes that the few electric utilities not nationalized by the 1980s were 
domestically-owned: all foreign-owned utilities had been nationalized. He also notes that 
where the sector was regulated at the national level – in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico – 
the regulatory frameworks were more robust but still not strong enough to provide 
continued incentives for investment.  In Argentina, utilities were regulated by 
municipalities, and were the first to be nationalized.  Finally, he notes the impact of 
macroeconomic factors on the financial viability of utilities, given the reluctance of 
regulators to allow prices to rise to reflect inflation and currency devaluation.   
                                                 
25 Gomez-Ibanez, Jose A. 1999. The Future of Private Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nationalization of 
Electric Utilities in Latin America, 1943–1979. Discussion Paper, Taubman Center for State and Local 




Klein and Roger (1994) note the above factors but also emphasize the role of other 
factors in nationalization of private infrastructure, including reactions against 
colonialism, and private investment associated with this in newly-independent countries, 
and the belief prevalent in the middle of the last century that the public sector could 
provide these services more efficiently.  They highlight the fact that many infrastructure 
services would continue to be provided in monopoly settings.  The regulatory systems 
designed to oversee these would be vulnerable to political pressure and this could lead to 
a vicious cycle of a decline in profitability, under-investment and deterioration in services 
and ultimately nationalization.  They highlighted the role that competition for the market 
could play in reducing demands for this type of regulation, as well as the possible role of 
repeated competitive bidding of natural monopoly concessions. 
 
Some of the regulatory issues in privatization of infrastructure are illustrated in the figure 
below. 
 


















Many infrastructure firms operate in monopoly markets. Natural monopolies are 
characterized by a downward sloping marginal cost curve. The socially optimal price is at 
Ppc, where P=MC. While the monopolist would want to set the price at the level of Pm, 
where MC=MR, the regulator would want to set the price near Ppc or at the most where 
P=AC thus allowing a fair return to the monopolist provider of infrastructure services. 
These regulatory concerns may eventually lead to the exit of the private sector from 
infrastructure as has been outlined above.  
 
Case studies of the Mexican toll road program of the 1990s, a number of Indonesian 
power projects, and water projects in Argentina (see Annex 1, Case Studies 1-3) show 
that macro-economic shocks have played an important role in project cancellation. The 
macro-economic crises reduced the demand for services from these projects and 
increased the cost of financing, as foreign currency loans were extensively used. Private 
infrastructure projects in Mexico were adversely affected by the 1994 Mexican peso 
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crisis, in Indonesia by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and in Argentina by the large 
devaluation of the peso in 200226. Macro-economic shocks were not the only issue with 
some of these projects. In the case of the Mexican toll roads, Ruster27 (1997) noted that 
indirect guarantees by the government to the investors and lenders funding the projects 
might have reduced the extent of due diligence on these projects.  However, it should also 
be noted that the majority of projects that were subjected to macro-economic shocks in 
the early years of their existence, survived and were not cancelled. This implies that 
macro-economic shocks led to private sector exit from mainly the weaker projects. 
 
Water and sewerage projects and power distribution projects that were cancelled 
encountered problems as a result of opposition to needed price increases, difficulties in 
getting consumers to pay for services (usually in a situation where they were accustomed 
to getting the service free) and opposition to the principle of the private sector providing 
these ‘essential’ services. Most countries see power and, in particular, water being priced 
well below costs (Figure 4).  Though the private sector may bring in efficiencies, in terms 
of reducing costs and increasing revenue collections, the initial gap between revenues and 
costs may be too large to bridge with politically feasible price increases. Gassner et al28 
(2007) in their review of the performance of public and private utilities highlight scarce 
                                                 
26World Bank. Private Participation in Infrastructure Project database (http://ppi.worldbank.org); and 
Gómez-Ibáñez, José A. 2007. Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons from Recent 
Experience. Paper presented to the Commission on Growth and Development at the Workshop on Global 
Trends and Challenges. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization  
 
27 Ruster Jeff. 1997. A Retrospective on the Mexican Toll Road Program (1989-94). World Bank Viewpoint 
Note No.125. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
28 Gassner Katharina, Alexander Popov and Nataliya Pushak. 2007. An Empirical Assessment of Private 
Sector Participation in Electricity and Water Distribution in Developing and Transition Countries. 




evidence of increase in consumer prices for private water utilities, while Andres et al29 
(2006) find limited evidence of an increase in prices of privatized electricity distribution 
companies. The overall scant evidence of a price rise subsequent to private participation 
suggests difficulties in increasing prices in these politically sensitive sectors. 




























Source: World Bank. 1994. World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development 
 
The low level of user charges and difficulties in raising prices in the water sector explain 
the mismatch between internal rate of return and cost of equity in the sector (Table 3). 
This may, in turn, explain the increased project cancellation (Table 1) and the flat private 
investment commitments in the water sector in recent years (Figure 1).  
Table 3: Cost of Equity and Average Profitability, by Sector, of Privatized and Concessioned Firms 
in Latin America and Caribbean Countries, 1990-2000 (%) 
Sector Initial cost of equitya IRR (adjusted)b 
Telecommunications 14.0 26.8 
Water and sanitation 15.5 13.0 
Energy 14.0 14.0 
a Cost of equity is evaluated at the time of the transaction. 
b Internal Rate of Return (IRR) has been adjusted to incorporate management fees. 
                                                 
29 Andres Luis, Vivien Foster, and José Luis Guasch. 2006. The Impact of Privatization on the Performance 
of the Infrastructure Sector: The Case of Electricity Distribution in Latin American Countries. World Bank 




Source: Foster and others (2003). As quoted in Guasch, J. Luis. 2004. Granting and renegotiating 
infrastructure concessions: Doing it Right. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
In a number of cases, unrealistic project design and poor management of the reform 
process can be cited for project cancellation: for example, the Tucuman and Cochabamba 
water concessions required steep tariff increases to pay for large investment programs 
(Harris, 2003). Some projects that run into difficulty are cancelled even when feasible 
adjustments might be made because one or more of the parties involved are not strongly 
Id to the project’s success.  Gomez-Ibanez30 (2007) discusses the failure of the Energie du 
Mali concession where, although the contract stipulated price increases, substitution of 
generation sources (from thermal to hydro) would have reduced generation costs and 
called for a price increase lower than originally required.  The author attributes its 
cancellation to a lack of commitment by either side to the long term future of the 
contract.  
 
Changes in regulatory frameworks are also important and in some cases there is direct 
evidence of a change in the regulatory framework leading to private sector exit.  In 2002, 
the Chinese State Council decided that guaranteed rates of return were illegal for private 
utility contracts31.  As a result, eight water and sewerage projects were sold back to the 
public sector. Similarly, two water and sewerage contracts in the province of Maldonado 
(Uruguay) reverted to the public sector (to Obras Sanitarias del Estado, OSE) after 2004 
when the electorate approved a constitutional amendment that made access to water a 
                                                 
30 Gómez-Ibáñez, José A. 2007. Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons from Recent 
Experience. Paper presented to the Commission on Growth and Development at the Workshop on Global 
Trends and Challenges. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization  
 
31 Browder Greg J et al. 2007. Improving the Performance of China’s Urban Water Utilities. Washington 




fundamental human right32 and transferred water and sanitation services to the public 
sector.  
  
Even with good regulatory and policy frameworks we might expect to see some 
cancellation of projects (see Annex 1, Case Study 4 for an example of cancellation in a 
difficult sector due to poor performance of the private partner).  Commercial discipline 
and the “freedom to fail” are a major part of the rationale for turning to the private sector.  
Indeed, the telecommunications sector projects in the PPI Database that were cancelled, 
were for the most part, cellular services in markets with alternative suppliers, with the 
projects often failing for commercial reasons.  
 
Work done on the renegotiation of projects can also shed some light on factors that might 
lead to private sector exit.  Guasch33 (2004) analyzed more than a thousand concessions 
in Latin America and Caribbean region granted over the period 1985-2000.  He found 
high rates of renegotiation, in particular, for transport and water and sanitation projects 
(Table 4) and that the average duration between concession award and renegotiation was 
2.2 years.  Guasch also found that macro-economic shocks increased the likelihood of 
renegotiation; regulatory arrangements were significant, with the existence of an 
independent regulatory agency reducing the probability of renegotiation; certain political 
factors (political cycles, corruption, and opportunism) lead to increased likelihood of 
                                                 
32 Santos Carlos and Alberto Villareal. 2006. Uruguay: Direct democracy in defence of the right to water. 
(http://www.tni.org/books/wateruruguayrev.pdf ) 
 
33 Guasch, J. Luis. 2004. Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions: Doing it Right. 




renegotiations; and aspects of concession design, including risk allocation, and the award 
criteria also had an impact on renegotiations. 
 
Table 4 shows that projects are far more likely to be renegotiated than cancelled. It could 
be argued that we would perhaps see higher rates of cancellation but for the willingness 
of public sector authorities to renegotiate contracts and adjust key project terms. 
Governments are often keen to avoid cancellations because of concerns about service 
continuity, possible payments to be made in the event of termination, as well as the 
negative publicity surrounding these perceived failures. A corollary to this could be that 
unsuccessful renegotiation may lead to project cancellation as is evident from the case 
studies [Aguas Argentinas case (Annex 1, Case Study 3) and Dar-es-Salaam Water and 
Sewerage (Annex 1, Case Study 4), specifically]. This hypothesis is supported by 
information in Table 4 showing much lower incidence of project cancellation as 
compared to project renegotiation, and the evidence that the average duration between 
concession award and renegotiation is 2.2 years (Guasch, 2004), while the average 
duration between financial closure and project cancellation is 5.3 years (authors’ 
calculations).       
 
Table 4: Incidence of Renegotiation and Cancellationa, total and by sector 
 Total Total (excluding 
telecom) 




30 41.5** 9.7** 54.7** 74.4** 
Percentage of 
Canceled projects 
4.7 4.7 3.3** 4.7 8.8** 
a Incidence of renegotiation is only for the Latin America and Caribbean Region for the period 1985-2000 
while incidence of cancellation is for all regions for the period 1990-2006. 
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
Source: Guasch, J. Luis. 2004. Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions: Doing it Right. 




Infrastructure contracts are complex and therefore essentially incomplete because of 
bounded rationality34. Because of transaction specific infrastructure investments, there is 
high asset specificity35, which makes the contracting parties bilaterally dependent. These 
factors are conducive to frequent renegotiations as documented by Guasch. As 
Williamson says, all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete, on which account 
the parties will be confronted with the need to adapt to unanticipated disturbances that 
arise by reason of gaps, errors, and omissions in the original contract36. If human actors 
are not only confronted with needs to adapt to the unforeseen (by reason of bounded 
rationality) but are also given to strategic behavior (by reason of opportunism), then 
costly contractual breakdowns (demands for renegotiation, refusals of cooperation, and 
possibly private sector exit) may occur. 
  
Broader reviews of privatization shed light on some of the other factors that lead to 
cancellation.  Examining the experience of privatization in the 1980s, Kikeri et al (1992) 
found that “in low-income settings…privatization is more difficult to launch, and the 
chances of a negative outcome are greater.”37 This could imply a higher project 
cancellation rate in low-income countries. However, the ‘obsolescing bargain’ construct 
recounted earlier may imply a higher project cancellation rate for middle-income 
                                                 
34 Williamson (1985) stresses bounded rationality and, especially, the inability of individuals to foresee all 
future contingencies and how they will be met. 
 
35 A transaction has high levels of asset specificity if, as the trade develops, one side or the other or both 
becomes more tied to and in the 'power' of the other side (Kreps, David M. 1990. A Course in 
Microeconomic Theory. New Jersey: Princeton University Press) 
 
36 Williamson, Oliver E. 2002. The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract 
(http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/bpp/oew/choicetocontract.pdf) 
 
37 Kikeri Sunita, John Nellis and Mary Shirley. 1992. Privatization: The Lessons of Experience. 




countries as they graduate from low- to middle-income status. 
 
Harris et al38 (2003) have also reviewed the extent of the cancellation of private 
infrastructure projects. They found that over the period 1990-2001, only 48 private 
infrastructure projects had been cancelled, 1.9% of projects by number, and representing 
3.2% of total investment commitments. About one third of the cancellations pertained to 
the Mexican toll road program.  By number of projects, transport projects had the highest 
rate of cancellation.  Water and sanitation had the highest volume of investment 
associated with cancelled projects. 
 
Given the above literature review, this chapter fills an important gap in the literature. The 
contribution of this chapter would be to quantitatively model many of the factors that 
have been identified in the literature and assess their contribution to project 
cancellation. This would be useful as the literature is mainly anecdotal and modeling 
the factors would provide insight into the relative importance of these factors for 
project cancellation.     
 
4: Data description 
 
The general literature on foreign investment and privatization and the case studies of 
private infrastructure projects suggest that some factors for project cancellation are 
related to the project characteristics, specifically to its design and contractual structure, 
some deriving from the sector circumstances, and others that are related to the country 
                                                 
38 Harris Clive, John Hodges, Michael Schur, and Padmesh Shukla. 2003. Infrastructure Projects: A 





economic and institutional circumstances. To empirically model the factors that lead to 
PPI project cancellation, we have, therefore, identified three sets of variables, the first 
relating to the project, the second relating to the sector, and the third relating to the 
country in which the project is located. 
 
The project-specific variables include the following: 
 
 The type of project – whether it is a divestiture, concession of an existing facility, 
a greenfield project or a management contract. It could be argued that the level of 
project risk that is borne by the government and the private sector differs by types 
(least for management contract and greater for others), and also the extent to 
which the project is creating new assets as in a greenfield project compared to 
others. 
 The level of government granting the contract – federal, state/provincial or local. 
Locally granted projects may be more fragile as compared to federally granted 
projects. 
 The presence of foreign sponsors in a project - a foreign-sponsored project may 
be more risky. 
 The size of the project, a large project being more visible to the public eye. 
 The occurrence of macroeconomic shocks in early life of projects, which can 
impact their financial equilibrium. 
 




 The sector and sub-sector to which the project belongs: although there is 
variation, in general, the telecommunications sector is highly commercialized 
(and competitive in most countries) – as are parts of the transport sector, whereas 
power and water see the most under-pricing of services relative to costs (Figure 3) 
– particularly water – and also see the most concerns about the presence of the 
private sector in provision of these “essential” services. 
 
The country-level factors include the following: 
 
 The region in which the country is located. 
 The country per-capita income level, which might proxy ability-to-pay of 
consumers and therefore the ability of the sector and project to sustain adequate 
cash flows. It might also proxy domestic capability and the play of ‘obsolescing 
bargain’. 
 The quality of governance and political and regulatory institutions in the country. 
 
The data for the empirical analysis of cancellation of projects has been sourced from 
various publications of the World Bank as described below:  
 Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database (2008)39 
                                                 
39 The Private Participation in Infrastructure Project Database (http://ppi.worldbank.org) is a joint product 
of the World Bank’s Infrastructure Economics and Finance Department and the Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). Its purpose is to identify and disseminate information on private 
participation in infrastructure projects in low- and middle-income countries. To be included in the 
Database, a project must have reached financial closure, serve the public as opposed to being a captive 
facility, and be owned or managed by the private sector. 
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 World Development Indicators (2008) 
 World Bank Country Classification data (2007) 
 World Governance Indicators (2007) 
 
The PPI database is the primary source of data for the paper. It contains information on 
more than 3,800 infrastructure projects in low- and middle-income countries dating from 
1984 to 2006. However, PPI data for the 1984 to 1989 period is sparse as very few 
countries had embraced the concept, and even in those that had, there were very few PPI 
projects (77 PPI projects in all). Therefore, the analysis is restricted to the period 1990 to 
2006 and my sample consists of 3,835 PPI projects. The PPI projects have been divided 
into four primary sectors in the Database: energy, telecommunications, transportation, 
and water and sewerage. The database contains over 30 variables per project, including 
country where the project is located, financial closure year, infrastructure services 
provided, contractual arrangements (type of private participation), technology, capacity, 
contract duration, private sponsors, and development bank support. Thus, the Database 
includes a range of relevant information that captures the key issues highlighted in the 
literature review. 
 
However, the reliance on the Database for project specific information does limit our 
analysis.  For example, while we could model whether a foreign sponsor was present in a 
particular project using the information in the database, it was not possible to model other 
ownership factors like shares held by the general public. It could be hypothesized that 
widespread public ownership could play a role in preventing project cancellation. 
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However, we could not test this hypothesis because of data limitations. Similarly, while 
the level-of-government-granting-contract could be a significant explanatory variable, 
there is such data on only 1,395 projects as compared to the total 3,835 projects in the 
Database. In the same way, details on the regulatory structure that the project faces (like 
price-cap, rate of return, or some hybrid of these basic types) could not be accessed from 
the Database. The literature on private infrastructure projects bears out that risk allocation 
to the private sector is higher under price-cap regulation vis-à-vis rate of return 
regulation, which should have an impact on project cancellation.    
 
The nominal exchange rate data has been sourced from the World Development 
Indicators, 2008. This has been used for modeling the macro-shock variable. The 
occurrence of a project-specific macro-economic shock has been defined as a 20% or 
more depreciation in the official exchange rate of a country from the previous year, 
during the first five years since a project’s financial closure. The logic is that a project 
generally becomes more financially stable with time as demand and debt service stabilize 
but is especially vulnerable in earlier years. Macro-shocks happening before financial 
closure would presumably be incorporated in investors’ expectations and the terms of the 
contract or concession agreement.  
 
The World Bank Country Classification data40 has been used for classifying countries 
among income groups. While almost all the countries in the database are low or middle 
income countries, four of them (Barbados, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Trinidad and 
                                                 





Tobago) have been classified as high income countries by the World Bank recently. 
Therefore, PPI projects located in these four countries have not been analyzed.  
 
Finally, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 200741 has been used to model 
institutional quality. This data source covers 212 countries and territories (out of which 
143 countries are included in the PPI Database and we analyze projects in 139 of them 
excluding the recently re-classified high income countries in the Database) and measures 
the following six dimensions of governance over the period 1996 and 2006: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators are based 
on a number of specific and disaggregated variables measuring various dimensions of 
governance, and are taken from 33 data sources provided by 30 different organizations. 
The data reflect the views on governance of individuals, NGO experts, firms, and public 
and private sector institutions worldwide. 
 
The scores for institutional variables vary between -2.5 and +2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better outcomes. As explained by the authors, the six institutional 
variables consist of the following:  
 
                                                 
41 Kaufmann Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4280. 




 Voice and Accountability measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 
 Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures perceptions that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
 Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. 
 Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
 Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 Control of Corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.   
 
Table 5 summarizes the main variables used in the models and provides our expectations, 
based on the literature review, of their impact on the likelihood of project cancellation. 
 
Table 5: PPI Project Cancellation: Variable Description 
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Binary variable that takes a value of unity in case of 




PPI contract type 
 
Dummy variables for the following four PPI contract 
types: management and lease contracts, concessions, 
greenfield projects, and divestitures.  
Uncertain: Projects 
involving higher risk 
(e.g. concessions) 
might be more likely to 




Dummy variables for federal, local and state/ 
provincial governments 
Positive for local 
government 
Presence of  
foreign sponsor 
Dummy variable taking a value of unity if any of the 
project sponsors belongs to a country different from 
the host country, zero otherwise. 
Positive 
Natural log of 
Investment  
 






Dummy variable taking a value of unity if the project 
suffers a macroeconomic shock in the first five years 
of its existence. Macroeconomic shock has been 
taken to mean a depreciation of 20% or more in the 






Dummy variables for the following four sectors to 
which a PPI project belongs: energy, telecom, 
transportation, and water and sewerage.  
Positive for water and 
sewerage projects 
Country-specific 
Region Dummy variables for the following regions in which 
the country which hosts the project is located: East 
Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
Positive for Sub-
Saharan Africa  
Country income 
group 
Dummy variables for low income, lower middle 
income, and upper middle income countries.  
Uncertain as it could  
influence both project 






The following six dimensions of governance have 
been used: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption. These variables serve as 
proxies for institutional quality.  
Negative for all 
 
5: Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 6 to 8 show descriptive statistics for the key project-level variables, sector-level 
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variables and country-level variables respectively. Table 6 shows that some contractual 
types like divestitures, projects with foreign sponsors, and projects that experience 
macro-economic shocks in the first five years of their existence, are likely to be 
significant determinants of project cancellation. Similarly, Table 7 shows that the energy, 
and water and sewerage sectors are likely to be significant explanatory variables. Finally, 
Table 8 shows that some regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, upper middle income 
countries, and some institutional variables like rule of law, and control of corruption are 
significantly associated with project cancellation. 
 
It is noteworthy that all the institutional variables have a lower mean (higher negative 
value) for cancelled projects (Table 8). This implies that countries with 'bad' institutions 
have higher rate of PPI project cancellation. This is intuitive and suggests that countries 
with poor rule of law, sub-par control of corruption, low ‘voice and accountability’, and 
depressed government effectiveness (to name a few institutional dimensions) have higher 
than average project cancellation rate. 
 
 Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for project-level variables 














0.279     
(0.450)          
0.221     
(0.415)        
1.81 3835 




0.117      
(0.323)          
0.203     
(0.402)        
-2.81** 3835 




0.520     
(0.501)          
0.519     
(0.500)        
0.02 3835 





0.084     
(0.278)          
0.056     







0.218    
(0.414)          
0.182     






0.173     
(0.379)          
0.138 




















0.045    
(0.207)          
0.040     
(0.196)        
0.30 3835a 




0.669     
(0.472)          
0.565     
(0.496)        
2.49* 3136 





3.457     
(3.461)    
3.148     






0.503     
(0.501)          
0.350     
(0.477)        
4.18** 3835 
 Standard deviations are in parentheses  
a Though the Database has information about level-of-government-awarding-contract on only 1395 out of 
the 3835 projects, we include 'zeroes' for missing information on all the ‘levels’ in order not to constrict the 
dataset.  
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
* indicates a significant difference at the 5% level of statistical significance 
Source: World Bank, PPI database; World Development Indicators, 2008  
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for sector-level variables 

























0.208     








0.259     







0.268    
(0.444)          
0.136     
(0.343)        
4.95** 3835 
 Standard deviations are in parentheses  
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
Source: World Bank, PPI database  
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for country-level variables 














0.352    
(0.479)          
0.282     
(0.450)        
2.01* 3835 




0.112     
(0.316) 
0.198     







0.324     
(0.469)          
0.316     
(0.465)        
0.24 3835 
Region (Middle East 
& North Africa) 
0.029 
(0.168) 
0.034     
(0.180)          
0.029     
(0.167)        
0.37 3835 
Region (South Asia) 0.086 
(0.281) 
0.022     
(0.148)          
0.089     



















0.156   
(0.364)          
0.085     






0.174     
(0.380)          
0.170     






0.472     
(0.501)         
0.399     






0.343    
(0.476)          
0.427     




















































-0.348     
(0.505) 
-0.441    
(0.435)       
-0.343     





















Standard deviations are in parentheses  
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
* indicates a significant difference at the 5% level of statistical significance 
Source: World Bank, PPI database; World Bank Country Classification data, 2007; World Governance 
Indicators, 2007. 
 
6: The Model and Results 
 
We use the Linear Probability Model (LPM) and the Probit Model to model the variables 
shown in Table 5. We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate LPM and Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to estimate the Probit Model42.  
                                                 
42 The most important shortcoming of the Linear Probability Model is that we can get predicted 
probabilities of less than zero or greater than one (an impossibility) by using certain combinations of values 
for the independent variables. In addition, the LPM assumes constant marginal effects for the independent 
variables. These shortcomings are addressed by using a Probit Model which restricts the probability of 





The basic model is specified below: 
Pi = α + X1i β1 + X2i β2 + X3i β3 + X4i β4 + X5i β5 + β6x6i+ β7x7i + β8y1i + β9y2i +εi 
where Pi is the i
th project with values 1 or 0 (1 if cancelled),  










1i = dummy (1 or 0) for 
energy, x21i , = dummy (1 or 0) for telecom, x
3
1i = dummy (1 or 0) for transport, x
4
1i 
= dummy (1 or 0) for water and sewerage (telecom is the excluded sector). 
 










2i = dummy (1 or 0) for 
management and lease contracts, x22i, = dummy (1 or 0) for concessions, x
3
2i  = 
dummy (1 or 0) for greenfield projects, x
4
2i = dummy (1 or 0) for divestitures 
(divestiture is the excluded contract type). 
 














3i = dummy (1 or 0) for 
East Asia and Pacific, x23i = dummy (1 or 0) for Europe and Central Asia, x
3
3i = 
dummy (1 or 0) for Latin America and Caribbean, x
4
3i = dummy (1 or 0) for 
Middle East and North Africa, x53i = dummy (1 or 0) for South Asia, x
6
3i = dummy 
(1 or 0) for Sub-Saharan Africa (South Asia is the excluded region). 
 









dummy (1 or 0) for federal government granted contract, x
2
4i  = dummy (1 or 0) for 
local government granted contract, x34i = dummy (1 or 0) for state/ provincial 













5i = dummy (1 or 0) 
for low income group, x25i, = dummy (1 or 0) for lower middle income group, x
3
5i = 
dummy (1 or 0) for upper middle income group (upper middle income group is the 
excluded country income group). 
 
x6i  is a dummy variable (1 or 0) identifying foreign sponsorship of the project. 
 
x7i  is a dummy variable (1 or 0) identifying macro-economic shock experience of 
the project. 
 
y1i  is the natural log of investment commitment for the project.  
 
y2i  is control of corruption score for the country in which the project is located. 
 
εi  is the error term, which is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed (iid). 
 
Total investment commitment is a proxy for project size and has been used in the log 
form to address the issue of vast range of values for investment commitments. A number 
of variations of institutional variables were tried. The six proxies for institutional quality 
were tried individually, as a group, as well as an overall measure of institutional quality 
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by using the mean of the six proxies for a country. The year of financial closure was also 
interacted with the average institutional score of the host country for that year. The 
control of corruption variable had the highest t-statistics in these variations. Further, as 
may be expected, the six proxies for institutional quality have a high degree of correlation 
(see Annex 2, Appendix Table 2). The correlation between the overall measure of 
institutional quality and the average control of corruption in a country was found to be 
0.94. Finally, Kaufmann et al state that ‘changes in our estimates of governance in most 
countries are relatively small even over the nine-year period…”43 Given the high degree 
of correlation between average institutional score and average control of corruption score, 
we control for institutional quality using the average (1996-2006) of the control of 
corruption score for a country. Using the average control of corruption score for a 
country is also justified because a prospective private partner bases his decision to invest 
in a project in a particular country on the basis of its past institutional performance and 
future prospects and not on the basis of a single year’s control of corruption score for that 
country.     
 
The correlation matrix for all the variables used in the models is shown in Annex 2, 
Appendix Table 1. Very few variables have a correlation higher than |0.5|. The variables 
with a correlation coefficient higher than |0.5| were checked for multicollinearity44 by 
dropping the variables (one at a time) and examining the impact on the sign and statistical 
                                                 
43 Kaufmann Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4280. 
Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
44 In general, multicollinearity can lead to high standard errors for the coefficients of the correlated 
variables and a corresponding lack of significance in those coefficients, even though the coefficients will be 
unbiased. One suggested means to analyze the impact of multicollinearity is to re-estimate the regression, 
leaving out each of the correlated variables in turn. 
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significance of the variables of interest. Since there was no significant change in the sign 
or statistical significance of the variables of interest by following this procedure, it can be 
assumed that the model does not suffer from any major problem related to 
multicollinearity. 
 
Table 9 presents regression results with the binary dependent variable (project 
cancellation=1, otherwise 0). It has 2 result columns - column (1) shows the results of the 
Linear Probability Model while column (2) shows the results of the Probit Model with 
marginal effects.  
 
Table 9: Model results with binary dependent variable: Model (1) is a Linear Probability 
Model. Model (2) is a Probit with marginal effects.   
 (1) (2)a 
Dependent Variable: Project Status = 1 if Canceled, 0 otherwise 
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Log of Total Investment 


















Observations 3027 3027 
R-squared/ Pseudo R2 0.03 0.07 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Robust t and z statistics in parentheses for Model (1) and (2) 
respectively 
a dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
The most interesting, statistically significant and robust explanatory variables are water 
and sewerage sector, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, presence of foreign sponsor, 
project-specific macroeconomic shock experience, and project size (natural log of total 
investment commitment). Projects in water and sewerage sector are more likely to be 
cancelled than in any other sector, ceteris paribus.  The results of the LPM [Model (1)] 
indicate that, everything else being constant, the probability of cancellation for projects in 
the sector is 0.07 higher (or 7 percentage points higher) than a telecom project (the 
excluded sector). There are likely two reasons for this. The water sector sees very low 
levels of cost recovery (Figure 3): projects that envisage large price increases to support 
new investments may in practice be hard to sustain.  In addition, the very involvement of 
the private sector in the provision of an essential service such as water can be politically 
contentious (see Annex 1, Case Study 4 of Dar-es-Salaam Water and Sewerage Services 
as an example). Our model results suggest (not reported) that project cancellation is 
strongly associated with water and sewerage projects, regardless of the regression 




Controlling for other variables, we also see that projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are more 
likely to be cancelled.  Model (1) shows that a project located in Sub-Saharan Africa 
region has a higher probability of project cancellation by 0.055 (or 5.5 percentage points), 
ceteris paribus, relative to a project in South Asia, which is the excluded region and also 
sees the lowest levels of cancellation. This might reflect weaknesses in institutional 
capacity that is not being picked up in the control of corruption variable, related to project 
design, or to the ability to effectively deal with problems in project construction and 
operation.   
 
The presence of a foreign sponsor and occurrence of a macroeconomic shock increase the 
probability of project cancellation, ceteris paribus. Projects with foreign sponsors (99 of 
the 148 canceled projects have foreign sponsors; on the balance 31 canceled projects, we 
do not have project sponsorship information) might possibly be arousing greater political 
sensitivities and foreign sponsors may also feel more able to abandon a project in 
difficulty than local sponsors would. In fact, Wells has found that domestic firms are 
likely to be more accommodative in renegotiations rather than foreign multinational firms 
and thus projects with domestic sponsors may be less likely to be cancelled even after a 
macroeconomic crisis as in the case of some of the Indonesian power projects after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis45. In addition, a foreign sponsored project may be more 
likely to use foreign financing which, since revenues from infrastructure projects are 
often earned in local currency, can lead to mismatches and stresses within projects.   
 
                                                 
45 Wells, Louis T and Rafiq Ahmed. 2007. Making Foreign Investment Safe: Property Rights and National 




The high statistical significance of the positive coefficient on the macro-economic shock 
variable accords with the importance attached to this variable in the literature on project 
cancellation (see Annex 1, Case Study 1-3 as examples). Where foreign financing is used, 
required revenues for servicing foreign debt increase as the domestic currency loses 
value, but experience indicates it is very difficult to increase user charges for 
infrastructure services at the time of a macroeconomic shock.  The real effect of a macro-
shock also reduces demand for infrastructure services causing further financial stress to 
the affected project. 
 
Larger projects also have a higher likelihood of cancellation [Model (1)], ceteris paribus, 
as they may be more visible to the public eye (see Annex 1, Case Study 5 on the Dabhol 
power project). In addition, they may impose a larger fiscal burden if risk allocation is 
not appropriate. Our results indicate that if a project is 10% larger, its probability of 
cancellation increases by 3 percentage points, everything else being constant.  
 
An interesting model result is the negative and statistically significant coefficient on local 
government-granted projects. This implies that, everything else being constant, a local 
government-granted project would have a lower probability of project cancellation by 3.2 
percentage points than that granted by the state/ provincial level. The probability of 
project cancellation seems to be much lower than even the federally granted projects. 
This runs counter to established thinking: for example, Gomez-Ibanez (2007) opines that 
“Not only do sub-national governments have fewer skills and resources to resolve 
disputes but they also have a narrower perspective than the national governments, and 
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thus may be less concerned about the chilling effect that a serious dispute may have on 
investments in other sectors or parts of the country.”46 Similarly, it has been stated that 
“local governments, with their own agendas, break agreements or insist on renegotiations 
with less concern than central governments over the consequences for the national 
investment climate47.”  
 
On the contrary, our results indicate lower probability of cancellation for locally granted 
projects possibly reflecting local buy-in and political support for such projects. However, 
our results are subject to the caveat that the Database has information on the level-of-
government-that-grants-contracts for only 1,395 projects out of a total of 3,835 projects. 
Instead of restricting the number of observations to this level, we checked for the 
robustness of our main explanatory variables without this category (level-of-government-
that-grants-contracts) and found the results to be robust. 
 
There might also be an omitted variable in our analysis related to selection of projects 
granted by local government as compared to the federal government. Possible empirical 
solution may involve the use of an instrumental variable (IV) that explains why a project 
is granted at the local level or at the federal level, but isn’t related to why a project might 
be cancelled. To describe this approach, we start with the multiple regression model: 
 
                                                 
46 Gómez-Ibáñez, José A. 2007. Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons from Recent 
Experience. Paper presented to the Commission on Growth and Development at the Workshop on Global 
Trends and Challenges. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization  
 
47 Wells, Louis T and Rafiq Ahmed. 2007. Making Foreign Investment Safe: Property Rights and National 




y = βo + β1x1 + β2x2 + … + u1 
 
where we think that x1 and u1 are correlated: Cov(x1, u1) ≠ 0. 
 
In order to obtain consistent estimators of βo, β1, β2 … when x1 and u1 are correlated, we 
need some additional information. The information comes by way of a new variable 
(Instrumental Variable) that satisfies certain properties: IV should be uncorrelated with u1 
and it should be partially correlated with x148.   
 
One possible IV may be the presence of sovereign guarantees for a project (through 
which a federal government institution insures all parties against their risk and in turn 
gains some influence on the project) in that a federally-granted infrastructure project may 
be more likely to have sovereign guarantees compared to a locally-granted government 
project. While it can be argued that a project with sovereign guarantees is likely to be 
more robust and thus less likely to be cancelled, if the contractual structure is 
fundamentally flawed and there is little due diligence by the various actors, the presence 
of sovereign guarantees may not prevent project cancellation. This happened in the case 
of the only cancelled power generation project in India (the Dabhol Power Project), 
which had sovereign guarantees that were not able to prevent its cancellation. Broadly, it 
can be said that sovereign guarantees are related to the level-of-government-that-grants-
contracts, but isn't related to why a project might be cancelled. After introducing the IV 
in the multiple regression equation, we solve and interpret it in the usual way. 
                                                 






The control of corruption variable has a negative coefficient (though not statistically 
significant), indicating that countries which have low levels of corruption (higher control 
of corruption) have a lower likelihood of their private infrastructure projects being 
cancelled, ceteris paribus.  
 
The probit correctly classifies over 95% of the dependent variable observations. The 
model is statistically significant in terms of the F-statistic (not reported). Though, the r-
squared is admittedly low, the high degree of consistency between our results and those 
found by other researchers (subjectively) when exploring the determinants of project 
cancellation across regions and time as outlined in the literature review provides 
validation for our results.  
 
The estimates from the LPM [Model (1) in Table 9] and the Probit [Model (2) in Table 9] 
tell a consistent story: the sign, size, and significance of the coefficient on independent 
variables of interest are a close match.   
 
Robustness check 1: Sign, size, and significance of the main explanatory variables 
across sub-samples 
 
The variables of interest vis-à-vis project cancellation that emerge from our model are: 
water and sewerage sector, Sub-Saharan Africa region, presence of foreign sponsor, 
macroeconomic shock, local government granted projects, and project size (log of 
investment commitment). Though institutional quality as measured by control of 




We find that cancellation is most strongly associated with project-specific 
macroeconomic shocks, and water and sewerage projects, regardless of the regression 
specification, i.e., regardless of what other variables are controlled for (results not 
reported). This corroborates the importance of these two explanatory variables as evident 
from the sign, size and significance of their coefficients in our basic model (Table 9, 
Model 1). To examine the robustness of these explanatory variables further, we compare 
their coefficient across sub-samples49 separately. As Table 10 below shows, the 
coefficient on project-specific macroeconomic shock is positive and significant across all 
sub-samples50.  
 


































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 845 2182 1895 1132 1701 1326 
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
* indicates a significant difference at the 5% level of statistical significance 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
 
As discussed earlier, macroeconomic shocks may cause unbearable financial stress on 
private infrastructure projects because of, inter-alia, high commercial and foreign 
exchange risk. Thus, we see that when commercial risk is transferred in its entirety to the 
                                                 
49 This is a widely used method to check robustness of variables (See, for example, Megginson William L., 
Robert C. Nash, and Matthias van Randenborgh. 1994. The Financial and Operating Performance of 
Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance. Vol. 49(2), 403-452). 
 




private sector (as happens generally in the transport sector as opposed to energy and 
water sectors where private infrastructure companies enter into long-term purchase 
contracts with public sector companies who have to bear the risk of collecting user 
charges from the ultimate consumers), the likelihood of project cancellation increases 
considerably (column 2 and 3 of Table 10), ceteris paribus.  
 
The East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region experienced a major macroeconomic shock in 
1997, while the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region experiences such shocks 
periodically [e.g., Mexico (1994) and Argentina (2002)]. Table 10 shows that the 
probability of project cancellation due to macroeconomic shocks is higher in these two 
regions as compared to other regions, ceteris paribus.  
 
Reasons for the higher size and significance of the coefficient on macroeconomic shock 
variable for foreign sponsored projects, as already stated, may be that the presence of a 
foreign sponsor arouses greater political sensitivities and foreign sponsors may also feel 
more able to abandon a project in difficulty than local sponsors would. In addition, 
foreign funding of projects is more likely when a project has foreign sponsors. This 
would mean that such projects have higher foreign exchange risk and this is reflected in 
the size and significance of the coefficient on macroeconomic shock in the case of 
projects with foreign sponsors, where it is higher, as compared to projects which do not 
have foreign sponsors.  
  
Similar analysis for water and sewerage sector variable shows that its coefficient is 
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positive and significant across sub-samples in most instances51 (see Table 11).   
   






























Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1701 1326 1032 1995 1001 2026 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  
** indicates a significant difference at the 1% level of statistical significance 
* indicates a significant difference at the 5% level of statistical significance 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
      
However, as in the case of project specific macro-economic shocks, it is important to 
discuss the difference in the size and significance of the coefficient on the water and 
sewerage variable across sub-samples. Thus, if it is a foreign- sponsored water and 
sewerage project, the probability of cancellation for the project is significantly higher 
than when it is not a foreign-sponsored project, ceteris paribus. The reason could be 
related to the low user-charges in the sector vis-à-vis costs (Figure 3). Efforts to increase 
these charges to cost-recovering levels may be viewed as a sell-out to foreigners, if it is a 
foreign-sponsored water and sewerage project, thus increasing the risk of project 
cancellation.   
 
Latin America and Caribbean region has had the most extensive experience in 
privatization of infrastructure (Table 2). It has also seen a number of high profile 
cancellations in the water and sewerage sector [e.g., Tucuman (Argentina, 1997), 
Cochabamba (Bolivia, 2000), La Paz (Bolivia, 2005), and Aguas Argentinas (Argentina, 
                                                 




2006)]. In an environment of dwindling support for privatization52, the high profile 
cancellations have created an excessively negative sentiment for private participation in 
the sector, increasing the probability of cancellation of the water and sewerage projects in 
the region as compared to other regions, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 11 also shows that the probability of cancellation of projects in the sector is much 
higher for projects that experience a macroeconomic shock in the early years of their 
existence as compared to projects that do not experience such a shock, ceteris paribus. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the sector even in non-macroshock cases 
reflects the high and significant coefficient on the water and sewerage variable for the 
entire sample of PPP projects (Table 9).  
 
Robustness check 2: Expanding the analysis to include “distressed” projects as a 
dependent variable 
 
As a second way of looking at the robustness of the results, we changed the dependent 
variable to include cancelled and distressed projects. Distressed projects are those where 
either the government or the operator has requested contract termination or are in 
international arbitration, but have not been canceled yet. There are two caveats that need 
to be mentioned when we include distressed projects as a dependent variable: one, there 
is poor information on distressed projects as the arbitration agencies are quite secretive 
about such projects; two, it is likely that many distressed projects end up being cancelled, 
                                                 
52 “Latinobarómetero (2005, p.76), which surveys some 19,000 Latin Americans in 18 countries every year, 
reports that the percentage agreeing strongly or somewhat with the statement that “the privatization of state 
enterprises has been beneficial for the country” fell from 46 percent in 1998, when the question was first 
asked, to 21 percent in 2002, at the height of the Argentine financial crisis, and had recovered to only 31 




but as per the PPI Database, which has been tracking distressed projects since 2003, so 
far only 14% of the distressed projects have been cancelled. The regression results with 
both canceled and distressed projects as the dependent variable are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Model Results with binary dependent variable (including distressed projects on 
the LHS). Model (1) is a Linear Probability Model. Model (2) is a Probit with marginal 
effects.   
 (1) (2)a 
Dependent Variable: Project Status = 1 if Canceled or Distressed, 0 
otherwise 
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Observations 3027 3027 
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R-squared/ Pseudo R2 0.04 0.08 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Robust t and z statistics in parentheses for Model (1) and (2) 
respectively 
a dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
A comparison of the model results between ‘cancelled’ and ‘troubled’ projects (where 
‘troubled’ consists of both ‘cancelled’ or ‘distressed’ projects) as the dependent variable 
proves the robustness of our main result, which is that water and sewerage sector 
projects, Sub-Saharan Africa region projects, projects with foreign sponsors, larger 
projects, and projects that experience macroeconomic shocks in the early years of their 
existence have a significantly higher probability of being cancelled, other things 
remaining constant.     
 
When comparing Tables 9 (Model 1) and 12 (Model 1), an important difference is that 
the institutional variable (control of corruption) has become highly significant while 
preserving its negative coefficient. This highlights the fact that countries with bad 
institutions (less control of corruption) have a higher likelihood of having troubled 
projects. If a country improves its position by 1 unit in terms of control of corruption 
(which translates into a 34% improvement in relative position of the country in a normal 
distribution), the probability of projects being troubled decreases by 0.04 (or 4 percentage 
points), everything else being constant. Given the magnitude of the improvement 
required, this can happen only in the medium-to-long term.  
 
There are also other important differences among the two sets of models. The current 
model shows that greenfield projects have a significantly lower probability of being 
‘troubled’ vis-à-vis divestitures (the excluded type of PPI), ceteris paribus, probably 
 56
 
reflecting the fact that the private sector building a project from scratch has some risk 
mitigation in terms of reduced baggage of public sector culture that a divested project 
may suffer from. In addition, “greenfield projects raise fewer problems than brownfield 
projects because greenfield projects do not involve an incumbent workforce…”53 The 
third major difference between the two sets of models is that projects in Latin America 
and Caribbean region have a significantly higher probability of being ‘troubled’ vis-à-vis 
projects in South Asia (the excluded region), ceteris paribus, reflecting the higher 
incidence of distressed projects in the LAC region (53 out of 56 projects).   
 
Robustness check 3: Duration Models – Including time dimension in analysis  
Until now, we have conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the data without considering 
the time dimension. This analysis was useful as it allowed us to identify the most 
important explanatory variables in project cancellation and estimate the magnitude of 
their impact. We also found that infrastructure PPP projects that are cancelled have an 
average time duration of 5.3 years from financial closure before they are cancelled. 
Clearly, the rate of cancellation of infrastructure projects varies with time (time 
dependence) and so we use duration or failure time analysis to model this behavior.  
The dataset in duration analysis format is described in Table 13 below. 
Table 13: Description of the Dataset in Duration Analysis format 
     -------------- per subject -------------- 
Category  total        mean  min     median        max 
   
no. of subjects* 2421    
                                                 
53 Gómez-Ibáñez, José A. 2007. Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons from Recent 
Experience. Paper presented to the Commission on Growth and Development at the Workshop on Global 




no. of records  2421           1  1          1          1 
 
(first) entry time   0  0          0          0 
(final) exit time   22.8  1         22        108 
 
subjects with gap 0    
time on gap if gap 0    
time at risk  55253     22.8  1         22        108 
 
failures  178      .07  0          0          1 
Note: The number of observations has decreased to 2,421 in duration analysis from earlier 3,835 on 
account of missing data for contract period. 
 
The interesting row in the above table is ‘time at risk’, which shows that the projects 
were at risk of failure for a total of 55,253 years. This is the cumulative number of years 
spanned by the projects in the dataset. The last row reports that there were 178 failures 
(project cancelations) in our dataset (compared to 179 found earlier because of missing 
data). The maximum number of failures per project is one, indicating that we have single-
failure-per-project data, and the minimum number of failures is zero, indicating the 
presence of censored observations. 
   
Figure 5 below shows the hazard estimate54 for infrastructure projects over time. It shows 
that the probability of project cancelation peaks about 5 years from project financial 
closure and decreases thereafter. Thus, it captures the varying hazard ratio over the life of 
infrastructure projects.  
 Figure 5: Hazard estimate for infrastructure projects 
                                                 
54 In duration analysis, the risk ratio is called the hazard ratio. Risk ratio = probability (cancelation)/ 
probability (survival). In effect, it gives the risk of cancelation conditional on survival to time t. The 






















Figure 6 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate55. It indicates the unconditional 
probability that an observation will survive beyond time t.  It shows that only a small 
fraction of projects are cancelled and that cancellation is concentrated in early years of 
the project life. 
Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate     
                                                 
55 The Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator is a non-parametric estimate of the survivor function, which indicates 






















In our earlier analysis (OLS and Probit), we have found that macroeconomic shock is a 
highly significant explanatory variable for project cancelation. We get similar results in 
Figure 7 below which shows the significantly different survival (converse of 
cancellation) estimates of projects that experience a macro-economic shock vis-à-vis that 
do not. 
 
Figure 7: Different survival estimates of projects that experience macro-economic shock vis-
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Finally, we use the semi-parametric Cox model to carry out duration analysis. The 
advantage of the Cox model is that the specific distributional form of the duration times 
is left unspecified. OLS assumes that the duration times (conditional on the independent 
variables) are normally distributed. This assumption is nearly always unrealistic in the 
context of duration data where data often exhibit asymmetry (as in our case).  
 
The Cox model assumes that there is some baseline hazard ratio56, which is affected by a 
set of covariates through increase or decrease in the baseline hazard ratio. Thus, a 
positive coefficient greater than one increases the hazard function (between its bounds of 
0 and 1).  
 
                                                 
56 In duration analysis, as we have already seen, the risk ratio is called the hazard ratio: Risk ratio = 
probability (cancellation)/ probability (survival). In effect, it gives the risk of cancellation conditional on 
survival. The baseline hazard corresponds to the hazard rate when all the covariates are set to 0. 
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Table 14 below shows the Cox model regression output.   
 
Table 14: Model results with Cox regression – exact marginal likelihood model  
 Hazard Ratio 
Primary Sector (Energy) 0.819 
(0.69) 
Primary Sector (Transport) 0.833 
(0.56) 




Type of PPI (Concession) 0.291 
(3.36)** 
Type of PPI (Greenfield) 0.367 
(3.22)** 




Region (East Asia & Pacific) 2.892 
(1.72) 
Region (Europe & Central Asia) 2.012 
(1.00) 








Region (Sub-Saharan Africa) 4.045 
(2.39)* 








Low Income Country 1.154 
(0.32) 
Lower Middle Income Country 1.058 
(0.21) 
Project with Foreign Sponsor 1.745 
(2.91)** 
Log of Total Investment 







Control of Corruption 0.579 
(2.27)* 
Observations 2141 
LR chi2 (17) 88.58 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Z statistics in parentheses 
 
The duration analysis confirms many of our earlier findings (on the basis of LPM and 
probit models):  
 For water sector projects, the hazard ratio increases by 143%, ceteris paribus; 
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 For projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, the hazard ratio increases by 305%, ceteris 
paribus; 
 For projects that are granted by local governments, the hazard ratio is lower by 
51%, ceteris paribus; 
 Projects that experience a macro-economic shock in the first five years of their 
existence and those with foreign sponsors have a higher hazard ratio of 99% and 
75% respectively, other things remaining the same; 
 Higher control of corruption, ceteris paribus, is associated with lower hazard ratio 
of 42%. 
 
However, there are also some important differences from our earlier models: 
 Size of the project has no significant impact on the hazard ratio, other things 
remaining the same;  
 Greenfield projects and concessions have a significantly lower hazard ratio. While 
there is some support for the significantly lower hazard ratio in the case of a 
Greenfield projects57, the result in the case of concession is counter-intuitive and 
is game for future research.   
 
The Cox model is a proportional hazards (PH) model. This assumption implies that 
covariates will have a proportional and constant impact on the hazard ratio that does not 
                                                 
57 For example, Gomez-Ibanez says “greenfield projects raise fewer problems than brownfield projects 
because greenfield projects do not involve an incumbent workforce…” (Gómez-Ibáñez, José A. 2007. 
Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons from Recent Experience. Paper presented to the 
Commission on Growth and Development at the Workshop on Global Trends and Challenges. New Haven, 




vary with time. If this assumption is violated, the estimates would be biased, the standard 
errors would be incorrect, and the inference about the impact of covariates would be 
faulty.  
 
We tested for the PH assumption using Schoenfeld residuals. Schoenfeld residuals can be 
thought of as the observed minus the expected values of the covariates at each failure 
time. If the Schoenfeld residuals exhibit a random pattern at each failure time, then this 
suggests that the covariate effect is not changing with time, i.e., that the PH assumption 
holds. If it is systematic, it suggests that the covariate effect is changing with time. One 
test for PH assumption would be to plot Schoenfeld residuals against time. If the PH 
assumption holds, then the slope of the Schoenfeld residuals should be zero58. We did 
this for all covariates and found the slope of the Schoenfeld residuals to be very near 
zero. This suggests that we can use the Cox model for analyzing the cancelation of 
private infrastructure projects.        
                                                
   
7: What happens to canceled projects? 
Another method of checking robustness of some variables is to see the pattern of re-
privatization after cancellation. It is interesting to note that some of the same factors that 
explain project cancelation (like sector viability) in the first round of privatization seem 
to be playing a part in re-privatization as well.  
 
As already stated, commercial discipline and the “freedom to fail” are often a big part of 
 




the rationale for turning to the private sector, and project cancellations should therefore 
be expected, since some projects or concessionaires will under-perform. However, there 
is a reluctance to shut down a private infrastructure project once it has commenced (often 
manifested in frequent bouts of renegotiations), on account of likely termination 
payments, service disruptions, reputational issues, as well as an incremental budgeting 
mindset. However, if governments will not allow projects to fail, there is a high 
likelihood that they would revert to them following cancellation, often imposing 
substantial financial burden on them59. This outcome is diametrically opposite to what 
was originally envisaged, as the starting point of many PPP projects is the inability of 
governments to provide for the infrastructure needs of their citizenry because of the fiscal 
crunch.  
 
Our survey confirms that after the infrastructure projects are canceled, they are usually 
taken over by the government, thus demonstrating their reluctance to allow them to be 
shut down following cancellation. The lenders are unwilling to take over the canceled 
projects as the project assets do not constitute adequate security for them, and they are 
hardly equipped to run the infrastructure projects. It is the project revenue stream that is 
the main constituent of security for infrastructure projects and the government, by taking 
over the project, tries to harness the project revenues to service the project debt. In many 
cases, governments try to re-bid the project, but without much success. This is because it 
                                                 
59 For example, the government of India has paid a high price for the canceled Dabhol Power Project. The 
total cost of revival of DPC is estimated at Rs.100.38 billion ($2 billion), out of which the ‘acquisition 
price’ was Rs.84.85 billion ($1.7 billion) at which RGPPL acquired the assets from the owners of DPC. The 
price of power in the case of RGPPL, the public sector company that has taken over DPC, is about US 6 
cents per kwh compared to the recently awarded ultra mega power projects, each with a capacity of about 
4000 MW, with the price of power in the range of US 2.38-4.66 cents per kwh. 
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is difficult to get the private sector interested again when experience has demonstrated 
that private operations are not sustainable. 
 
Table 15 shows the fate of projects post- cancelation. The table shows that only 15% of 
the projects are revived with private sector participation. The majority of the projects 
(about 84%, leaving out some projects that have been taken over by workers, or 
abandoned for a variety of reasons) revert to the government following cancellation. The 
full list of projects revived with private sector participation is in Annex 3, Appendix 
Table 3. 
 
Table 15: Project ownership status subsequent to cancellation, by sector, 1990-2007 
 Number of Canceled 
projects 
Number of projects 
revived with private 
sector participation 
Percent of projects 
revived with private 
sector participation 
Energy 49 2 4* 
Telecom 35 10 29** 
Transport 47 10 21 
Water and sewerage 48 5 10 
Total 179 27 15 
* indicates a significant difference at the 10% level of statistical significance 
** indicates a significant difference at the 5% level of statistical significance 
Source: Authors’ tabulation. 
 
The average duration between cancellation and re-privatization for all 27 re-privatized 
projects is 3.4 years. There are important sectoral variations though in that telecom, with 
the highest re-privatization rate, has a low duration of 2.8 years, while energy and 
transport sector projects take 5 and 5.3 years respectively for finding a new private 
partner. What is intriguing is the low duration between cancellation and re-privatization 
for the water sector projects given the low user charges and political sensitivity of the 
sector. However, it must be recognized that the dataset is quite limited for making broad 




Sectoral patterns of re-privatization 
It is significant to note that only 4% of the canceled projects in the energy sector have 
been re-privatized. The size of the project and its sub-sector (whether it is an electricity 
generation or distribution/ integrated project) seems to play a major role in re-
privatization. For example, the two projects that have been re-privatized in the energy 
sector (Puerto Plata Diesel Power Plant and SIIF Accra60) were small greenfield 
generation projects of 69 MW and 32 MW respectively. None of the 20 canceled 
electricity distribution/ integrated projects were re-privatized. Canceled large generation 
projects like Dabhol Power Project (Annex 1, Case Study 5) as well as electricity 
distribution projects remain in government hands possibly because of their high public 
visibility, which may prevent their re-privatization. However, it is also true that not all 
canceled small generation projects are re-privatized (for example, Houjie Power Plant – 
66 MW – in China), which implies that there are other factors at work too.  
 
Energy sector projects are also prone to international litigation, which may also be a 
factor in their low rate of re-privatization. The international arbitration awards related to 
the Dieng, Patuha, and Karaha Bodas power projects in Indonesia make the government 
liable to pay over $700 million for an additional capacity of only 60 MW, which would 
definitely have impacted the re-privatization efforts for these projects.  
 
The high fiscal costs associated with cancelled projects are sometimes associated with 
                                                 




inappropriately high level of arbitration awards foisted on developing countries by the 
international tribunals, when the private investors are compensated not only for the costs 
incurred, but also the foregone profits over the expected lifetime of the project. The 
pronouncement of such high awards without taking into account the desperate situation of 
some countries going in for project cancellations [for example, Indonesia (1997) and 
Argentina (2002)] and the flawed original contracts in terms of projected returns 
inconsistent with risk allocation to the private sector, is likely to set up perverse 
incentives for the private investors, when they would be bothered more about the 
arbitration award rather than the success of the projects (by seeking risky investments 
that demonstrate moral hazard issues), and undermine the confidence of the developing 
countries in the international arbitration system. This calls for reforms, of both procedural 
and substantive nature, in the international arbitration system. “Failure to reform the 
system to redress the imbalance between its attention to the legitimate economic and 
social concerns of host countries and those of investors will surely mean a retreat by 
those nations from the system”61.  
 
On the other hand, telecom sector enjoys the highest re-privatization rate mainly because 
of its high sector viability (see Figure 3) compared to power and water sectors. That 
sector viability is important in re-privatizations is also evident from the fact that most re-
privatizations are concentrated in the mobile phone segment as compared to fixed access. 
As an example, although ACG Telesystems (Westel) in Ghana had disputes with the 
regulator as well as the public sector incumbent operator, Ghana Telecom, which 
                                                 
61 Wells, Louis T and Rafiq Ahmed. 2007. Making Foreign Investment Safe: Property Rights and National 




ultimately led to private sector exit in 2005, the company was re-privatized with majority 
stake sold to Celtel in 2007. The sector profile shows that Ghana is one of the most 
attractive markets in Africa with mobile subscribers growing at more than 55% per 
annum and mobile penetration at a still low rate of around 35%, which would have 
played a part in its re-privatization.  
 
The attractiveness of the telecom sector for re-privatization is also evident from the 
repeated re-privatizations [2 projects, Ghana Telecom and Mobile Telecommunications 
Services Limited (Nigeria)] seen in the sector, the only sector where this has happened. 
Thus, in February 2002, Ghana Telecom ended the contract with Telekom Malaysia, 
which had run the company for four years, claiming performance deficiencies, only to 
award a management contract in February 2003 to Telenor Management Partner (TMP) 
of Norway that lasted till December 2006. Subsequently, the government signed the deal 
for sale of 70% shares in Ghana Telecom to Vodafone in July 2008. 
   
Re-privatizations are rare in sectors other than telecom and happen only when there is 
significant “uplift in sector credit quality” and commensurate reduction in risk perception 
among private participants. The case in point is the re-privatization of four toll roads in 
Mexico after a decade of their cancellation. In August 2007, ICA, Mexico’s largest 
construction company, and its partner, Goldman Sachs Infrastructure Partners were 
awarded four toll road concessions [Aguascalientes-Leon Toll Road (104 km), 
Guadalajara-Zapotlanejo Toll Road (26 km), Lagos de Moreno-Zapotlanejo Toll Road 
(119 km), and Maravatio-Zapotlanejo Toll Road (309 km)] at a bid price of US$ 4 
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billion. The improved credit quality derives from improved bidding parameter (minimum 
public subsidy instead of minimum concession period earlier), better procurement 
process (2-stage bidding process), more transparency, better traffic and revenue 
forecasting, more preparatory work (right of way was secured before the concession was 
bid out), relative macroeconomic stability in Mexico with improving sovereign credit 
rating, and top level political commitment and support. 
  
Many characteristics of the water sector, like severe under-pricing of services, dilapidated 
assets and the need for substantial investments, and high levels of leakage, illegal 
connections, low billing and payment collection efficiency, and the associated political 
sensitivity, make it unattractive for private participation. Once a water project gets 
cancelled, these same factors make its re-privatization difficult as is apparent from the 
case of Dar-es-Salaam Water (see Annex 1, Case Study 4), the lease contract for which 
was signed in 2003, which was cancelled in 2005, and was taken over by a government 
entity, Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Corporation (DAWASCO). The private 
company suffered operating losses of Tanzanian shillings 15.6 billion in its less than two 
years of operations, which was an important reason for project cancellation. Since the 
time DAWASCO has taken over operations, revenue collection is up, costs have been cut, 
and a new billing system has been put in place. However, problems of mismatch between 
collections and costs remain: DAWASCO collects only about Tanzanian shillings 1.6 
billion a month, while its operational costs are 2.2 billion, forcing the government to pick 




International patterns of re-privatization 
Table 16 shows some of the most popular countries for PPPs and how they have fared 
with regard to cancellation and re-privatization. It is significant to note that although 
Mexico accounts for a significant chunk of cancelled projects among developing 
countries (11%), it also accounts for the maximum number of re-privatized projects. On 
the other hand, countries like Argentina, Philippines, and Indonesia have had limited 
success in re-privatization. 
   
Table 16: Privatization, cancellation, and re-privatization of infrastructure projects, by 
country  
Country Number of privatized 
projects 
Projects cancelled Cancelled projects 
revived with PSP 
China 682 36 0 
Brazil 318 5 0 
Russian Federation 294 1 0 
India 233 4 1 
Argentina 190 9 2 
Mexico 160 20 5 
Philippines 83 5 1 
Indonesia 82 11 0 
Note: PSP: Private Sector Participation; Privation and cancellation are for 1990-2006 and re-privatization is 
for 1990-2008. 
 
Project cancellation is interpreted as a negative signal by the government and the private 
sector for the feasibility and success of public-private partnerships. This may have a 
prolonged impact on private participation in infrastructure as the private sector becomes 
apprehensive about government’s commitment and the government loses confidence in 
the robustness and ‘value for money’ of these arrangements. This is clear in the case of 
PPI flows in Argentina, Philippines, and Indonesia shown in Figure 8 below.  In the case 
of these countries, the chances of a canceled project remaining in government hands are 
higher.  
 
The case of Mexico appears to be different, possibly reflecting the high financial 
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implication of cancelled projects and the government’s desire to offload this liability fast. 
After the Mexican financial crisis (1994), the government agreed to pay the sponsor’s 
debt in exchange for the concession rights for many road projects. Specifically, the 
government took on about $7.7 billion in debt, two-thirds owed to Mexican banks and 
one-third to construction companies, which may perhaps explain its keenness for re-
privatization by improving the policy framework as we have seen above. 
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 t
 
Source: World Bank, PPI Project database 
 
China’s case also seems to be different as regulatory change rather than project 
economics seems to have played a part in cancellation. In 2002, the Chinese State 
Council decided that guaranteed rates of return were illegal for private utility contracts, as 
a result of which many private infrastructure projects (including eight in the water sector) 
were sold back to the public sector.  Guaranteed rates of return reduce the commercial 
risk of projects and its withdrawal must have made the projects unattractive to the private 




Sometimes, governments go overboard in providing incentives to private investors to 
tackle a short-term shortage situation. The resultant high cost of such projects makes 
them unaffordable to the public sector leading to their cancellation. In the case of the 
TermoCeara and Macae power projects in Brazil, numerous incentives were provided to 
the private sector to address the severe energy crisis of late 1990s: guaranteed natural gas 
supply for 20 years, low-cost long-term financing for the construction of the projects, 
subsidies for gas transportation costs, and minimum revenue guarantee from the state-
owned oil and gas company, Petrobras. However, following the huge drop in the price of 
power in late 2002 owing to an energy surplus in the country, Petrobras realized that what 
was supposed to be a temporary support (minimum revenue guarantee) to shield private 
partners from volatility in the nascent spot market for power had become a permanent 
subsidy to the project. Petrobras had already paid substantial amounts to the project 
sponsors in the early years of project operation, and found it cheaper to buy off the 
private sponsors for US$137 million (TermoCeara, 2005) and $358 million (Macae, 
2006) respectively. In these situations, re-privatizations may not be a preferred strategy 
for the government. 
 
It has been opined that government takeover of private firms may also be associated with 
increased political interference in their functioning and fund shortage for investment, 
both of which should be impediments to performance. Performance evaluation of the 
nationalized firms has not been attempted in this paper and is game for future research. 
 
From the above analysis, one can draw three major conclusions regarding the post-
 73
 
cancellation status of PPP projects:  
 A vast majority of the cancelled projects devolve on the government. Though 
public-private-partnerships are designed to be a mechanism by which 
governments are able to divest infrastructure provisioning responsibilities to the 
private sector, governments may not be able to do so in perpetuity and continue 
with service provision after the exit of the private sector.  
 Only a small percentage of canceled projects are revived through private sector 
participation. More viable sectors like telecom may support more re-privatization 
as compared to difficult sectors like water.  
 Many of the same factors that explain project cancelation in infrastructure sectors 
(like sector viability) seem to be playing a part in re-privatization as well.  
 
8: Conclusion  
 
Project cancellation rates, though rising, are still low. Although ownership may change 
hands, for the most part, the private sector is staying in private infrastructure projects.  
Although the above empirical analysis confirms the significance of factors identified in 
project cancellation literature and case studies, it is also the case that the impact of these 
factors is relatively small. The overall rate of project cancellation is less than 5%. 
Macroeconomic shocks, the most significant explanatory variable, increase the 
probability of cancellation by only about 4 percentage points.  This reflects reality: many 
projects in countries which suffered crises in the 1990s and early part of the current 
century, for example, were not cancelled.  Those that were cancelled were probably the 
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least robust, or possibly, particularly politically contentious. 
 
The 2008-09 financial crisis, however, may accelerate project delays and cancellation as 
many countries, including Argentina, Hungary and Pakistan, find themselves buffeted 
with worsening macroeconomic imbalances, large current account deficits, equity market 
declines, difficulties in access to credit for companies, elevated risk perception and the 
impact of these factors on interest rate spreads, investment, inflation, and exchange rate, 
and as a result, shrinking growth rates and demand. The impact of this deterioration in the 
economic environment may not be apparent immediately as governments and private 
sector enter into renegotiations to save these projects.  
 
One recent feature of the private infrastructure markets in low and middle income 
countries has been the increased role of domestic investors – seen in countries such as 
India, Mexico and Brazil62.  This will likely make projects more robust to cancellation by 
reducing concerns about the presence and role of foreign investors profiting from 
supplying these essential services. Development of local capital markets that is being 
seen in many developing countries would also play a role in managing foreign exchange 
risk associated with private infrastructure projects through incentivizing usage of 
domestic financing in such projects. In addition, since domestic firms are likely to be 
more accommodative in renegotiations compared to foreign multinational firms, projects 
with domestic sponsors may be less likely to be cancelled even after a macroeconomic 
                                                 
62 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2008. Emerging Market Investors and Operators in Infrastructure: Global 





crisis as in the case of some of the Indonesian power projects after the 1997 East Asian 
Financial Crisis63. 
 
Although trends in cancellation may not be an issue for private infrastructure projects as a 
whole, it is a concern in the water and sewerage sector.  The high probability of 
cancellation and relatively low level of fresh investment in the sector suggests a declining 
role for the private sector in making available this essential service. With cash-strapped 
governments not in a position to satisfy the need, the net result is deteriorating quantity 
and quality of water and sewerage services across much of the developing world. 
 
                                                 
63 Wells, Louis T and Rafiq Ahmed. 2007. Making Foreign Investment Safe: Property Rights and National 
Sovereignty. New York: Oxford University Press 
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Annex 1: Case Studies of Canceled Private Infrastructure Projects 
 
Case Study 1: Mexican Toll Roads - Their Cancellation and Re-privatization 
 
In the period 1989-94, the Government of Mexico undertook an ambitious program of 
constructing about 5,500 kilometers of private greenfield four-lane toll roads. This was crucial for 
the country to be able to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which became operational in 1994, and the economic 
integration of the country. By 1995, 53 contracts had been awarded through competitive bidding 
entailing an investment of about $13 billion. The mode of implementation was build-operate-
transfer (BOT) with the maximum contract period being 30 years. The project companies were 
typically highly leveraged and the debt provided by domestic banks was mainly at floating rate, 
both factors increasing the risk of project companies. 
 
The project companies soon ran into problems. Construction costs were frequently under-
estimated while traffic was over-estimated in the bids (Standard & Poor’s reported that traffic 
forecasts turned out to be too high in more than 75% of cases64). Concessions were often awarded 
before all permits, approvals, and the right-of-way were secured, introducing delays and exposing 
concessionaires to community pressures for route realignment – placing further upward pressure 
on costs. Demand forecasts were also uncertain because, under Mexican laws, a free road had to 
run parallel to a toll road. The high tariffs (owing to short concession periods initially, some as 
short as 30 months, the average term being 10 years) compounded difficulties for the private 
sponsors because of their impact on traffic. The toll rate on the Mexico City-Acapulco road, for 
example, was 30 cents/km, or 10 times more than the New Jersey Turnpike running between 
                                                 




Philadelphia and New York in the US65.  
 
The problems were further exacerbated after the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 when traffic 
declined by 12%, domestic interest rates climbed to more than 100% per annum, and foreign 
currency denominated loans became huge liabilities in terms of domestic currency. As a result, 
the financial equilibrium of project companies deteriorated sharply to border on bankruptcy. 
Consequently, the Mexican government (through its entity, Fideicomiso de Apoyo al Rescate de 
Autopistas Concesionadas, FARAC) took over the 23 most troubled federal highways operated 
by private concessionaires. The typical deal was that the government agreed to pay the sponsor's 
debt in exchange for the concession rights. The equity holders are estimated to have lost about $ 3 
billion66 as government offered them no compensation. Once under government control, tariffs 
on these toll roads were significantly reduced (by 40% for trucks) and commercial users were 
offered substantial tax discounts to promote asset usage and revenue generation.  
 
The re-privatization: Given the resource crunch, the government has re-privatized some of the 
toll roads recently. In August 2007, ICA, Mexico’s largest construction company, and its partner, 
Goldman Sachs Infrastructure Partners were awarded four toll road concessions [Aguascalientes-
Leon Toll Road (104 km), Guadalajara-Zapotlanejo Toll Road (26 km), Lagos de Moreno-
Zapotlanejo Toll Road (119 km), and Maravatio-Zapotlanejo Toll Road – 309 km] totaling 558 
km. The consortium made the highest bid of US$ 4 billion. This re-privatization, called FARAC 
I, entailed awarding 30-year concessions to private partners to build, operate, exploit, conserve, 
and maintain the four toll roads. To collect the proceeds from the toll road concessions, the 
                                                 
65 Project Finance International. 1997. Mexican Toll Roads 
(www.pfie.com/story.asp?sectioncode=&storycode=148797) 
 
66 Ehrhardt David and Timothy Irwin. 2004. Avoiding Customer and Taxpayer Bailouts in Private 
Infrastructure Projects: Policy toward Leverage, Risk Allocation, and Bankruptcy. World Bank Policy 




government has launched an infrastructure fund (El Fondo Nacional de Infrastuctura) that will 
support potential investments in roads and other infrastructure sectors. Some of the money raised 
through re-privatization would also be used for retiring debt raised when these assets were taken 
over by the government in the late 1990s. 
 
The bidding process for privatization is in progress, inter-alia, for the following projects (under 
FARAC II): Guadalajara-Tepic Toll Road (168 km), and Mazatlan-Culiacan Toll Road (181 km). 
The following projects are under preparation for privatization: Cadereyta-Reynosa Toll Road, 
Chamapa-Lecheria Toll Road, Champoton-Campeche Toll Road, Cordoba-Veracruz and La 
Tinaja-Cosoleacaque Toll Roads, and Monterrey-Nuevo Laredo Toll Road.  
 
The re-privatizations after a decade long hiatus “reflects an uplift in sector credit quality”67 and 
commensurate reduction in risk perception among private participants. The improved credit 
quality derives from improved bidding parameter (minimum public subsidy instead of minimum 
concession period earlier), better procurement process (2-stage bidding process constituted by 
technical and financial bids), more transparency, better traffic and revenue forecasting, more 
preparatory work (right of way is secured before concession is bid out), relative macroeconomic 
stability in Mexico with improving sovereign credit rating, and top level political commitment 
and support. The partial risk guarantee from the Inter-American Development Bank for FARAC I, 
which served as a backstop guaranteeing the revenues of the toll road, also made the projects 
marketable. What must also have worked in favor of re-privatizations was that all the four re-
privatized highway projects were existing highways with predictable cash flows and growth 
projections rather than greenfield projects where it is more difficult to make accurate traffic 
forecasts.   
                                                 





Case Study 2: The cancellation of Dieng, Patuha, and Karaha Bodas power projects 
(Indonesia) 
 
The Dieng, Patuha, and Karaha Bodas geothermal power projects were part of the group of 27 
private power projects that Indonesia signed up before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to meet 
rising power demand. These projects were contracted under Presidential Decree 37 (1992) that 
allowed private entities to be involved in power generation, transmission and distribution. Dieng 
Power Project and Patuha Power Co were majority owned by Mid American Energy Holdings 
(formerly CalEnergy) and were to be built under a 30-year Build-Operate-Transfer contract to a 
capacity of 400 MW each. The Karaha Bodas Company (KBC) was a Cayman Islands joint 
venture among Caithness Energy (40.5%) and Florida Power and Light (40.5%), both of the US, 
Tomen Corporation of Japan (9%) and PT Sumarah Daya Sakti of Indonesia (10%) for a 
geothermal project of 400 MW capacity. These foreign sponsored projects entered into 30-year 
take-or-pay Energy Sales Contracts (equivalent to PPA) with the national utility, PT Perusahaan 
Listrik Negara (PLN) with dollar-denominated payments. This implied that PLN was bearing 
most of the commercial and foreign exchange risks of these projects. The first 60 MW of the 
Dieng Project was commissioned in March 1998.   
 
The Asian Financial Crisis (1997) had a much greater impact on Indonesia as compared to its 
neighbors. While the impact of the Crisis on per capita income growth (defined as change from 
average in two years prior to crisis to average in crisis and subsequent year) was (-) 12.7% for 
Indonesia, it was only (-) 0.4% in the case of Thailand68. This was accompanied by a large 
demand contraction and the collapse of the domestic currency in Indonesia, both of which made 
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the dollar denominated debts and payments unaffordable. The severity of the Crisis partly 
explains the differential incidence of project cancellation across countries in East Asia. In 
addition, Indonesia suffered more because of dollar-denomination of tariffs, extensive use of 
foreign currency financing, project award through negotiations rather than competitive bidding 
(which contributed to higher tariffs), and extensive use of comfort letters to reassure private 
investors that the national utility power offtaker would abide by its commitments. The reliance on 
informal procedures like direct negotiations and “letters of comfort” in Indonesia could be 
explained in terms of the weaker institutional environment in the country69.  
 
In late 1997 and early 1998, the Indonesian government issued a series of Presidential Decrees 
under which the three projects were cancelled (owing mainly to their unwillingness to renegotiate 
lower power rates), following which the foreign sponsors called for international arbitration under 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The arbitration panel 
found that PLN had breached the contracts and the duty of good faith and awarded the Dieng and 
Patuha project companies a total of $572 million in damages in 1999. After PLN failed to pay the 
awarded damages, OPIC and Lloyds paid in full Mid American Energy Holdings' claims under its 
political risk insurance policies. Project ownership was transferred from OPIC to Government of 
Indonesia in August 2001 after the Indonesian Ministry of Finance signed an agreement to pay 
US$400 million over 14 years, constituted by US$260 million to OPIC and US$140 million to 
various creditors.  
 
In December 2000, KBC was awarded US$261 million (to cover incurred expenses and lost 
profits) against Pertamina, the state oil and gas company holding property rights to the 
geothermal fields, by Swiss arbiters. By August 2005, the debt and penalties had swelled to 
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US$307 million, at which point Pertamina offered to settle the dispute for US$50 million.  
 
In 2008, the Dieng and Patuha projects are being controlled by the state-owned enterprise, 
GeoDipa. The capacity of the Dieng project remains at 60 MW while the Patuha project remains 
a publicly controlled quasi-greenfield project. The government did not develop the projects 
further after takeover, reflecting its own resource crunch and the high cost of power from 
geothermal projects. In 2008, the KBC project is listed as a publicly-controlled quasi-greenfield 
project, which is still under dispute70. 
 
The quantum of the arbitration awards is held to be inappropriately high by some71. It is also true 
that the Indonesian government has paid (or is liable to pay) over $700 million on account of 
these three projects for an available capacity of only 60 MW, which highlights the deleterious 
impact that project cancellation can have on public finances.  
 
Case Study 3: The cancellation of Aguas Argentinas project (Argentina) 
The state-owned Obras Sanitarias de la Nacion (OSN) was responsible for water and sanitation 
services in Buenos Aires up to 1993, when the Argentinean government awarded a 30 year build-
rehabilitate-operate-transfer concession to Aguas Argentinas (AA). The water services in the 
Argentinean capital had deteriorated over the years because of OSN’s poor performance and little 
maintenance or new investment. There was high unaccounted-for-water loss (45%), inadequate 
metering, billing not based on actual consumption, and poor coverage, especially in low-income 
suburban areas. Politically determined tariffs that failed to recover the cost of providing water left 
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OSN with little surplus for investment. The situation was worse with regard to sewerage.  
In this environment, AA was awarded the concession after a competitive bidding process. AA 
was a consortium with majority shareholding (at end-2003) of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (known 
as Suez after 2001, 39.9%), the other partners being Aguas de Barcelona, Banco de Galicia y 
Buenos Aires, Vivendi Universal (known as Veolia Environment as of May 2003), International 
Finance Corporation, Anglian Water, and Employee Stock Ownership Program. AA promised to 
cut average consumer water tariffs by 26.9% compared to the tariff charged by OSN. Prior to the 
privatization of the Buenos Aires water and sewerage services, the public regulatory agency, Ente 
Tripartito de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS), was created in 1992.  
AA's contract entailed a $4 billion investment in rehabilitation and expansion of water services 
and sanitation over the lifetime of the concession to attain the following targets: increase in water 
supply coverage from 70% in 1993 to 100% in 2023, increase in sewerage coverage from 58% to 
90%, increase in treated wastewater from 4% to 93%, and reduction in unaccounted-for-water 
from 45% to 25%. About half of the required capital investment was to come from loans 
denominated in US dollars.  
Though the project performed well initially and its perceived success made it the template for a 
string of privatizations within Argentina (Santa Fe, Cordoba, and projects in the provinces of 
Mendoza, Buenos Aires, Corrientes, and Formosa) and elsewhere, problems occurred 
intermittently. AA realized that the infrastructure was in a far worse shape than it had expected. 
In addition, local governments and communities pressurized the federal government to extend 
coverage over illegal habitations. To take care of the losses due to new connections, the 
government authorized renegotiation in February 1997, which allowed, inter-alia, for automatic 
revenue protection against currency devaluation and inflation, and “the right to economic 
equilibrium” whereby the company had the right to recover all operating costs and expenses, 
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including financing costs.  The net result was water tariff increase: one study reported that 
between 1993 and 2002, AA asked for and the government allowed successive extraordinary 
revisions in the tariffs, for a total hike of 88% for residential consumers, while overall increase in 
prices (inflation) was only 7% during this period72. All through the life of the concession, there 
were allegations of corruption against government officials associated with the renegotiations73.  
From 2001, the credit ratings of Aguas Argentinas steadily declined to parallel the credit ratings 
of the country. Standard and Poor's cut its ratings for Aguas Argentinas from selective default 
(SD) to payment default (D) in 2002 following AA’s announcement to temporarily postpone the 
repayment of its project finance debt (estimated at $706 million in end-2001) to dedicate its 
financial resources toward ensuring continuation of service while renegotiating its tariff 
agreement with the government. To be sure, Aguas Argentinas was hit hard by the financial crisis 
of 2001-02, when the country defaulted on its substantial foreign debt: Argentinean national 
currency depreciated by about three-fourths in the space of five months, GDP declined by 12%, 
and inflation ballooned to 43%. In an effort to tackle the economic emergency in the country, the 
government first converted the utility rates (including water) from dollar amounts to devalued 
pesos and subsequently froze them in 2002 by decree, regardless of earlier agreements with 
private companies, which led to AA’s default in servicing its own dollar-denominated debt.  
 
Meanwhile, the regulatory agency, ETOSS, in its report on the AA concession in 2003, 
maintained that, while AA had increased tariffs significantly between 1993 and 2002 and enjoyed 
abnormal profits, it had fallen behind in investments: as against the agreed investment of $2.2 
billion in the period, the actual investment was only $1.3 billion, which led to shortfalls in output 
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targets especially in low-income areas. In that year, ETOSS slapped the company with a 55 
million peso fine when it discovered that the company had never implemented its construction 
plans, while it had gone in for water rate hikes in order to finance them74.  
 
Also in 2003, the major shareholders of Aguas Argentinas, Suez, Vivendi and Aguas de 
Barcelona filed a claim against the Argentinean government with an international arbitration 
tribunal (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID), demanding US$ 1 
billion as compensation for losses to its investments in Argentina due to frozen rates and 
devaluation of the currency, which the companies maintained, amounted to expropriation of their 
investment. Later in 2005, as part of its worldwide restructuring whereby it wanted to concentrate 
on Europe and North American markets, Suez, the main sponsor of Aguas Argentinas, proposed 
the cancellation of its concession contract after talks on tariff hikes with Argentinean authorities 
broke down. This would be the most high-profile exit of a foreign-owned utility since Argentina’s 
2002 economic crisis, though not the only one: by the end of 2004, Argentina faced 32 cases and 
claims of over $16 billion in damages. In March 2006, the Argentine central government 
cancelled the concession contract with Aguas Argentinas citing failure to meet contractual 
obligations and to improve the quality of the water it supplied.  
 
A new group called Agua y Saneamiento Ambiental (AYSA), 90% owned by the state and 10% 
by workers, took over the Buenos Aires water system after cancellation of the contract with 
Aguas Argentinas. It was announced in 2006 that AYSA would not increase water rates, and 
would come out with a new five-year plan that continued with current investment projects. Under 
the plan, in 2008, Argentina tendered for a US$634 million potable water plant in the Tigre area 
of Buenos Aires.  
                                                 






Case Study 4: The cancellation of Dar-es-Salaam Water and Sewerage (Tanzania) 
 
The water and sewerage services in Dar es Salaam were in a precarious state at the beginning of 
the current millennium. The system was characterized by high levels of leakage, illegal 
connections, low billing and payment collection efficiency, and low coverage. The low tariffs 
historically charged – before 1991 water was provided free to users – had been insufficient to 
fund maintenance or capital expenditures and had led to a progressive worsening of the system.  
In this environment, the Government of Tanzania (GOT) awarded the provision of water and 
sewerage services in the area served by Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority 
(DAWASA) to City Water Services Ltd (CWS) under a 10 year lease contract in 2003 through 
competitive bidding. The 80-20 joint venture between British Biwater International Limited and 
German HP Gauff Ingenieure GmbH and Co. [Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited, BGT] held a 
51% stake in CWS, the operating company, while 49% stake was held by the local partner, Super 
Doll Trailer Manufacture Co. (T) Limited (STM).  
 
As a prelude to the bidding of the Project, the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority 
(EWURA) was established in 2001 to regulate the provision of water supply and sanitation 
services and audit the private operators in relation to their license. Following a significant delay 
in the appointment of members of the Authority, the Minister in-charge in Tanzania took on the 
role and functions of EWURA in respect of DAWASA and City Water as the “Interim 
Regulator”, by an amendment to the DAWASA Act in May 200375. However, this step created 
problems of credibility for the regulatory authority. 
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City Water began providing services in August 2003 and almost immediately, serious difficulties 
began to be experienced by both City Water and DAWASA in their respective performance of the 
Lease Contract. Overall, although City Water made improvements to the water system in difficult 
operating conditions, and repeatedly emphasized that improvements should not be expected 
overnight, its performance “had been pretty poor”76: cash collections had clearly deteriorated 
substantially over the course of the contract period and were worse than that of DAWASA. 
Following the failure of renegotiations, in May 2005, the Tanzanian government terminated the 
10-year contract with City Water, claiming the company had made less than half the required 
investment (US$4.1 million out of US$8.5 million), had failed to meet revenue collection targets 
or improve water supply services, and attain other performance conditions described in the 
contract. 
 
Post-cancellation, the foreign sponsors of the project filed for arbitration at International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). However, ICSID was of the opinion that “BGT 
had seriously underestimated the amplitude of the task. It had submitted a poorly structured bid, 
and then failed to perform as anticipated …with the consequence that it encountered serious 
financial problems at a very early stage.”77 ICSID dismissed BGT’s claims for damages in the 
final award dated 24 July 200878. 
 
The new entity, the state-owned Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Corporation (DAWASCO), 
took over City Water’s responsibilities in June 2005. Since the time DAWASCO has taken over 
operations, revenue collection is up, costs have been cut, and a new billing system has been put in 
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place. However, problems of mismatch between collections and costs remain and this has forced 
the government to pick up the tab more than once79. 
 
Case Study 5: Dabhol Power Company (India) 
 
India embarked on liberalization of its industrial licensing and investment regime in the early 
1990s as a solution, inter-alia, to persistent infrastructure deficit in the country. Faced with 
limited fiscal resources, private investment was encouraged to bridge the financing gap in 
infrastructure. The Dabhol power project, situated in the Indian state of Maharashtra, was 
initiated in 1992 as a greenfield build-own-operate project following an amendment to the energy 
law [Electricity (Supply) Act (1948)], which allowed private and foreign investment in the power 
sector. The government rapidly cleared eight “fast-track” projects, which were awarded through 
direct negotiation rather than competitive bidding, of which the Dabhol power project was the 
largest.    
 
This was the flagship project of the now bankrupt Enron Corporation, which executed the project 
along with project partners, Bechtel Enterprises (primary contractor for the engineering, 
procurement and construction of the project) and General Electric (supplier of the project’s 
turbines). The project company was known as the Dabhol Power Company (DPC), had a capacity 
of 2,184 MW spread over two phases, and was to be built at a total cost of $2.9 billion. A 20-year 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) was signed in 1993 between DPC and the Maharashtra State 
Electricity Board (MSEB) with guaranteed off-take through a take-or-pay contract. The first 
phase of 740 MW became operational in 1999. 
 
                                                 




The project faced considerable difficulties right from inception and went through protracted 
renegotiations. Many believed that the capital costs of the project were inflated, the foreign 
currency denomination of tariff payments led to high price of power, that there were unresolved 
environmental questions, and that there were human right violations in project implementation. In 
addition, there were allegations of lack of transparency and corruption against the project. 
Because of these problems, the project had become especially politically contentious and 
controversial. These problems became compounded with the naptha price spike of 2000 (naptha 
was the feedstock for the project at that time).  
 
The project was cancelled in 2001 as MSEB stopped drawing the expensive power from the 
project: total tariff payments by MSEB from May 1999 to December 2000 were Rs.29.31 billion, 
at an average of Rs.4.69 per kilowatt hour80 (kwh), compared to the projected tariff of Rs.2.40 per 
kwh and Rs.1.89 per kwh at the time of signing the original PPA and the amended PPA in 1993 
and 1996 respectively claimed by the proponents of DPC81 as also Rs.2.20 per kwh that MSEB 
was paying82 for power sourced from other sources. The tribulations of the project have been 
succinctly put in the following words by The Economist “Since its conception … the Dabhol 
power project in the Indian state of Maharashtra has generated more problems than power.”83  
 
The project remained dormant in the period 2001-04 as the federal government, the state 
government and the MSEB became embroiled in a number of lawsuits and arbitration 
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proceedings in India and abroad filed by the foreign shareholders and lenders of DPC. However, 
as there was excess demand of electricity in the state of Maharashtra (18% overall shortage and 
23% peaking shortage in 2005-0684) and no new generation capacity had come up in the state in 
the period 2000-05, government has tried to revive the project after settling the claims of foreign 
sponsors (Bechtel and GE, which had bought the stake of the bankrupt Enron in 2004), OPIC and 
the offshore lenders. 
Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited (RGPPL), the project special purpose vehicle, has taken 
over the assets of DPC in 2005 to operate the power project. RGPPL is currently owned by Indian 
energy companies (NTPC and GAIL, 28% each), Indian financial institutions (28% divided 
among IDBI Ltd, SBI, ICICI Bank and Canara Bank) and the MSEB Holding Co Ltd (15%).  
RGPPL has signed a 25-year PPA with Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd 
in April 2007 for supply of power from the project using liquefied natural gas as fuel. The price 
of power has been set at Rs.3 per kilowatt hour (kwh)85 (about US 6 cents per kwh).  
The government of India has paid a high price for this project. The total cost of revival of DPC is 
estimated at Rs.100.38 billion ($2 billion), out of which the ‘acquisition price’ was Rs.84.85 
billion ($1.7 billion) at which RGPPL acquired the assets86 from the owners of DPC. The price of 
power in the case of RGPPL, as already stated, is about US 6 cents per kwh compared to the 
recently awarded ultra mega power projects, each with a capacity of about 4000 MW, with the 
price of power in the range of US 2.38-4.66 cents per kwh87. One conclusion that can be drawn is 
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that a cancelled infrastructure PPI project, instead of providing support for strained fiscal 
resources may end up accentuating the fiscal crunch.  
 





Annex 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Correlation among institutional variables 
 avvoice avpol avgov avreg avlaw avcorruption avgovern 
avvoice 1.00       
avpol 0.41 1.00      
avgov 0.51 0.72 1.00     
avreg 0.68 0.64 0.90 1.00    
avlaw 0.61 0.73 0.90 0.82 1.00   
avcorruption 0.61 0.72 0.91 0.86 0.92 1.00  
avgovern 0.75 0.80 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.94 1.00 
Legend:  
 Colored cells represent a correlation greater than |0.5| 
 avvoice: Average score for ‘Voice and Accountability’ for a country over the period 1996-2006  
 avpol: Average score for ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’ for a country over the period 1996-2006 
 avgov: Average score for ‘Government Effectiveness’ for a country over the period 1996-2006 
 avrel: Average score for ‘Regulatory Quality’ for a country over the period 1996-2006 
 avlaw: Average score for ‘Rule of Law’ for a country over the period 1996-2006 
 avcorruption: Average score for ‘Control of Corruption’ for a country over the period 1996-2006 
 avgovern: Average score for all the six governance variables for a country over the period 1996-2006 
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Annex 3: Canceled infrastructure projects that have been revived with private participation 
in developing countries, 1990-2007   
Project Sector Country Year of 
Cancellation 
Year of revival with  
private participation 











Belize 2004 2007 
ACG Telesystems (Westel) Telecommunications Ghana 2005 2007 





Koshika Telecom Limited Telecommunications India 2002 2003 




Liban-Cell Telecommunications Lebanon 2001 2004 




















Rosario Port Concession Port Argentina 2000 2002 
Beirut Container Terminal Port Lebanon 2001 2004 




Argentina 2004 2005 
Transgabonais  Railroad Gabon 2003 2005 
Aguascalientes-Leon  Toll Road Mexico 1997 2007 




Mexico 1997 2007 
Maravatio-Zapotlanejo  Toll Road Mexico 1997 2007 
Ferihegy Airport Terminal 
2 Expansion 
Airport 
Hungary 2001 2005 
Puerto Vallarta Wastewater 
Plant 
Sewerage 
Mexico 2004 2005 
Maynilad Water Services Water and sewerage Philippines 2005 2006 
Litoral Sur  Water and Sewerage Chile 2000 2000 
Sabanagrande and Santo 
Tomas  
Water and Sewerage 
Colombia 2004 2004 
Thu Duc Water Project Potable Water Vietnam 2003 2004 





Aguas Santafesinas S. A. website (www.aguasdesantafe.com.ar) 
 
Andres Luis, Vivien Foster, and José Luis Guasch. 2006. The Impact of Privatization on 
the Performance of the Infrastructure Sector: The Case of Electricity Distribution in Latin 
American Countries. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3936. Washington 
DC: The World Bank. 
 
Asian Development Bank. 2006. Country Water Action: Viet Nam. 
(www.asiandevbank.org/water/Actions/VIE/nrw-hide-seek.asp) 
 
Belize Water Services website (www.bws.com.bz) 
 
Belizean. October 18, 2004. The Belize Telecom Saga (www.belizean.com) 
 
Browder Greg J et al. 2007. Improving the Performance of China’s Urban Water 
Utilities. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
Budapest (Ferihegy) Airport website (www.bud.hu/english) 
 
Cleves, Mario A., William W. Gould, Roberto G. Gutierrez, and Yulia U. Marchenko. 
2008. An Introduction to Survival Analysis using Stata. College Station, Texas: A Stata 
Press Publication 
  
Cascal company website (www.cascal.co.uk) 
 
Center for Public Integrity. 2003. The ‘Aguas’ Tango: Cashing in on Buenos Aires 
Privatization. (http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2003/0206argentinewater.htm) 
 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure website (www.cki.com.hk) 
 
China Resources Power Holdings Co. Ltd. website (www.crc.com.hk) 
 
China Water Company website (www.chinawater.com.hk) 
 
Cline William. 2002. Financial Crises and Poverty in Emerging Market Economies. 
Center for Global Development. Working Paper Number 8. 
 
Corpwatch. 2004. Argentina Water Privatization Scheme Runs Dry 
(http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=10088) 
 
Covindassamy M. Ananda, Daizo Oda and Yabei Zhang 2005. Analysis of Power 
Projects with Private Participation under Stress. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
Easterly William. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and 
 94
 
Misadventures in the Tropics. Massachusetts: The MIT Press 
 
Ehrhardt David and Timothy Irwin. 2004. Avoiding Customer and Taxpayer Bailouts in 
Private Infrastructure Projects: Policy toward Leverage, Risk Allocation, and Bankruptcy. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3274. Washington DC: The World 
Bank 
 
Financial Post. August 2007. Teacher's to purchase Esval S.A., Chile's third-largest 
water utility company (www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost) 
 
Gassner Katharina, Alexander Popov and Nataliya Pushak 2007. An Empirical 
Assessment of Private Sector Participation in Electricity and Water Distribution in 
Developing and Transition Countries. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
General Directorate of Road Development website, Secretariat of Communications and 
Transport, Government of Mexico (dc.sct.gob.mx) 
 
Ghanaian Chronicle. 2007. Ghana: Celtel to Take Over Westel, Offers Between U.S. 
$120m and U.S. $150m for Govt's Stake. 
(http://allafrica.com/stories/200707310804.html) 
 
Ghana Telecom website (www.ghanatelecom.com.gh) 
 
Global Insight. 2007. Beninois Regulator Withdraws Operating Licences from MTN and 
Moov. 
 
Gomez-Ibanez, Jose A. 1999. The Future of Private Infrastructure: Lessons from the 
Nationalization of Electric Utilities in Latin America, 1943–1979. Discussion Paper, 
Taubman Center for State and Local Government, Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Gómez-Ibáñez, José A. 2007. Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons 
from Recent Experience. Paper presented to the Commission on Growth and 
Development at the Workshop on Global Trends and Challenges. New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization  
 
Government of India (Ministry of Finance). 2008. Economic Survey 2007-08. 
 
Government of India (Ministry of Power). 2007. Power Sector Profile: Western Region 
(http://powermin.nic.in/indian_electricity_ scenario/pdf/WR1007.pdf) 
 
Guasch, J. Luis. 2004. Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions: Doing it 
Right. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
Hall David, Violeta Corral, Emanuele Lobina, and Robin de la Motte. 2004. Water 
Privatization and Restructuring in Asia-Pacific. Public Services International Research 
 95
 
Unit (PSIRU). University of Greenwich, London. 
 
Hamilton, Lawrence C. 2003. Statistics with STATA. Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Group/ Thomson Learning 
 
Hammami Mona, Jean-Francois Ruhashyankiko, and Etienne B. Yehoue. 2006. 
Determinants of Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure. Washington DC. IMF 
Institute 
 
Harris Clive and Kumar V Pratap. 2009. What drives private sector exit from 
infrastructure? Economic crises and other factors in the cancellation of private 
infrastructure projects in developing countries. PPIAF Gridline. Washington DC: The 
World Bank (http://www.ppiaf.org/documents/gridlines/46-Private-Sector-Exit.pdf) 
 
Harris Clive. 2003. Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: 
Trends, Impacts and Policy Lessons. World Bank Working Paper No. 5. Washington DC: 
The World Bank 
 
Harris Clive, John Hodges, Michael Schur, and Padmesh Shukla. 2003. Infrastructure 
Projects: A Review of Canceled Private Projects. World Bank Viewpoint Note No.252. 
Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
Henisz Witold J. 2002. The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 11, Number 2. 
 
Henisz Witold J., and Bennet A. Zelner. 2001. The Institutional Environment for 
Telecommunications Investment. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 
10, Number 1. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Henisz, Witold J. and Bennet A. Zelner. 2001. The Political Economy of Private 
Electricity Provision in Southeast Asia. East Asian Economic Perspectives 15(1):10 – 36. 
 
Indosat website (www.indosat.com) 
 
International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association website. Global List of Toll 
Facilities (www.ibtta.org) 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 2008. Award of ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22: Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. (Claimant) vs. United Republic of 
Tanzania (Respondent) 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Case No. ARB/97/3. 
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie 
Generale des Eaux) vs. Argentine Republic: Decision on Annulment  
 
International Energy Agency. 2009. The Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on 
 96
 
Global Energy Investment 
 
Jordan Telecom website (www.orange.jo) 
 
Kaufmann Daniel. 2004. Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich 
Countries and the World. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
Kaufmann Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. Governance Matters VI: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 4280. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
Kikeri Sunita, John Nellis and Mary Shirley. 1992. Privatization: The Lessons of 
Experience. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
Lamb, Peter M. 2006. The Indian Electricity Market: Country Study and Investment 
Context (Working Paper # 48). Center for Environmental Science and Policy, Stanford 
Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 
 
LibanCell website (www.libancell.com.lb) 
 
Megginson William L., Robert C. Nash, and Matthias van Randenborgh. 1994. The 
Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International 
Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance. Vol. 49(2), 403-452. 
 
Mobile Telecommunications (Namibia) website (www.mtc.com.na) 
 
New World Infrastructure Limited website (www.nwservices.com.hk/eng) 
 
Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd (NITEL) website (www.nitelnet.com) 
 
Orascom Telecom website (www.orascomtelecom.com) 
 
Prayas Energy Group. 2001. Godbole Committee on Enron Project: Expose and Way 
Out. Economic and Political Weekly. 
 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2008. Emerging Market Investors and Operators in 
Infrastructure: Global overview of the rise of emerging market investors and operators in 
infrastructure provision in developing countries 
 
Project Finance International website (www.pfie.com) 
 
PT Telkom website (www.telkom.co.id) 
 





Rao S L. 2001. Dabhol, Godbole Report and the Future. Economic and Political Weekly.  
 
Reuters. 2008. How to water a parched city: a Tanzanian tale 
 
Road King Infrastructure Limited website (www.roadking.com.hk) 
 
Ruster Jeff. 1997. A Retrospective on the Mexican Toll Road Program (1989-94). World 
Bank Viewpoint Note No.125. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
Santos Carlos and Alberto Villareal. 2006. Uruguay: Direct democracy in defence of the 
right to water. (http://www.tni.org/books/wateruruguayrev.pdf ) 
 
Schmidt Gerold. 2005. Legal and Institutional Changes towards Water Privatization in 
Mexico. Brot fur die welt (www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de) 
 
Standard & Poor’s. 2006. A Credit Review of Mexico’s Toll Road Sector: Stable and 
Strong 
 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad website (www.tm.com.my) 
 
Telecom Services Kiribati Ltd. (TSKL) website (www.tskl.net.ki) 
 
Tenenbaum Bernard and Ada Karina Izaguirre. May 2007. Private participation in 
electricity: The challenge of achieving commercial viability and improving services. 
PPIAF Gridlines. 
 
The Economist. 2001. Enron in India: Generation Gaps. 
 
Time dotCom website (www.time.com.my) 
 
Transnational Corporation Plc. Website (www.transcorpnigeria.com) 
 
Uzbek Telecom website (www.uztelecom.uz) 
 
Vernon, Raymond. 1971. Sovereignty at Bay: The Spread of U.S. Enterprises. New York: 
Basic Books. 
 
Wells, Louis T and Rafiq Ahmed. 2007. Making Foreign Investment Safe: Property 
Rights and National Sovereignty. New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Woo Pei Yee. 2005. China’s Electric Power Market: The Rise and Fall of IPPs. Program 
on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper # 45. Stanford University. 
 
Wooldridge Jeffrey M. 2006. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Mason 




World Bank. 1994. World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development 
 
World Bank Data – Country Classification. July 2007. (http://www.worldbank.org/ 
data/countryclass/countryclass.html) 
 
World Development Indicators. 2008. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
World Bank. Private Participation in Infrastructure Project database. 
(http://ppi.worldbank.org) 
 
World Bank. 2007. PPI data update note 8: Private activity in infrastructure continued 
its recovery in 2006. Private Participation in Infrastructure Project database.  
 
World Bank. 2007. Private activity in water sector shows mixed results in 2006. Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Database. 
 
World Bank. 2008. Project Appraisal Document for Geothermal Power Generation 








The public sector has traditionally been providing infrastructure services (telecom, 
electricity, roads, ports, airports, water and sewerage) because of their public good 
characteristics, large externalities, massive investment requirements, and long gestation 
periods. However, the fiscal resource crunch, the growing demand gap for infrastructure 
services, and the low quality of publicly provided infrastructure services has forced 
governments to invite the private sector to provide these services. It is felt that the private 
sector can augment infrastructure without using up fiscal resources, provide these 
services more speedily and efficiently, and be more responsive to the needs of the 
consumers.  
 
Private provision of public services has taken the form, most often, of Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure. Sustainable PPPs should provide substantial value 
for money to the government rather than just being vehicles for moving liabilities into the 
future through revenue or rate-of-return guarantees to the private sector. It is in this 
context that we examine value-for-money in PPPs in a major developing country (India).  
The specific question that the chapter tries to address is: Do Public-Private 
Partnerships provide Value for Money to the Government of India?  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 looks at the salient features of 
Public-Private Partnerships. Section 3 is the literature review section and looks mainly at 
the international evidence on value for money. Section 4 describes the data used in the 
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study and Section 5 elucidates the methodology. Section 6 presents the sector-wise 
analysis and results for value-for-money in PPPs. Section 7 concludes.    
2: Theoretical Framework 
What are Public-Private-Partnerships? 
One of the most common ways in which private provision of public services has taken 
place in recent years is through the government inviting the private sector to invest in 
infrastructure and share the associated risks and returns. The returns are spread over a 
number of years and are governed by the contractual structure between the government 
and the private sector. In this context, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been 
loosely defined as cooperative institutional arrangements between public and private 
sector actors88. They differ from outright privatization in that government retains a 
substantial role as the purchaser of the infrastructure service, or as the ultimate service 
provider if private sector exits the contract, or to which the asset reverts after the 
concession period. They differ from contracting out in that the private sector shares 
substantial operational risk of the project with the government as it is, most often, 
responsible for both building and operating the asset.  
 
Public-Private Partnerships recognize that both the public sector and the private sector 
have certain advantages relative to the other in the performance of specific tasks. By 
allowing each party to do what it does best, infrastructure services can be provided in the 
most economically efficient manner. The relationship between the public and the private 
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sectors is regulated by a contract that allocates responsibilities, rights, risks and rewards 
between the parties89. In practice, PPPs refer to a family of contractual relationships 
between the public and the private sector rather than a single approach. The figure below 
shows the range of PPPs used in different countries. As would be apparent, PPPs fill the 
space between conventionally procured government projects and full privatization90.  
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of PPP Arrangements 
 
Source: Castalia Strategic Advisors. 2007. Advice on Fiscal Management of Infrastructure PPPs in 
Pakistan 
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90 Grimsey, Darrin and Mervyn K Lewis. 2005. Are Public-Private Partnerships value for money? 
Evaluating alternative approaches and comparing academic and practitioner views. Accounting Forum 29 




The UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has driven much of the world’s thinking about 
Public-Private Partnerships. Many countries borrowed heavily from the UK’s PFI 
program in shaping their own PPP programs. Some countries limit their definition of 
PPPs by transaction type, sector, value, or whether users or the government pay directly 
for the services provided by the operator. For example, until 1994, South Korea limited 
its definition of PPPs to Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 
contracts. In Portugal, the term PPPs are limited to partnerships involving the present 
value of payments to private parties of more than 10 million euros or an investment of 
greater than 25 million euros.  
 
The following PPP definitions have been used in the various policy documents of the 
Government of India: 
 Partnership between a public sector entity (sponsoring authority) and a private 
sector entity (a legal entity in which 51% or more of equity is with the private 
partner) for the creation and/or management of infrastructure for public purpose 
for a specified period of time (concession period) on commercial terms and in 
which the private partner has been procured through a transparent and open 
procurement system91. 
 Public-Private Partnership Project means a project based on a contract or 
concession agreement, between a Government or statutory entity on the one side 
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and a private sector company on the other side, for delivering an infrastructure 
service on payment of user charges92. 
 
Summing up, PPPs involve a commercial transaction between a public and a private party 
by which the private party: 
 performs a function traditionally performed by the public sector or assumes the 
use of public property; 
 assumes related construction, commercial, and operational risks; and 
 receives a benefit in exchange of the above, either by way of public authority 
paying from its budget or revenue, or users or customers paying charges or fees 
for the service provided to them; or a combination of these. 
 
Contracting mechanisms in PPPs 
There are two principal aspects of the contractual structure associated with PPPs in 
infrastructure: first, the type of the project itself – whether it is a management contract, 
lease contract, concession, greenfield project, or a divestiture; and second, the mechanics 
of project implementation and operation as also what happens to the project at the end of 
the contract period – whether it is a BOO (Build-Own-Operate), BOOT (Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer), DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate), DBO (Design-Build-
Operate), or a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) project. A BOT project would be 
transferred to the government at the end of the contract period, while the private sector 
may operate a BOO project indefinitely.  
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Although BOT may be the most popular PPP type, it is a complex contract because of the 
presence of different actors with different goals, objective functions and interests, the 
need to reconcile or harmonize these varying objectives to meet a particular infrastructure 
goal, the presence of many risks affecting BOT projects and the need for the different 
actors to agree on risk sharing allocation and the use of risk management techniques to 
minimize those risks.  
 
PPP projects generally get financed on non-recourse basis: the lenders and investors to 
the project have to depend on the cash-flows generated by the project without having 
recourse to the sponsors' balance sheet. Thus, in the figure below, which shows a project 
finance contractual structure, the project implementing company is a Special Purpose 
Vehicle specially created for implementing the project. The loans to the project are most 
commonly non-recourse loans, which are secured by the project assets and paid entirely 
from project cash flow, rather than from the general assets or creditworthiness of the 
project sponsors. This increases the complexity of the contracts as they have to be 
watertight so that the interests of various stakeholders are protected. 
  




Source: Taylor DeJongh. 2009. Assessing the Impact of Recent Credit Constraints on Energy Sector 
Investment Requirements in Bangladesh, a study commissioned by the World Bank 
 
Under a BOT (toll) project, the private sector meets the cost of construction and 
expenditure on annual maintenance. The private sector recovers the entire investment 
from the user fee collections during the concession period. The contracting agency 
specifies the project requirements based on the Detailed Project Report. A capital grant 
may be provided by the contracting agency to make the project viable. This may be made 
the bidding parameter to conserve fiscal resources. There may be risk-sharing between 
the public and the private sectors on the basis of a Model Concession Agreement. 
 
To mitigate the traffic risk falling on the private partner, a variation of the BOT project in 
the form of BOT (annuity) may be used. Here also, the private sector meets the entire 
cost of construction and annual maintenance. No grant is paid by the contracting agency. 
The private sector recovers the investment through pre-determined annuity payments 
made by the contracting agency, determined through competitive bidding. The 
government retains the right to levy a user fee on the beneficiaries of the facility. 
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Appropriate packaging of BOT (annuity and toll) projects can help capture the benefits 
arising out of allocation of construction and maintenance risks to the concessionaire. 
 
Another type is the Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) contract. PFI in the UK has 
mostly consisted of DBFO contracts, which typically last 20-30 years93. Here the private 
sector meets the cost of design and construction, and recurring cost of operation and 
maintenance. The private sector recovers the entire investment from user fee collection 
during the pre-determined concession period. The contracting agency lays out the core 
project requirements based on a feasibility study. A capital grant may be provided by the 
contracting agency to maker the project viable. There may be risk-sharing between the 
public and the private sector on the basis of a Model Concession Agreement. Ownership 
of the asset remains with the private partner during the concession period, but may revert 
to the public sector at its conclusion. In this contracting method, bidders are encouraged 
to use innovative designs while remaining accountable for performance.  
 
Other important aspects of PPPs 
 
Competitive bidding: Though some infrastructure projects, by their very nature, may 
enjoy monopoly in the delivery of services (for example, rural roads and energy 
transmission projects), competitive bidding would ensure competition for the market, 
besides ensuring transparency, and thus is expected to compete away the monopoly rent 
available to such service providers. Competitive bidding would assign provision of 
                                                 




services to the party that is able to provide them most efficiently. However, competitive 
bidding produces the most efficient outcome if there are a sufficient number of bidders. It 
is, therefore, necessary to aim for a balance so that there is sufficient competition even as 
appropriate pre-qualification norms for bidders ensures that only credible and capable 
bidders are invited to submit financial bids. Market power may also be addressed by 
crossholding restrictions as was done in the two water contracts for Metro Manila, which 
were given to two separate companies. Similarly, GMR-led consortium was the only 
technically qualified bidder (originally) for both the Delhi and the Mumbai airport 
concessions in India, but it was not awarded both the concessions to encourage 
innovation and allow for competitive benchmarking. 
 
Bidding parameter: The bid parameters in infrastructure PPPs usually are: the lowest 
tariff to be charged to consumers, the lowest subsidy that the government must provide to 
offer a commercially viable service, the highest price to be paid for the assets, the 
shortest duration of the concession, the lowest cost to the government for constructing or 
operating services or facilities, the lowest income guarantee requested from the state, the 
largest amount of new investment to be undertaken by the operator, the highest revenue 
offered to the state for existing infrastructure (either a share, or a flat offer), or the lowest 
present value of future revenue streams. A new bidding parameter being used in the road 
sector is the least present value of revenue (LPVR), which endogenously adjusts the 





Some of these parameters may put excessive risk on the concessionaires. In the first 
phase of the Mexican toll road program, the bid parameter was the shortest duration of 
the concession. However, following the collapse of demand after the Mexican economic 
crisis of 1994, many of these projects reverted to the government as the concession 
period was too short to recoup the investment. In 2007, Mexico re-privatized some of 
these roads employing an improved bidding parameter (minimum public subsidy instead 
of minimum concession period). In general, ceteris paribus, there should be a single 
bidding parameter, lending transparency to the bidding process.    
 
Risk allocation: The key to designing an optimal concession structure is in terms of risk 
allocation between the public and the private sector. The objective should be balanced 
risk-sharing rather than seeking to transfer all risks to the private partner. This is because 
the private partner may charge a premium for accepting risks that are within the control 
of the government reducing the value for money to the public sector. The guiding 
principles for risk allocation are: 
 
i) Risk should be assigned to the agency that has more control over the risk 
factor; 
ii) The agency that is more able to bear the risk (less risk-averse) should be 
assigned the risk. 
 
Under these guidelines, the different types of risk associated with infrastructure projects 




Table 1: Types of risk and their normative allocation in a typical infrastructure PPP project 
Type of Risk Who should Bear It 
Political risk including expropriation, non-
convertibility or non-transferability 
Government should bear the risk. In case of contract 
termination on account of government default, 
compensation should be paid by the government. 
Concession design or development risk  Government should bear the risk. 
Construction risk 
(within private partner’s control) 
Private partner should bear the risk through fixed 
price construction contracts plus liquidated 
damages. 
Construction risk 
(outside private partner’s control: government 
action that delays the project like delays in 
obtaining approvals or permits) 
Government should bear the risk. 
Commercial risk 
Operation and maintenance risk 
Demand risk: lower than expected demand 
Payment risk: Customers do not pay the originally 
agreed tariffs 
Private partner should bear the risk. 
Competition risk Private sector should bear the risk. But, government 
may mitigate it by giving the private partner the 
right of first refusal to a competing route/ facility. 
Financial risk 
Exchange rate risk 
Interest rate risk 
Very often private partner insists on tariff 
indexation on account of exchange rate depreciation 
and inflation. However, private partner should bear 
the risk. Government can help through 
macroeconomic stability.  
Solvency risk  Private partner should bear the risk. Government 
debt guarantees may lead to higher solvency risk 
through increased leverage.  
Unexpected event risk 
(Acts of God like floods, earthquakes,  etc.) 
Insurer’s risk, if risk is insured. Otherwise, risk 
should be borne by private partner. 
Unexpected event risk (policy risk) 
(Changes in legal or contractual framework directly 
affecting the project)  
Government should bear the risk. 
Regulatory risk 
(Tariff risk is the most common type, and refers to 
the risk that the regulator will not enforce cost-
recovering level of tariffs) 
Private partner bears this risk. Government should 
set up autonomous regulatory institutions to 
mitigate this risk.  
Renegotiation risk Government bears this risk. Government should 
design proper concession agreements and regulatory 
framework to mitigate this risk. 
Unsolicited proposal risk Both the Government (through association with 
corruption) and the prospective partner (through the 
probability of rejection) bear this risk. 
Source: Author’s tabulation from various sources 
     
The level of risk borne by the private partner depends on the type of contract. In the case 
of a management contract, the private party shares minimal risks with the public sector. 
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In lease contracts, private parties take on only the operating and collection risks. In BOT 
contracts, the private partners also take on investment and financing risks.  
 
The private partner may pass on some risks to other private sector firms that can manage 
them better (see Figure 2). The private partner will typically sign separate contracts with: 
 
 An Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractor who takes on 
construction risk through a fixed-cost contract with provision for liquidated 
damages for delay in construction attributable to the EPC contractor; 
 An operating and maintenance contractor who takes on certain operating risks; 
 A lender (for example, a bank or private equity firm) who takes on financial risk 
associated with the loan or equity invested in the project; 
 The private partner may also source specialized insurance coverage—for 
example, Political Risk Insurance from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency. 
 
However, there is nothing sacrosanct about the risk allocation given in Table 1: it would 
also depend on a host of factors like the level of private sector participation (PSP) in the 
country. For a country that is starting PSP from scratch, there may be a need for sharing 
even demand risk initially (through minimum revenue guarantee, for example), otherwise 
PSP may not be forthcoming. However, as the PPP arrangements mature, the need for the 
government to take on risks that should optimally be transferred to the private sector may 
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come down. This is apparent from the evolution of private power policy of many 
countries including India and Pakistan. 
 
3: Literature Review 
This section surveys the experience of countries where PPPs have been extensively used 
in the provision of infrastructure. The UK is the pioneer in using PPPs in the provision of 
infrastructure where it began in 1992 as Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and this became 
the preferred option for public procurement since 1994. Till end-2004, the total 
investment in PFI projects was £43 billion and now typically constitutes 15-20% of the 
UK government's capital budget each year. In Korea, PPP investment is 10-15% of total 
public investment94. In India, the contribution of the private sector to total infrastructure 
investment in the Tenth Plan period (2002-07) was 25%. This percentage is likely to go 
up to 36% in the Eleventh Plan period (2007-12)95 and projected to be 50% in the 
Twelfth Plan period (2012-17).   
                                                
 
The UK experience suggests that PPP projects deliver average savings of 17% 
compared to traditional public sector delivery96. PPP projects, therefore, appear to offer 
excellent value for money (a financial comparison of the NPVs of the cash flows of the 
public sector option compared to the PPP option). As per this study (sample size: 29 
 
94 Government of India, Planning Commission (Secretariat for Infrastructure). 2010. Report of the Task 
Force on Ceiling for Annuity Commitments. 
 
95 Haldea, Gajendra. 2010. Presentation on Building Transmission Systems: Challenges and Opportunities 
at the Conference on PPP in Transmission of Electricity. India: New Delhi 
 
96 Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE. 2000. Value for Money Drivers in the Private Finance Initiative, a 
report commissioned by The Treasury Taskforce. The 17% Value-for-Money figure was dominated by two 




projects), there are six key drivers of value for money in PPP projects: risk transfer, the 
long term nature of contracts (including whole life costing), the use of an output-based 
specification, competition, performance measurement and incentives, and private sector 
management skills.  
 
This study maintains that if risk transfer is to deliver value for money, then the level of 
risk transfer must be optimal. It has become a truism to say that risk transfer can only 
offer value for money if risk is transferred to the party best able to manage or mitigate it, 
but the point remains worth emphasizing. Projected savings of 17% in PPP projects are 
sensitive to risk transfer valuation that accounted for 60% of the forecasted cost savings. 
The risk that attracted the highest valuation is that of construction cost overruns. 
 
The study emphasizes that a long-term contract is a key condition for delivering value for 
money. There are a number of reasons for this, including: the need for investment to be 
recovered over a reasonably long period if a project is to be affordable; the scope that a 
long contract period gives to invest in alternative approaches to service delivery; and the 
incentives that long contracts give to service providers to focus on whole life costing as 
they have to construct and operate the project over the concession period. This is an area 
in which the public sector has traditionally performed badly. Whole life costing can 
achieve optimization between capital costs and operating and maintenance costs, a 
realistic projection of total cost of ownership, and a way of comparing competing designs 
on a like-with-like basis. With public sector procurement, whole life costs have either 
been given insufficient priority in determining the design and specification of assets or 
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cash has not been made available to maintain assets to their original built standard. The 
study observes that while we would expect to drive on a PPP road in 20 years time and 
find a well-maintained asset still performing to the original specification, we would not 
have the same confidence if the asset had been conventionally procured. 
 
As per the study, the following elements are important for delivering a successful PPP 
competition: 
 A pool of actively interested suppliers; 
 Engagement with the market place. As the PPP market begins to grow, it is 
inevitable that bidders will prioritize resources towards the projects they believe 
offer the best opportunities. Market perception is therefore important and needs to 
be influenced through active marketing by the procuring body, both before and 
during the procurement process; 
 Clear and thorough project documentation. Bidders can only compete on price if 
they have a clear understanding of the procuring authority’s requirements and 
priorities; and 
 Maintenance of price pressure during the bidding process. In some PPP cases, it 
may not be possible to develop sufficient competition without reimbursing bid 
costs.  
 
The study opines that on performance measurement, a lot more work needs to be done on 
gathering operational information. This should cover several areas: 
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 The level of penalties being incurred by contractors in relation to performance 
that is deemed to be below the required standard. This will help understanding of 
whether incentives are working in practice; 
 Logging the performance of individual contractors and making it known to other 
procuring authorities who are the best and worst performers (benchmarking). It is 
in the public sector’s interest that success should breed success and that the 
lessons learnt are captured and fed into the procurement of new projects;  
 Capturing information on actual costs and benefits compared to the business case 
assumptions; and 
 Sharing practical information on best practice in measuring and incentivizing 
performance. 
 
On private sector management skills, the study maintains that the success of private 
sector managers is illustrated by the consistent record of PPP consortia in delivering 
projects on or ahead of time. The National Audit Office (UK) has found that in contrast 
to traditionally procured projects, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects were 
largely being delivered on time (76% versus 30%) and on budget (78% versus 27%)97. 
Moreover, the public sector did not bear the costs of construction cost-overruns in the PFI 
projects in contrast to conventionally procured projects as that risk is generally 
transferred to the private sector on account of fixed price construction contracts.   
  
                                                 




In another study reviewing large public procurement in the UK98, a representative sample 
of projects procured traditionally and through the PFI route and implemented over the 
previous 20 years (with values exceeding £40 million at 2001 prices) were compared. 
The ‘optimism bias’ level for conventionally procured projects was found to be higher 
than that for PFI projects. Optimism in project estimates arises from underestimating 
project costs and duration or overestimating project benefits. In order for projects to be 
delivered on time and cost, the optimism in project estimates has to be minimized. The 
difference in optimism bias between conventionally procured projects and PFI projects is 
attributed to the negotiated transfer of project risks from the public sector to the private 
sector, where project risks are passed to the party best placed to manage them consistent 
with achieving value for money and quality. The reasons for lower optimism bias in PFI 
projects could be related to the high level of diligence demanded in PFI procurement to 
establish the business case (e.g. by defining the project scope clearly and/or addressing 
stakeholders’ interests specifically), which was not observed for conventional 
procurement and may have contributed to the inadequacy of the conventional project 
business cases used in the study. Further, for PFI projects, a long-term relationship is 
developed between the service provider and the client, thus allowing potential problems 
to be resolved early. In addition, PFI procurement requires the projects to be defined 
around their benefits/requirements and not just project deliverables. Adopting this 
approach of defining a project based on its benefits may help ensure full delivery of 
benefits. This study reiterates that all project business cases need to be based on correct 
and reliable project intelligence (e.g. reliable information about ground conditions). 
                                                 





Under conventional procurement, with limited levels of risk transfer, the optimism bias 
remains at the contract award stage. The study emphasizes that the problem is 
accentuated in politically important projects: if it is believed that once given the go-ahead 
a project cannot be allowed to fail, there remains a strong incentive for optimism bias, 
even if applied implicitly. 
 
Department of Treasury and Finance (Government of Victoria, Australia) had 
commissioned an independent external evaluation of eight PPP projects which was 
undertaken in January 200499. The review concluded that the eight projects examined (of 
which two were actually completed), provided tangible evidence of the benefits available 
from harnessing private sector skills and innovation of design in infrastructure. Other 
positive aspects were seen as timeliness of delivery, certainty of price, and a whole-of-
life approach to maintenance. The evaluation found that the weighted average saving of a 
PPP project was 9 per cent against the risk adjusted public sector comparator (PSC) 
using the then prevailing discount rate. 
 
The value for money calculation of PPP procurement in this study involved the following 
steps: 
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 The Net Present Cost (NPC) of the PSC. This is the net cost (taking into account 
any project revenues) estimated by the public sector of undertaking a project itself 
and producing the same or similar outputs under conventional procurement. The 
NPC should include an estimate of the risk that would be retained by the public 
sector compared to the PPP option; 
 
 The NPC of the PPP option. This is the cost to the public sector of making 
payments to the service provider over the life of the contract. The payment profile 
should assume that no deductions are made for poor performance; 
 
 The estimated saving/ cost to the public sector in NPC terms of entering into the 
PPP contract. This is the difference between the NPC of the Public Sector 
Comparator and the NPC of the PPP option. The estimated cost saving could be 
expressed as a percentage of the NPC of the Public Sector Comparator. 
 
However, the Fitzgerald report opines that the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) should be 
reformed to become just one factor in procurement decisions and conclusions as to value 
for money. In addition, the use of a PSC should be discontinued in circumstances where 
public provision has not been done in the past and is not a reasonable option going 
forward. In such circumstances, the analytic comparison should be against a reference 




There are obvious limitations in using PSCs100: inaccuracy because of poor data 
availability, omitted risks like that of contract renegotiation, no consensus on discount 
rate101, and inappropriate benchmark when the public sector does not have the resources 
to implement the project. Thus, it should be kept in mind that value for money 
calculations using the PSC approach provide a useful, though incomplete, method to 
evaluate the utility of PPPs. It should be emphasized that recourse to PPPs in 
infrastructure projects should not solely be based on the value for money numbers, and 
should be supplemented by qualitative assessment of evidence from past projects102. 
 
It has also been found that there is very poor public information on PPPs. This has been 
emphasized by the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee (Government of Victoria) 
when it observes that in the absence of public documentation, the Committee cannot 
conclusively state whether or not PPP policy is generally delivering value for money over 
the life of projects compared with traditional procurement methods. Public accountability 
needs to be improved through prompt disclosure of contracts on the government’s 
website and providing Parliament with a schedule of payments to the private partner103. 
In addition, PPP procurement has been criticized on account of locking-in costs for many 
                                                 
100 Leigland, James, and Chris Shugart. 2006. Is the Public Sector Comparator Right for Developing 
Countries? The World Bank: PPIAF Gridlines 
 
101 Indeed, opposite conclusions were reached when using a 8.65% discount rate (leading to the conclusion 
that the PPP mechanism was 9% cheaper than traditional delivery in the Fitzgerald report) compared to an 
evaluation adopting a 5.7% discount rate (when the PPP mechanism was 6% more expensive). 
 
102 Government of Victoria (Australia), Public Accounts and Estimates Committee. 2006. Report on 
Private Investment in Public Infrastructure  
 
103 Government of Victoria. 2006. Public Accounts and Estimates Committee Seventy First Report to the 






years and thus 'mortgaging the future' for near-term gains. 
 
Another study104 comparing the performance of PPP projects with that of traditionally 
procured infrastructure projects in Australia (sample size: 67 projects) found that: 
 PPPs delivered projects for a price that is far closer to the expected cost than if the 
project was procured in traditional manner (less optimism bias in cost terms);  
 Over the period from initial announcement of a project to when it is finally 
commissioned, PPPs and traditional projects are delivered with the same 
confidence in the likely overall time performance. One interesting observation in 
this study was that during the period prior to project execution, PPP projects are 
frequently delayed (average 15%). However, once PPP projects reach financial 
closure, there was only, on average, a further 2.6% delay to these projects. This 
indicates that PPP projects are well developed prior to release to market and 
changes after financial closure are minimal. This is in contrast to traditionally 
procured projects, where financial closure is faster than anticipated, but the 
project suffers from major time over-run after that stage.    
 
In a 2002 study of some prisons in South Africa105 built and operated on PPP basis, it was 
found that: 
 Construction was completed on-time and on-budget; 
                                                 
104 Duffield, Colin. 2008. Report on the Performance of PPP projects in Australia when compared with a 
representative sample of traditionally procured infrastructure projects. Melbourne: The University of 
Melbourne. 
 
105 Government of South Africa (Department of Correctional Services, National Treasury, Department of 




 Operating costs per inmate per day was broadly comparable with the public 
sector’s operating costs; 
 There was significantly higher quality of facilities and levels of service in PPP 
prisons compared to public prisons. 
 
On the cost of service, a Partnerships UK study (sample size: 450 PFI projects) found that 
cost of service for PFI projects was higher. However, private service providers received 
high performance rating by users and contract managers. In another UK study (2007) on 
benchmarking and market testing106 the ongoing services component of PFI projects, it 
was found that 11 PFI projects had gone through a benchmarking/ market-test, out of 
which 5 projects were found to have achieved value for money (VfM), while in the case 
of the balance 6 projects, the VfM was uncertain. Specifically, it was found that: 
 Two telecommunication projects which had completed value testing had achieved 
value for money through price reductions of 19% and 37% after using 
benchmarking to take account of falling prices in the very competitive 
telecommunications sector. 
 In the seven building projects NAO examined, five of which were hospitals, 
where value testing had been completed, the final price adjustments were mainly -
                                                 
106 National Audit Office. 2007. Benchmarking and market testing the ongoing services component of PFI 
projects. (http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/06-07/0607453.pdf). Benchmarking is the 
process by which the project company compares its costs against the market price of equivalent services. If 
the costs are higher than market prices, a reduction in the price charged to the public sector should be made 
on an agreed cost-sharing basis to reflect the differential. If costs are lower than market prices, the project 
company must justify any price increase. Market Testing means the re-tendering by the project company of 
the relevant service so that the authority can test the value for money of that service in the market. Any 
increase or decrease in the cost of such a service following market testing should be reflected by an 
adjustment in the price charged to the authority. Benchmarking is an alternative to market testing if the 
prospect of strong competition between suppliers is not there. It can also be completed quickly and be 




2 to + 6% although in one school project the final price increase was 14%. The 
authorities had been involved in negotiations to arrive at these price changes after 
the value tests initially suggested that, in most cases, upward price changes would 
be required, with the changes mainly in the range -1 to +19%. 
 For the potential benefits of market testing to be realized, there needs to be strong 
competition. 
 
In Japan also, under government guidelines, the public sector must construct a PSC and 
demonstrate that the PPP option provides better VfM, before adopting a PPP project, and 
is required to disclose the extent of VfM, either in the form of percent or absolute 
amount107. 
 
The perceived superior performance of PPPs has been attributed to the same factors that 
are thought to produce superior results on account of privatization108. There is also some 
discussion in the literature as to the relative attractiveness of the various contracting 
mechanisms [like BOT (annuity) versus BOT (toll)]. Hodge and Greve109 referring to the 
BOT (annuity) variant say that the early claim that private financing of public 
infrastructure reduces pressure on public sector budgets and provides more infrastructure 
                                                 
107 Grimsey, Darrin and Mervyn K Lewis. 2005. Are Public-Private Partnerships value for money? 
Evaluating alternative approaches and comparing academic and practitioner views. Accounting Forum 29 
(2005) 345-378.  
 
108 For example, first, it is a means of resolving agency problems, which arise due to the divergence 
between ownership and control of assets, and are easier to manage in the private sector through managerial 
incentives and market discipline. Second, the transfer of risk to the private sector provides an incentive for 
private entities to maximize efficiency. Third, resources are more efficiently allocated in cases where clear 
markets for property rights can be established. [Grimsey, Darrin and Mervyn K Lewis (2005)]. 
  
109 Hodge, Graeme A., and Carsten Greve. 2007. Public-Private Partnerships: An International 
Performance Review. Public Administration Review, Volume 67, Issue 3.  
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than is otherwise achievable is seen to be largely false. A mechanism through which 
governments may turn a large, once-off capital expenditure into a series of smaller, 
annualized expenditures has simply been provided. On the other hand, they find better 
payoffs for the government in BOT (toll) projects: "In the case in which a government 
enters into an infrastructure deal requiring users or citizens to pay directly, such as tolls 
on a new road, it is clear that there is little impact on public budgets. Such an 
arrangement does reduce pressure on public sector budgets…" Broadly interpreted, this 
would imply a higher value for money to the government in BOT (toll) projects 
compared to BOT (annuity) projects. However, the counterfactual in the BOT (toll) case 
would have to include an estimate of the amount of the tolls given up by the government 
in favor of the private sector, which we shall attempt in Section 5. This adjustment would 
provide a better estimate of the value for money to the government from BOT (toll) 
projects and their relative attractiveness vis-à-vis BOT (annuity) projects.   
 
Overall, the literature suggests the following positives from PPPs:  
 Off-balance sheet infrastructure financing, augmentation of capital spending 
without increasing public debt, and thus reduced pressure on government budgets; 
 Better defined and improved quality services through tight contracts, improved 
efficiency, output-based service specification, strengthened monitoring and 
accountability; 
 Public services provided more cost-effectively and quickly (within budget and on-
time delivery);  
 123
 
 Value for money to the government is estimated at 17% for UK and 9% for 
Australia; 
 Transfer of design, construction, financing, and operation risks to the private 
sector; promotes innovations in design; 
 Business-friendly, which promotes investor confidence and can provide electoral 
dividends to government; with the private sector implementing projects, any 
given project is less likely to be selected only for political reasons. 
 To the extent that the public sector is being benchmarked against private sector 
companies, PPPs are likely to improve public sector efficiency also. 
 
PPPs have also been vociferously opposed on many counts. It has been alleged that with 
PPPs, government's role has changed from traditional stewardship to mutually conflicting 
roles of policy advocacy, commercial signatory to the contract, and regulator over the 
contract life. Some have castigated PPPs as "Problem, Problem, Problem" (Bowman, 
2000) and in the UK, private project sponsors have been branded by some as "evil 
bandits running away with all the loot". The reasons for the negative assessment of PPPs 
are:  
 Internationally, there have been many high-profile PPP project failures like some 
portions of the London Underground rail transportation project (UK), Aguas 
Argentinas (Argentina water project), Mexican toll road debacle, and the Indian 
Dabhol Power Project exemplifying cases where PPPs, instead of providing fiscal 
help, may turn out to being a drain on it. There is also a tendency for governments 
to be unwilling to “pull the plug” on PPP projects once under way for service 
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continuity, reputational, and termination liability reasons, increasing the costs of a 
future consumer or taxpayer bailout. 
 Many PPPs are characterized by over-optimistic bids, subjecting governments to 
the risk of renegotiation after private partner bags the contract. More often than 
not, the outcome of the renegotiation is favorable to the private sector vis-à-vis 
the public sector or the customers110.  
 Ultimately the risk transfer to the private sector is limited, as government has the 
overriding obligation to provide public services: 85% of the canceled PPP 
projects revert to the government111. 
 Because of poor availability of public information on PPP projects (leading to low 
transparency and associated potential for corruption), such procurement has 
eroded democratic accountability; 
 Annuity payments are liability of the government, but not shown in government 
accounts. This may lead to locking in of public resources over a long-time period 
as many PPP contracts are for 30 years (for the UK, according to one author, the 
total government commitments to future payments of around 670 PFI contracts 
are estimated at £141 billion over 26 years112), reducing flexibility in the face of 
changing needs, and burdening future generations. There is also a lack of public 
sector contract management skills especially at the sub-national level, where such 
                                                 
110 Guasch, J. Luis. 2004. Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions: Doing it Right. 
Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
111 See chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
 
112 As quoted in Pollitt, Michael. 2005. Learning from UK Private Finance Initiative Experience in The 
Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships: Learning from International Experience by Graeme Hodge and 




problems may be more acute.  
 PPPs are characterized by poor competition, time consuming bidding process, 
high deal complexity and transaction costs, and high asset specificity. In 
situations involving long term lease of public assets to the private sector, there is a 
real possibility of under-pricing of public assets113. 
 In terms of value for money calculations, there are problems associated with the 
PSC114 and the associated discount rate115. Besides, the following should also be 
factored in VfM calculations: commercial borrowing rates are higher than 
government borrowing rates and there may be affordability issues because the 
cost of service may rise under such procurement. It has also been pointed out that 
outcomes for long-term contracts are always uncertain and current results are 
early perceptions because the concession period has ended for few of the sampled 
projects. 
 
Overall, it would appear that the financial, economic, and political basis for PPPs 
in infrastructure is still quite uncertain (some have suggested 'caveat emptor'). The 
present study is expected to lessen some of the uncertainty by adding to the PPP 
evaluation literature. In addition, what is missing from the above literature review 
                                                 
113 For example, it has been observed that the State of Indiana (USA) received an amount equal to only 
40% of the actual economic value of the physical asset from the lease of the Indiana Toll Road (see 
Mullins, Daniel and Marvin Ward Jr. 2009. Violating the Golden Rule: Fleecing the Next Generation from 
the Backs of the Past. School of Public Affairs of American University: Center of Public Finance Research) 
  
114 A PSC is the estimated cost of a conventionally procured project delivering the same output as the PPP 
project. 
 
115 In the Fitzgerald study, as has already been noted, when the discount rate was reduced from 8.65% to 




is value for money analysis of PPPs in developing countries (except some analysis 
for South Africa). India has made PPPs the main method of public procurement in 
most infrastructure sectors. The sectoral spread of PPP projects in India may be seen 
in Table 2. In the period 1990-2007, India has entered into 306 PPP contracts 
accounting for an investment of $96 billion. India is also among the first five 
developing countries both by number of PPP projects and the associated investment. 
So, it is important to fill this gap in literature and to carry out a value for money 
analysis for PPPs in India to help validate their use in infrastructure provision in 
developing countries.  
 
Table 2: Private Participation in Infrastructure in India (1990-2007) 
Sector Number of Projects Investment ($ billion) 
Energy 97 33.9 
Telecom 34 43.1 
Transport 166 18.9 
Water and Sewerage 9 0.3 
Total 306 96.2 
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org) 
 
It should also be remembered that the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which has 
driven much of the world’s thinking about Public-Private Partnerships, and Japan require 
that before the PPP mode is adopted, a careful evaluation is undertaken to establish that 
the government is likely to get the value for its money. In addition, governments also 
apply a Public Sector Comparator to establish that the cost to the exchequer would be 
lower in the case of PPP-based procurement as compared to the conventional mode of 
procurement. However, 'no such analysis is presently being done in India before approval 
…of…PPP projects.'116 This makes this study a pioneering study for India and one that 
                                                 
116 Government of India, Planning Commission (Secretariat for Infrastructure). 2010. Report of the Task 




directly contributes to policy making with regard to private participation in 
infrastructure.  
 
4: Data description  
Some India related PPP project data is publicly available over the internet 
(http://www.pppindiadatabase.com). In addition, some project-level financial information 
is also available in a Price Waterhouse Coopers report entitled ‘Public-Private-
Partnership Financing in India’ (2007, report prepared for the World Bank). This has 
been supplemented by information from the relevant ministries, annual reports of 
ministries, answers to parliament questions, presentations of government officials, audit 
reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, and websites of project 
companies.  
 
The PPP database (http://www.pppindiadatabase.com) has provision to provide 
information on individual projects relating to location of the projects, capacity/ size, type 
of PPP, contracting authority, contract period, project status, some bidding information 
(including contract award method, bid criteria, number of bids, financial closure date, 
date of commencement of construction, date of commencement of operation), project 
benefits and costs (including estimated project cost, amount of government support), 
legal instruments (including risk allocation and dispute resolution mechanism), and some 
financial information. While this was supposed to be the main source of information for 
the current study, most of the data under the above headings is missing for many projects 
in the database, which implies that data has to be supplemented from various other 
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sources mentioned above.  
 
Data collection for this chapter posed many challenges as much of this data is not public. 
In addition, the data used in the analysis is real-time data which poses additional 
collection difficulties. Some of the data used is from newspapers which posed problems 
of reliability and consistency and had to be validated from multiple sources.  
 
In addition, data availability in terms of level of detail has limited our ability to draw 
sharper conclusions. Thus, in the case of BOT (toll) roads, we had to use the national 
average toll collection rate as the value of tolls foregone by the government in favor of 
the concessionaire, which could possibly have led to a higher value for money from such 
projects. If we had more detailed information (i.e., project-specific toll collection rate), it 
would have been possible to use a more realistic counterfactual, which could have led to 
a better value for money estimate. 
 
The data that has been used in this chapter relates mainly to India. The basic idea in using 
this data was to carry on in-depth analysis of Value for Money of a few projects for 
which data could be accessed rather than attempt a multinational study which would 
suffer from more methodological complications and problems associated with missing 
data. The latter was also attempted for road projects with data from Project Finance 
International (www.pfie.com) but was abandoned because of missing data for crucial 




5: Methodology  
 
Taking into account the methodology used for calculating value for money in PPPs in the 
UK, Australia, and South Africa, this study tries to establish the counterfactual by 
relying on the concept of Public Sector Comparator (PSC). The discounted incremental 
cost of the PPP option is compared to that of traditional public procurement (based on 
PSC) to arrive at the value for money to the government in such transactions.  
 
To illustrate, the following methodology has been used to calculate the Value for Money 
to the government in BOT (annuity) projects:  
 
 Value for Money to the government = Present Value of (estimated Project Cost + 
estimated O&M expenditure over the life of the contract – Annuity payments).  
 
This methodology is illustrated in the figure below. The government, instead of making 
lumpy investments at the start of the project for constructing it (area A in Figure 3) and 
subsequently making small Operation & Maintenance expenditures (area B), is making 
annuity payments for the duration of the contract (area C). Value for money is given by 
the area (A+B-C).  
 




















End of construction period 




End of contract period 
Obviously, the above estimation would be based on assumptions about project cost, 
discount rate, etc. I would examine the robustness of these assumptions through a 
sensitivity analysis of my results obtained by changing the important assumptions of my 
models. 
  
In addition, this study uses a variety of other methods for benchmarking PPP offers for 
calculating value for money, depending on availability of concrete information, rather 
than relying on too many questionable assumptions. There is support in the literature too 
for benchmarking PPPs. For example, Fitzgerald117 maintains that the use of a PSC 
should be discontinued in circumstances where public provision is not a reasonable 
option going forward (because of, say, fiscal crunch). In such circumstances, the analytic 
comparison should be against a reference case or a range of benchmarks. The National 
                                                 
117 Fitzgerald, Peter. 2004. Review of Partnerships Victoria Provided Infrastructure. Melbourne, Australia: 




Audit Office (2007), UK also benchmarked the ongoing services component of PFI 
projects. Benchmarking, as used in this study, is the price comparison of the PPP offer 
against the public sector/ reserve price of equivalent services.  
 
There are obvious limitations in using PSCs118: inaccuracy because of poor data 
availability, subjectivity and dependence on assumptions (sometimes dealt by using a 
range of estimates through sensitivity analysis rather than using point estimates), omitted 
risks like that of contract renegotiation, no consensus on discount rate, long-term nature 
of the contract and the associated uncertainty, and inappropriateness of the benchmark 
when the public sector does not have the resources to implement the project. These 
limitations should be kept in mind while evaluating the results of this study.  
 
Overall, the PSC approach is itself not a ‘first best’ approach but a cost-effective 
compromise between a full cost-benefit analysis of all project options (as in Germany) 
and simply selecting the ‘best’ private bid (as in France) which at the same time ensures 
that all projects are treated in a like for like way and are subjected to a broadly similar 
and systematic test for VfM119. It would be important to keep in mind that value for 
money calculations provide a useful, though incomplete, method to evaluate the utility of 
PPPs. It follows, therefore, that recourse to PPPs in infrastructure projects should not 
                                                 
118 Leigland, James, and Chris Shugart. 2006. Is the Public Sector Comparator Right for Developing 
Countries? The World Bank: PPIAF Gridlines 
 
119 Grimsey, Darrin and Mervyn K Lewis. 2005. Are Public-Private Partnerships value for money? 
Evaluating alternative approaches and comparing academic and practitioner views. Accounting Forum 29 




solely be based on the value for money numbers, and should be supplemented by 
qualitative assessment of evidence from past projects120. 
 
6. Sector-wise calculation of Value for Money in Indian PPPs   
 
PPP projects would seem to provide immense value for money to the Indian 
government as the average draw-down on fiscal resources on account of government 
grants in Indian PPPs is only 4% of project costs121 (as against the maximum 
permissible grant of 40%), while a functional asset is created. However, some anecdotal 
evidence is out of sync with this hypothesis. In the case of the Dabhol power project 
(now known as Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited), the government of India 
shelled out about $2 billion to buy out a PPP project of about 2000 MW capacity in 2005 
and has contracted for power from the project at about US 6 cents per kilowatt hour 
(kWh). Even now, the project is only partially operational owing to shortage of feedstock. 
Meanwhile, the project cost is increasing relentlessly imposing a substantial burden on 
the public sector. As against this, the power price contracted for the ultra mega power 
projects122 (UMPPs) is only about US 2.4-4.7 cents per kWh in the 4 UMPPs awarded to 
                                                 
120 Government of Victoria (Australia), Public Accounts and Estimates Committee. 2006. Report on 
Private Investment in Public Infrastructure  
 
121 Price Waterhouse Coopers. 2007. Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Financing in India. Report 
prepared for the World Bank. 
 
122 Ultra Mega-Power Projects (UMPPs) are large-sized coal-based power projects of about 4,000 MW 
capacity each being developed on a Build-Own-Operate basis through PPPs involving a capital outlay of 
about $4 billion. To expedite the implementation of these projects, the Government of India has created 
shell companies with all pre-implementation clearances (including land acquisition and environmental 
clearance) and then opened these companies for tariff-based competitive bidding by private parties. The 
pre-implementation clearances in UMPPs have reduced the project development risks of private parties. 
UMPPs are expected to use supercritical technology and would be based on pithead (captive blocks) or 
imported coal (coastal blocks). 4 UMPPs have been awarded to-date. 
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date123. So, the Dabhol project is not value for money to the government.  
 
Similarly, the Delhi-Noida toll bridge project provides a guaranteed annual 20% return 
on total project cost (TPC), and the TPC has been left open-ended. The project cost has 
already doubled in the first five years of operations, owing to shortfall in guaranteed 
returns. A simulation exercise undertaken using the traffic and associated revenue 
projections for the project showed that starting with a total project cost of Rs. 9.53 billion 
in 2006, and even if the entire operating surplus were allocated to payment of returns, 
there would still be a shortfall in returns each year, with the result that the total project 
cost in 2021 could be about Rs. 118.18 billion124. To re-emphasize the point, a project 
worth $80 million125 when it was commissioned in 2001 would become a white elephant 
worth $2.4 billion in 2021 imposing substantial burden on the public sector, and in turn 
the tax-payers and the customers. This underscores the need for optimal risk sharing 
between the public and private sectors in PPP contracts and returns to be commensurate 
with the risks borne by the stakeholders. As the Delhi-Noida toll bridge case study 
illustrates, PPPs can impose substantial financial burden on the public sector and 
commensurately result in negative value for money. 
 
Given the above anecdotal evidence, the study attempts a more structured analysis for 
calculating value for money in some infrastructure sectors of the Indian economy.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
123 Source: Project Finance International (www.pfie.com) 
 
124 Government of India (Planning Commission). 2007. Concession for the Delhi Noida Bridge case study 
 






There was a major move away from ‘item rate’ contracts to Public-Private-Partnerships 
(PPP) under build-operate-transfer (BOT) mode for implementing road projects since the 
beginning of the decade so that scarce budgetary resources could be leveraged to access a 
larger pool of private capital. In addition, it was also expected that PPP projects would be 
delivered on time without cost overruns, and the quality of service would improve. To 
further streamline the mode of implementation of road projects, the Government of India 
decided in April 2007 that all new projects under different phases of the National 
Highways Development Program (NHDP) would be taken up on PPP basis by awarding 
them first on BOT (toll), failing which on BOT (annuity), failing which on engineering-
procurement-construction (EPC) basis126.  
 
On-time and cost effective service delivery are major concerns in Indian road projects. As 
per the Project Implementation Status Report of Central Sector Projects costing Rs. 0.20 
billion and above127, out of the 211 projects under implementation in the road sector in 
India, 82 are within time and cost, 125 projects are suffering from time-overrun of 1 
month to 92 months, while 19 projects have cost-overruns of an average of 20%. 110 
projects are within cost but with time overrun, 4 projects are within time but with cost 
overrun, and 15 projects are with time and cost overrun. 
                                                 
126 Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. 2009. Annual Report 2008-09 
 
127 Government of India (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation). 2008. Project 






As per the Project Implementation Status Report, the main factors contributing to 
occurrence of time overrun in the road projects have been - adverse law and order 
situation in states like Bihar and Jharkhand; difficulties experienced in land acquisition in 
Maharashtra , Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu; difficulty in getting forest clearance in Orissa, 
UP, and Jammu & Kashmir; removal of large number of structures including places of 
worship from the alignment of various packages in case of UP, Tamil Nadu and Andhra 
Pradesh and also removal of various utilities such as water mains, electrical lines, sewer 
lines, telephone lines, wind mills in Bihar, Karnataka, Maharashtra, West Bengal and 
Tamil Nadu; pending court cases in West Bengal and Gujarat; slow progress on the part 
of contractors and non-availability of quarry stone of the desired grade in Bihar and 
Karnataka; award of contracts without completing formalities of land acquisition, delay 
in obtaining approval for rail over bridges (ROBs), changes in the design and alignment 
subsequent to award of contract due to factors such as local soil and geology of the 
region; inadequate deployment of qualified skilled labor and engineers by contractors at 
project – sites; poor cash flow position of the contractors due to sharp rise in prices of 
cement and steel, and difficult geology of the region as in case of packages undertaken in 
the Deccan region of Maharashtra. 
 
To address some of the reasons for such delays in project implementation, the new Model 
Concession Agreement for roads in India stipulates that 60% land acquisition and utilities 
clearance be done by the contracting agency, National Highway Authority of India 
(NHAI), and passed on to the road developer before the financial closure of the project. 
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In addition, the NHAI Board in its meeting held in May 2009 decided to award contracts 
only after Notification under Section 3D(1) of the National Highways Act 1956 is issued 
for all land to be acquired from private landowners. This Notification vests the land 
absolutely in the Central Government. 
 
The two major methods for implementing BOT road projects are BOT (annuity) and 
BOT (toll). The major difference between these two relates to allocation of traffic risk, 
which is assumed by the government in the former to make the project attractive to the 
private sector, while it remains with the concessionaire in the latter case.  
 
BOT (annuity) projects: In such projects, construction, operation, and maintenance are to 
be performed by the concessionaire who gets annuity payments determined by 
competitive bidding to recover his investment. Annuity payments are borne by the public 
sector in the form of deferred budgetary payments and the concessionaire receives a fixed 
sum directly from the contracting agency, NHAI, biannually for the services provided by 
the road over the life of the contract. At present, 24 BOT (annuity) projects have been 
executed/ are under execution for a total road length of 1,340 km in India. The total cost 
of these projects is estimated at Rs.92.06 billion (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: BOT (Annuity) based projects in India 
 Awarded   Completed 












NHDP-I 8 476 23.54 2.88 8 476 
NHDP-II 16 864 68.52 6.02   
Total 24 1340 92.06 8.90 8 476 
NHDP: National Highways Development Program is the flagship program for the development of roads of 
the Government of India. NHDP Phase I connects the four mega-cities of Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, and 
Delhi. NHDP Phase II connects the East-West and North-South extremities of the country. 
Source: Government of India (Department of Road Transport & Highways). 2007. Presentation on PPPs in 
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National Highways in the Conference of Chief Secretaries on PPP in Infrastructure on July 21, 2007 at 
New Delhi  
 
We have analyzed all 8 BOT (annuity) projects under NHDP Phase I that are under 
operation.  The following assumptions have been made in the value for money (VfM) 
analysis for BOT (annuity) road projects using the simplified Public Sector Comparator 
(PSC) method: 
 The estimated project cost by NHAI is increased by 25% on account of optimism 
bias128. Project implementation is spread over three years ending in the planned 
year of completion in the ratio 1:2:2.   
 Operation and maintenance (O&M) costs is Rs.1 million per km per year129 at 
constant prices.  
 The project revenues for the concessionaire consist of annuity only130.The annuity 
payments are made for 15 years after the construction period of 3 years, unless 
otherwise stated.  
 Discount rate is 11% (6% on account of time value of money131, corresponding to 
the yield on treasury bonds of comparable maturity at the time the projects were 
                                                 
128 Column 4 of tables 4 and 5 show the estimated project cost by the contracting agency, NHAI. Optimism 
bias in project estimates arises from underestimating project costs and duration or overestimating project 
benefits. We assume (conservatively) an optimism bias of 25% in the NHAI estimates on the basis of data 
on 4 projects [2 BOT(annuity) projects and 2 BOT (toll) projects] where the average difference between the 
estimated project cost and the cost at financial closure was 39.5%. These projects are: Nellore Bypass 
(optimism bias 19%), Maharashtra Border-Belgaum (78%), Nellore-Tada (15%) and Tumkur - 
Neelmangala (46%); see Report of the Core Group on Financing of the National Highway Development 
Programme (http://www.pppinindia.com/pdf/NHDP.pdf) for phasing of the construction cost. 
 
129 Report of the Core Group on Financing of the National Highway Development Programme 
(http://www.pppinindia.com/pdf/NHDP.pdf) page 23. 
 
130 Government of India (Department of Road Transport and Highways). Model Concession Agreement for 
Annuity-Based Projects (http://www.nhai.org/annuity.pdf) 
 




awarded, plus 5% on account of inflation, which corresponds to the actual 
historical rate of inflation in the country). 
 
We do not account for toll collection after completion of these BOT (annuity) projects as 
the tolling option would be available to the government even with conventional 
procurement of the project. The asset residual value of PPP project is not taken into 
account because it is assumed to be the same as under the PSC option to keep the VfM 
estimate conservative. We do not adjust for differential taxation and transaction costs of 
the PPP projects for simplification.  
 
As already stated, the following methodology has been used to calculate value for money 
to the government in BOT (annuity) projects:  
 Value for Money to the government = Present Value of (estimated Project Cost + 
estimated O&M expenditure over the life of the contract – Annuity payments).  
    
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4 below. Overall, there is a positive 
value for money to the government from these 8 projects (about 8% of the present value 
of estimated project and O&M costs). 
 
Table 4: Value for Money in NHDP Phase I for BOT (annuity) projects 





















































































65 4,324 400 1542 27% Oct 2002 Feb 
2005 
July 2005 
Total for 8 
projects  
 476 23,537 2,878 2,624 8%    
* Contract period of 17 years with construction over 2 years and O&M over the next 15 years. 
** Contract period of 15 years with construction over 2.5 years and O&M over the next 12.5 years. 
*** Contract period of 17.5 years with construction over 2.5 years and O&M over the next 15 years. 
Source: India PPP Database (http://www.pppindiadatabase.com); Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India. 2008. Union Audit Reports: Public-Private Partnership in implementation of road projects of 
National Highways Authority of India (Performance Audit - Report 16 of 2008). 
(http://www.cag.gov.in/html/reports/commercial/2008_PA16com/contents.htm); NHAI website - NHAI 
Contracts with BOT-Annuity Funding (http://203.200.117.60/CPISWeb/Reports/ViewReport.aspx). Value 
for money calculations are those of the author. 
 
The estimate of the value for money to the government is conservative for a number of 
reasons. Though we have assumed an optimism bias of 25% in the cost estimates of 
NHAI, the actual optimism bias could be higher. In the case of Nellore Bypass project, 
the estimated project cost was Rs.1,432 million, while the project cost at financial close 
was Rs.1,700 million (an optimism bias of 18.7%). Similarly, estimated project cost for 
Maharashtra Border-Belgaum project was Rs.3,320 million, while the project cost at 
financial close was Rs.5,905 million (an optimism bias of 77.9%). If there is optimism 
bias, area A of Figure 2 would be larger than what it is with a concomitant positive 




In addition, conventionally procured road projects are routinely delayed (59% projects 
are delayed, with delays of 1 month to 92 months)132, while the timeliness of delivery of 
the BOT (annuity) projects seems to be better. 3 projects were delivered before their 
scheduled delivery time (Nellore Bypass,  Maharastra Border-Belgaum, and Tambaram - 
Tindivanam road) for an average of 1.67 months while 3 suffered slippages (Ankapalli – 
Tuni, Palsit – Dankuni, and Panagarh – Palsit) of an average of 5.67 months, and the 
balance 2 were delivered on time. Even here, the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(CAG) of India has observed133 that in the case of Panagarh-Palsit project, there was a 
delay of 5 months in making the required land available and finalizing the issue of 
change of scope orders. So, this may not be treated as a case of concessionaire default.  
 
As stated earlier, 9% of the traditionally procured projects are suffering from cost-
overruns of an average of 20%. But, the incidence of cost-overruns could be higher. As 
per a recent World Bank study134, the average cost-overrun was 24% in 28 recently 
completed national and state highway projects. The risk of cost-overrun to the 
government under PPP procurement may be limited as construction cost risk is 
transferred to the private sector. As per the pioneering UK study135, projected savings of 
                                                 
132 Government of India (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation). 2008. Project 
Implementation Status Report of Central Sector Projects costing Rs. 20 crore and above (July-September 
2008). (http://mospi.nic.in/mospi_pi_status_report.htm) 
 
133 Comptroller and Auditor General of India. 2008. Union Audit Reports: Public-Private Partnership in 
implementation of road projects of National Highways Authority of India (Performance Audit - Report 16 
of 2008). (http://www.cag.gov.in/html/reports/commercial/2008_PA16com/contents.htm) 
 
134 World Bank. 2008. Indian Road Construction Industry: Capacity Issues, Constraints, and 
Recommendations. Washington DC: The World Bank 
 
135 Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE. 2000. Value for Money Drivers in the Private Finance Initiative, a 




17% in PPP projects are sensitive to risk transfer valuation that accounted for 60% of the 
forecasted cost savings. The risk that attracted the highest valuation is that of construction 
cost overruns.  
 
Consolidating over 14 studies for UK, Australia, France, and Norway, Bain136 finds that 
the average construction cost overrun in PPPs (at 13%) is around half that observed in 
conventionally procured projects, and the range of outturn costs is significantly narrower 
(see Table 5 below). Even this construction cost overrun does not represent a risk to the 
public sector as Bain finds that experienced PPP contractors with strong balance sheets 
and reputations will complete their obligations as intended and at their own risk. To 
illustrate the point, Bain says that in the case of Spencer Street Station PPP in Melbourne, 
the contractor (Leighton) admitted that it had suffered significant losses yet it completed 
the works with no additional payments from the public sector. 
 
Table 5: Construction cost overrun (conventional procurement vs PPPs) consolidated over 14 studies 
 Conventional procurement PPPs 
Maximum 98% 20% 
Average 25% 13% 
Minimum -9% -4% 
  Source: Bain, Robert. 2010. Construction Risk - What risk? Project Finance International (www.pfie.com) 
 
All these factors (optimism bias in cost estimates, timeliness of delivery, and limited risk 
of cost-overrun) would improve the overall VfM. Finally, given the fiscal crunch, it may 
not have been possible for the government to undertake all these projects. So, the overall 
economic benefits should be much higher.  
 
We also carried out sensitivity analysis of value of money to changes in discount rate and 
                                                 




optimism bias. We found that the value of money in BOT (annuity) projects is very 
sensitive to discount rates (see Table 6 below). With an assumed optimism bias of 25%, 
the VfM increases to 20% from 8% if we increase the discount rate from 11% to 13%, 
while it decreases to -7% if we decrease the discount rate to 9%. This is because of the 
impact of the discount rate on large future annuity liabilities in such PPPs. 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis of VfM in BOT (annuity) projects 
Optimism bias 
 15% 25% 35% 
9% -14% -7% -1% 
11% 2% 8% 13% 
Discount 
rate 
 13% 15% 20% 25% 
 
This disproportionate impact of discount rate on VfM is in line with what was found in 
the Australian evaluation137 of PPPs where opposite conclusions were reached when 
using a 8.65% discount rate (leading to the conclusion that the PPP mechanism was 9% 
cheaper than traditional delivery) compared to an evaluation adopting a 5.7% discount 
rate (when the PPP mechanism was apparently 6% more expensive). 
                                                
 
BOT (toll) Projects: BOT (toll) projects are the preferred mode of implementing PPP 
road projects in India apparently because no annuity payments need to be made and the 
traffic risk is borne by the concessionaire [as opposed to BOT (annuity) projects where 
traffic risk is borne by the government]. In these projects, the concession includes 
construction, operation and maintenance by the concessionaire and the investment is 
recovered through toll revenues. Budgetary support is restricted to an upfront grant to the 
concessionaire determined through competitive bidding and is up to a maximum of 40% 
 




of the project cost. This upfront grant is expected to compensate the concessionaire for 
undertaking projects that are economically viable but fall below financial viability 
threshold because of externalities that the market is not able to capture.  
 
So far 94 projects valued at about Rs.381.70 billion have been awarded on BOT (toll) 
basis. Out of these, 43 projects have been completed and 51 projects are under 
progress138. We have analyzed all 9 BOT (toll) projects under NHDP Phase I that are 
under operation. It is important to choose operational projects as promised benefits may 
not always materialize. Thus, the BOT (annuity) and BOT (toll) road projects analyzed in 
this chapter constitute the entire universe of such projects implemented under NHDP 
Phase I. Selection bias in projects considered for analysis is addressed by considering all 
BOT (annuity) and BOT (toll) projects implemented under NHDP Phase I. But, only the 
more viable projects may have been considered for bidding out, so selection bias remains. 
 
The assumptions used in the analysis are the same as for BOT (annuity) projects 
presented above, except the following additional assumptions about tolls and upfront 
grant (viability gap funding): 
 Tolls are foregone by the government in favor of the concessionaire in such 
projects. Toll collection has been assumed to be Rs.4 million per km per annum139 
                                                 
138 Government of India (Ministry of Road Transport and Highways). 2009. Annual Report 2008-09 
 
139 Total toll collection during Indian financial year 2008-09 was Rs.26.13 billion. The average annual 
collection made through toll roads works out to Rs.4.06 million per km.  [Reply to Rajya Sabha (Upper 
House of Indian Parliament) Question No. 539; replied on July 08, 2009]. Data availability in terms of level 
of detail has limited our ability to draw sharper conclusions. In the case of BOT (toll) roads, we had to use 
the national average toll collection rate as the value of tolls foregone by the government in favor of the 
concessionaire, which could possibly have led to an over-estimation of value for money from such projects 
on this count. If we had more detailed information (i.e., project-specific toll collection rate), it would have 
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(in constant terms140). The growth rate of toll revenue has been assumed to be 6% 
per annum on account of traffic growth. 60% of the potential toll receipts have 
been considered141. 
 Equity brought in by the concessionaire is spread over 3 years in proportion to 
progress in construction of the project and is assumed to be in the ratio 1:2:2. 
Since viability gap funding (upfront grant) is released in proportion to the equity 
brought in by the concessionaire, we assume the same spread for it. 
 
The methodology for calculating VfM stands slightly modified given the nature of BOT 
(toll) projects wherein the toll receipts are the returns to the concessionaire instead of 
annuity payments from the government:  
 Cost savings to government = Present value of (estimated Project Cost + 
estimated O&M expenditure over the life of the project –  Viability Gap funding)  
 Value for Money to the government = Cost savings to government - present value 
of potential toll receipts.  
                                                                                                                                                 
been possible to use a more realistic counterfactual, which could have led to a better value for money 
estimate. 
 
140 The annual increase in toll rates is to the full extent of the inflation rate as can be inferred from the 
following: The fee collection on Delhi-Gurgaon BOT project started from 25.01.2008 on the basis of 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) of December, 2006 (208.40). The fee rates have since been increased twice. 
The first revision of 3.98% increase was made from 1st April, 2008 (based on WPI of 216.7 for the week 
ending on or nearest to 31st December, 2007). The second revision of 5.77% increase has become effective 
from 1st April, 2009 (based on WPI of 229.20 for the week ending on or nearest to 31st December, 2008). 
[Reply to Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Indian Parliament) Question No. 542; replied on July 08, 2009]. 
 
141 As quoted in The Economic Times. May 1, 2009. According to the Committee on Infrastructure 
(Government of India), NHAI could put up toll facilities only on 58.7% of 11,037 km of completed 
highways across the country. In our sample of 17 BOT projects, while the private sector could put up toll 
facilities in all 9 BOT (toll) projects, the public sector was able to put up toll facilities on only 4 of the 8 
BOT (annuity) projects, with no toll facilities on the following projects: Tuni-Dharmavaram, 
Dharmavaram-Rajahmundry, Nellore Bypass, and Panagarh-Palsit projects. [Reply to Lok Sabha (Lower 





The methodology is illustrated in Figure 3 below. The government, instead of making 
lumpy investments at the start of the project for constructing it (area A in Figure 3) and 
subsequently making small O&M expenditures (area B), is giving up the option of tolling 
these roads for the duration of the contract (area C) in favor of the concessionaire. 
Adjustment is made to the project cost on account of viability gap funding sought from 
the government. Value for money is given by (A+B-C).  
    
Figure 4: Value for Money in BOT (toll) road projects  
 
 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Value for Money in NHDP Phase I BOT (toll) projects 
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35 1386.50 402 -145 -6% Aug 2001 Dec 2003 June 2004 

























End of construction period 




End of contract period 
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Satara - Kagal Mahara
shtra 
133 6000 2400 -514 -5% Feb 2002 Aug 2004 May 2006 
Mahapura 




90.38 6440 2110 3,106 36% April 
2003 






1 180 166.60 53 25% March 
1998 






6 6410 1200 5,802 80% Sept 2002 Apr 2007 June 2007 
Durg Bypass Chhattis
garh  
18 700 0 94 8% March 
1999 
Jan 2001 Jan 2001 
Delhi-Gurgaon 
Highway 
Delhi 28 7100 (-) 610 7,728 93% Apr 2002 July 2005 Jan 2008 
Total for 9 
projects  
 454 35,980 7189.30 18,416 36.4%    
Source: India PPP Database (http://www.pppindiadatabase.com); Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India. 2008. Union Audit Reports: Public-Private Partnership in implementation of road projects of 
National Highways Authority of India (Performance Audit - Report 16 of 2008). 
(http://www.cag.gov.in/html/reports/commercial/2008_PA16com/contents.htm); NHAI website - NHAI 
Contracts with BOT Funding (http://203.200.117.60/CPISWeb/Reports/ViewReport.aspx). Value for 
money calculations are those of the author. 
 
We find that the Value for Money in our sample of BOT (toll) projects is 36.4% of the 
present value of estimated project and O&M costs. However, this estimate of VfM in 
BOT (toll) road projects is conservative for the same reasons as in BOT (annuity) 
projects:  
 Higher than assumed optimism bias in cost estimates: There was an optimism bias 
in cost estimates of 15% and 46% respectively in at least two of these projects 
(Nellore-Tada and Tumkur - Neelmangala) given by the difference in the NHAI 
project cost estimate and the cost at financial closure;  
 Timeliness of delivery of PPP projects: We find that traditionally procured road 
projects are routinely delayed (59% projects are delayed, with delays of 1 month 
to 92 months)142. Out of the 9 BOT (toll) projects considered, we find that 1 was 
                                                 
142 Government of India (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation). 2008. Project 





delivered before time, 3 were delivered on time, while 5 suffered a time overrun 
of an average of 12.2 months. However, the CAG report143 observes that in the 
case of the Satara - Kagal road, out of the overall delay of 21 months, there was 
delay of 9 months in execution of additional items of work and the balance delay 
of 12 months in completion of the project was due to deficient performance of the 
concessionaire. In the case of Delhi-Gurgaon Highway, failure to provide land to 
the concessionaire in time and delay of 26 months in issuing orders for change of 
scope of work for Rs.1466.20 million by the NHAI contributed to the delay in 
completion of the project. If allowance for such delays that were not a result of 
deficient performance of the concessionaire is made, the time over-run in the case 
of the entire sample of BOT (toll) projects decreases to just over 2 months.  
 As stated earlier, the risk of cost-overrun in PPPs may be limited as construction 
cost risk has been transferred to the private sector.  
 
All these factors (higher than assumed optimism bias in cost estimates, timeliness of 
delivery, and limited risk of cost-overrun) would improve the overall VfM. Finally, given 
the fiscal crunch, it may not have been possible for the government to undertake all these 
projects. So, the overall economic benefits should be much higher.  
 
We also carried out sensitivity analysis of value for money over potential toll receipts and 
optimism bias. The results are presented in the table 8 below. If we assume collection of 
                                                 
143 Comptroller and Auditor General of India. 2008. Union Audit Reports: Public-Private Partnership in 
implementation of road projects of National Highways Authority of India (Performance Audit - Report 16 




100% potential toll receipts, ceteris paribus, the VfM from BOT (toll) projects declines 
to just 2.5% at the assumed optimism bias of 25%. 
 
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis of Value for Money in BOT (toll) projects 
Collection ratio of potential tolls 
 60% 80% 100% 
15% 32.2% 14.0% -4.1% 
25% 36.4% 19.4% 2.5% 
Optimism 
bias 
 35% 40.2% 24.2% 8.2% 
 
The weighted average VfM from 8 BOT (annuity) projects and 9 BOT (toll) projects that 
constitutes the entire universe of such projects in NHDP Phase I is 25.1%. This will 
increase with increasing optimism bias and discount rate. However, it will decrease, 
ironically, with increase in the collection ratio of potential tolls. But, this stands to reason 
as increased efficiency of government (reflected in increased collection ratio of potential 
tolls) would reduce the differential advantage of the private sector performing the same 
tasks.  
 
The Government of India assigns priority to BOT (toll) mode of procurement of road 
projects over BOT (annuity) projects144. Our results confirm this priority on the basis of 
value for money to the government.  
 
Overall, the following conclusions follow from our analysis of road PPP projects: 
 There is value for money to the government in road PPP projects (average 25%). 
However, not all PPP projects provide positive value for money. So, government 
                                                 
144 See, for example, Government of India (Planning Commission). 2006. Report of the Core Group on 




should be mindful of the six key drivers of value for money in PPP projects145 
[risk transfer, the long term nature of contracts (including whole life costing), the 
use of an output-based specification, competition, performance measurement and 
incentives, and private sector management skills], which should be harnessed to 
improve VfM from PPP projects. The CAG has also emphasized that there is 
room for improvement in the following areas by the contracting authority, NHAI, 
so as to be able to realize increased VfM: monitoring and taking corrective action 
for timely project execution and ensuring that agreement clauses relating to levy 
of penalty are implemented in spirit146.  
 PPP projects perform significantly better in terms of timeliness of delivery: 59% 
of projects are delayed in conventional procurement while 47% of projects are 
delayed in PPPs. Another important point to note is that a quarter of the PPP 
projects in our sample were delivered before their due date. In addition, the delay 
in many cases is due to factors not in the control of the concessionaire. BOT 
(annuity) projects perform significantly better than BOT (toll) projects in terms of 
timeliness of delivery. 
 There is limited problem of cost-overrun in PPPs as construction cost risk is 
passed on to the private sector. As per the policy of the government, escalation 
due to delays is paid as per contract provision. In case the project is delayed due 
to reasons attributable to the concessionaire, liquidated damages are imposed and 
                                                 
145 Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE. 2000. Value for Money Drivers in the Private Finance Initiative, a 
report commissioned by The Treasury Taskforce. 
 
146 The CAG report points out that although concession agreements provide for levy of penalties for 
deficient/ nonperformance, NHAI failed to impose penalty of Rs.282.30 million due in three out of eight 
projects test-checked. Also, the NHAI did not incorporate the clause for recovery of penalty towards non-




no escalation is paid. Escalation is paid only in case where the delay is beyond the 
control of the concessionaire147. 
 One of the important reasons for involving the private sector in infrastructure 
provision was to ensure superior quality service. As per the CAG Report148, 
quality checks conducted by Central Road Research Institute (India) in six road 
projects revealed that the pavement surface condition was generally found to be 
satisfactory in all the projects. 
 Sensitivity analysis of our results shows that value for money to the government 
in PPPs increases with increasing discount rate (owing to large future annuity 
liabilities in such PPPs) and optimism bias, and, ironically, reduction in the 
assumed efficiency of toll collection by the government.  
 
However, the value for money calculations in the road sector is subject to an important 
caveat. It is not true that the selection of projects to be implemented by the public sector 
and the private sector is a random process. If there is a qualitative difference between the 
projects that are implemented by the public sector and the private sector, we cannot be 
sure that the 'net benefits' from PPP projects are for real or merely reflecting qualitative 
differences among projects in the sense that the private sector is cherry-picking the better 
projects for implementation. This endogeneity issue has not been dealt in this chapter and 
is game for future research (more on this later).          
                                                 
147 Reply to Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) Question No. 1371; replied on 07.14.2009. 
 
148 Comptroller and Auditor General of India. 2008. Union Audit Reports: Public-Private Partnership in 
implementation of road projects of National Highways Authority of India (Performance Audit - Report 16 







Cost- and time-overruns are major issues in the power sector. As per the Project 
Implementation Status Report of Central Sector Projects costing Rs. 0.20 billion and 
above149, out of the 66 projects under implementation in the power sector, 29 are within 
time and cost, 21 projects have cost-overruns of an average of 13% while 31 projects are 
suffering from time-overrun of 1 month to 68 months. 6 projects are within time but with 
cost overrun, 15 projects are within cost but with time overrun, and 16 projects are with 
time and cost overrun. As per the Report, even the strongest public sector undertaking, 
NTPC has many projects that are suffering from time overruns (Koldam Hydroelectric – 
23 months; Kahalgaon Thermal – 19 months; Sipat Thermal Stage I – 3 months; Sipat 
Thermal Stage II – 8 months; Barh Thermal – 19 months). Time overruns could be 
related to land acquisition problems, financing issues, fuel availability and linkages 
(shortage of coal), delays in environmental and forest clearances, and fragmentation of 
authority between states and the federal government with regard to environmental 
clearance, etc.  
 
One of the new initiatives in the power sector is the setting up of Ultra Mega Power 
Projects (UMPPs). UMPPs are large-sized power projects each of about 4,000 MW 
capacity being developed on a Build-Own-Operate basis involving a capital outlay of 
                                                 
149 Government of India (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation). 2008. Project 





about $4 billion each and are being developed without any guarantees as opposed to the 
power policy in the mid-1990s when guarantees were extensively used. To reduce project 
development risks, shell companies with most pre-implementation clearances (including 
land-acquisition, fuel and water linkage, and environmental clearance) are first created 
for these coal-based UMPPs and then these companies are opened for tariff-based 
competitive bidding by private parties. These shell companies (special purpose vehicles, 
SPVs), are subsequently transferred to the successful bidder. UMPPs are expected to use 
supercritical technology resulting in higher fuel efficiency and lower greenhouse gas 
emissions and would be based on pithead (captive blocks) or imported coal (coastal 
blocks).  
 
The price bid of NTPC, a state-owned enterprise, in UMPPs can provide a benchmark for 
the value for money calculations in the power sector. NTPC submitted bids for the Sasan 
UMPP and the Tilaiya UMPP (both awarded to Reliance Power). So, we can use the 
price of the winning bidder vis-a-vis that of NTPC to arrive at an estimate of the value for 
money in power sector PPPs.  
 
Table 9: Value for money in Power sector PPPs 




(Reliance Power Ltd) 
Percent saving as 
compared to  PSC 
Sasan UMPP (levelized 
tariff Rs./ kwh) 
2.13 1.20 44 
Tilaiya UMPP (levelized 
tariff Rs./ kwh) 
2.30 1.77 23 
Source: For Sasan UMPP, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1624 answered on August 27, 2007; 
For Tilaiya UMPP, newspaper reports. 
 
There appears to be clear value for money in the power sector from private participation 
(at least 23% cost saving as compared to the public sector comparator). However, one 
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would have to wait and watch whether the private projects become operational at these 
tariffs. It may just be a case of aggressive bidding and the private sector may think that it 
may be possible to renegotiate tariffs after award. Here it may be useful to remember that 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board bought power in the period May 1999 to December 
2000 at an average rate of Rs.4.69 per kWh150 from the Dabhol Power Company (the 
only canceled PPP power generation project in India) compared to the projected tariff of 
Rs.2.40 per kWh and Rs.1.89 per kWh at the time of signing the original Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) and the amended PPA in 1993 and 1996 respectively. In this regard, it 
may also be useful to remember that Guasch151 has found the incidence of renegotiation 
to be 30% for infrastructure projects in the Latin America and Caribbean region granted 
over the period 1985-2000. So, the results after commencement of operations would have 
to be watched. 
However, what is making the deal credible is that the Rs.145 billion ($2.9 billion) debt 
facility for the 4,000 MW Sasan UMPP of Reliance Power was inked on April 21, 2009. 
The project has been funded on a debt equity ratio of 75:25. This is the second UMPP 
that has achieved financial close, after that of Mundra UMPP of Tata Power. SBI Capital 
is leading the financing of the domestic facilities, which have tenors ranging from 15 to 
20 years, slightly longer than the earlier 13 to 19 years maturity. Interest rate stays at 
                                                 
150 Rao S L. 2001. Dabhol, Godbole Report and the Future. Economic and Political Weekly.  
 
151 Guasch, J. Luis. 2004. Granting and renegotiating infrastructure concessions: Doing it Right. 




11.75%, which is based on the SBI Prime Lending Rate. It is the largest project finance 
deal in India and the largest project to-date under the PPP route152.  
The tariffs in the four UMPPs bid out till now may be seen in the table below. It would 
appear that there is substantial value for money to the government from these power 
projects as the tariffs of the winning bidders are in the range of US 2.40 cents to US 4.66 
cents per kWh, which is clearly low.    
 
Table 10: Tariffs in Ultra-Mega Power Projects 
Project Capacity 
(MW) 































Tilaiya UMPP 4,000 Reliance 
Power Ltd 




Source: Project Finance International (www.pfie.com) 
 
Port sector  
In consonance with its economic liberalization policy, the Government of India has 
opened up its major ports for private sector participation in a big way to augment 
resources, induct latest technology, improve managerial practices, and speed up creation 
of capacities. Foreign direct investment up to 100% under automatic route is permitted 
for construction and maintenance of ports and harbors. In the port sector, 16 private 
projects worth about Rs.43 billion are already operational. These 16 projects include 6 
container terminals, 4 liquid cargo berths, 5 dry bulk cargo berths, and a container freight 
station (Kandla).  
 
                                                 




The problem of time and cost-overruns in the Indian port sector is quite severe and 
widespread. As per the Project Implementation Status Report of Central Sector Projects 
costing Rs. 0.20 billion and above153, out of the 41 projects under implementation in the 
shipping and ports sector, 15 are within time and cost, 13 projects have cost-overruns of 
an average of 50% while 19 projects are suffering from time-overrun of 4 months to 96 
months. 7 projects are within time but with cost overrun, 13 projects are within cost but 
with time overrun, and 6 projects are with time and cost overrun.  
 
Some of the Chennai Port Trust projects have suffered a time overrun of 74 months while 
the number is 79 months for Cochin Port Trust projects. Similar delays in other port 
projects have been reported: Kolkata Port Trust (23 months delay), Jawaharlal Nehru Port 
Trust (4 months delay), Kandla Port Trust (96 months delay and 80% cost overrun), 
Mormugao Port Trust (94 months delay), New Mangalore Port Trust (24 months delay), 
Paradeep Port Trust (19 months delay and 64% cost overrun), Tuticorin Port Trust (8 
months delay and 11% cost overrun), and Visakhapatnam Port Trust (24 months delay 
and 50% cost overrun).     
 
Some of the private sector terminals are running side-by-side with the public sector 
facilities. One can estimate the counterfactual by looking at the capital and operating 
costs of the private and public sector facilities. The Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), 
Mumbai granted a contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of a new 600 
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meter length container terminal for a period of 30 years on Build, Operate and Transfer 
(BOT) basis to Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal (NSICT). This facility is 
running side-by-side with the JNPT public sector terminal. The total project cost of 
NSICT is Rs. 9.75 billion. The bid criteria were Minimum Guaranteed Throughput and 
Royalty per TEU (Twenty Feet Equivalent Unit). Royalty per TEU varies from Rs.47 in 
year 3 to Rs. 5,610 in year 30.  
 
One of the 2005 orders of Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP154) implied that the 
operating costs of NSICT were considerably lower compared to the public sector terminal 
operated by JNPT. However, the benefit from lower operating costs was appropriated by 
the private sponsors of NSICT through higher than warranted tariffs155. Thus, no net VfM 
accrued to the government or the users on account of lower operating costs of the PPP 
project. The VfM appropriated by the sponsors was manifested in supernormal returns to 
the private investor as shown in the table below: 
 
Table 11: Return on equity (%) in Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal 
 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Actual Return on Equity earned 22 62 103 102 104 
Source: Government of India, Planning Commission. 2007. Case Study on Concession for Nhava Sheva 
International Container Terminal. 
 
NSICT had derived surplus revenue of Rs. 4.73 billion during 2000-01 to 2004-05, which 
was to be set off in the revision of tariff. Had TAMP initiated suo-moto revision prior to 
2005, the tariff would have been reduced by 30% due to setting off of entire surplus 
                                                 
154 TAMP has been set up under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 as an independent statutory authority to 
fix user tariffs and scale of rates for the facilities and services in the major ports. 
 
155 See Planning Commission (2007) Case Study on Concession for Nhava Sheva International Container 
Terminal, where it is stated that despite admitting that a reduction of 30% in NSICT tariff is warranted, 




revenue of Rs. 4.73 billion, but the tariffs were reduced only by 14%. In addition, the 
TAMP in its order dated 22 July 2005 allowed entire royalty paid by NSICT to JNPT 
during 2000-01 to 2004-05 as cost in computation of revised tariff in 2005. Thus the 
entire burden of paying the royalty was transferred to the port users and the NSICT got 
undue gain. When the Ministry of Shipping objected to the order of TAMP allowing 
entire royalty as cost, TAMP revised its order and further reduced the tariff by 12%. 
However, undue benefit, accrued during 2005-06 due to wrong computation of tariff, was 
allowed to be retained by the NSICT156. 
 
This excess return to the project sponsors reflects poor regulatory capacity. When the bid 
criterion was the Royalty per TEU paid to the exchequer, allowing this as a pass through 
by the regulator, “signals a serious breach of law and contract in that the original 
selection criterion was changed ex post, to the benefit of the licensee, after awarding the 
tender,”157 and to the detriment of the users. The Planning Commission study goes on to 
say that “the markup in tariff as a result of the unrequited payments would be in the 
vicinity of 60%. In other words, for every TEU handled, port users paid a rate that was 
nearly 60% higher than that permissible.”  
 
As per the pioneering UK study158, there are six key drivers of value for money in PPP 
projects: risk transfer, the long term nature of contracts (including whole life costing), the 
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157 Planning Commission. 2007. Case Study on Concession for Nhava Sheva International Container 
Terminal. 
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use of an output-based specification, competition, performance measurement and 
incentives, and private sector management skills. However, as per the Planning 
Commission case study, the NSICT Concession Agreement did not specify any 
performance norms or delivery standards to protect user interests. Moreover, no penalties 
have been levied for shortfalls in performance. 
 
To analyze the matter further, a comparison of container charges between JNPT and 
NSICT was carried out (see Table 12 below). NSICT's charges were found to be 
uniformly higher than JNPT despite its costs being lower (as seen earlier). However, this 
is with the caveat that the tariffs for the major federal government-run ports are set by the 
Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) every three years.  
 
Table 12: Charges for Normal Containers (From Ship to Container yard or vice versa) [Rate per 
TEU (in Rs.)] 
Foreign Container Coastal Container 
 
Loaded Empty Loaded Empty 
JNPT 2210 1785 1326 1071 
NSICT 2700 2181 1620 1308 
Excess of JNPT over NSICT (-) 22% (-) 22% (-) 22% (-) 22% 
Source: Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust website (http://www.jnport.com/); NSICT website 
(http://www.nsict.co.in) 
 
The picture that emerges in the port sector is that there is value for money through private 
participation manifested in lower operating costs of the private entity compared to the 
public sector. However, this was not passed on to the consumers. On the contrary, the 
tariffs at the private facility are significantly higher producing super-normal profits for 
the private entity. However, the quality of services at the private facility should be better 
than at the public sector entity so as to enable the private facility to charge higher tariffs 







In common with other infrastructure sectors, the public sector projects suffer from high 
time and cost-overruns in the airport sector. Besides, there is a fiscal crunch, which 
precludes large investments from the government to meet growing demand for 
infrastructure services. So, the government decided to invite the private sector in the hope 
that this would help bridge the demand gap in the sector as well as complete the projects 
within time and budget. 
 
As per the Project Implementation Status Report of Central Sector Projects costing Rs. 
0.20 billion and above159, out of the 31 projects under implementation in the civil aviation 
sector, 8 projects have cost-overruns of an average of 29% and 21 projects are suffering 
from time-overrun of 2 months to 50 months. 1 project is within time but with cost 
overrun, 14 projects are within cost but with time overrun, and 7 projects are with time 
and cost overrun. All these projects are being implemented by the public sector entity, 
Airports Authority of India.  
 
In the airport sector, while Delhi (estimated cost: Rs.89.75 billion and the project was to 
be ready by March 2010) and Mumbai (Rs.98.02 billion by December 2012) are being 
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restructured through the PPP route, Kolkata (Rs.19.42 billion by April 2011; will handle 
20 million passengers; work awarded in October 2008) and Chennai (Rs.18.08 billion by 
November 2010; will handle 23 million passengers; work awarded in September 2008) 
are being restructured by the public sector (Airports Authority of India, AAI).  
 
In January 2006, the Delhi International Airport Limited (DIAL) consortium was 
awarded the concession to operate, manage and develop the IGI Airport (Delhi) 
following an international competitive bidding process. DIAL entered into Operations, 
Management and Development Agreement (OMDA) on April 4, 2006 with the AAI. The 
initial term of the concession is 30 years extendable by a further 30 years. The contract 
has been awarded on lease-develop-operate-transfer (LDOT) basis. 
 
DIAL is a joint venture consortium of GMR Group (50.1%), Airports Authority of India 
(26%), Fraport and Eraman Malaysia (10% each) and IDF (3.9%). GMR is the lead 
member of the consortium, and Fraport AG is the airport operator. DIAL has to share 
45.99% of its gross revenue with AAI. The year-wise break-up of revenue received by 
AAI on this account is: 2006-07: Rs.2.72 billion; 2007-08: Rs.4.02 billion; and 2008-09 
(till Sept. 2008): Rs.2.13 billion. The original bids of the bidders were: Reliance-ASA 
(45.99%); GMR-Fraport (43.64%); DS Construction-Munich (40.15%); Sterlite-
Macquarie-ADP (37.04%); Essel-TAV (bid not opened). The minimum revenue share 
had been set at 5%, so the difference between the actual and the minimum revenue share 
can be a measure of the value for money, which was substantial at 40.99%. 
 
The first phase of the airport is designed to handle 60 million passengers per annum 
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(mppa). Total passenger traffic was 22.84 million and total cargo movement was 0.43 
million tonnes in 2008-09. The first phase was slated to be completed by March 2010. 
The cost of the first phase is about Rs.89.75 billion (debt-equity ratio is 79:21). The 
ultimate design capacity of the airport would be 100 million passengers per annum. 
 
The airport at Delhi has now become the first airport with three operational runways, 
with the new runway nearly doubling peak-hour capacity from 35–40 to 70 aircraft 
movements per hour160. However, the government has allowed the operator of the Delhi 
airport to charge each international traveler Rs.1,300 and each domestic passenger Rs.200 
as airport development fee for a period of 36 months to bridge the funding gap of 
Rs.18.27 billion (which is also the net present value of the airport development fee). The 
amount raised through the development fee would also not be shared with the AAI. The 
gross collection of Development Fee for the period from March 01, 2009 to January 31, 
2010 is Rs.5.03 billion. So, the original VfM derived from AAI share of the DIAL gross 
revenue would have to be adjusted downwards on account of the airport development fee 
(see Table 13).   
 
Mumbai International Airport Limited (MIAL): The Master Plan incorporates passenger 
traffic capacity of 40 mppa by 2012. The contract period is 30 years. Contract Award 
Method was International Competitive Bidding. The Airport was handed over to the 
private entity in May 2006. Six consortia submitted their bids and their revenue sharing 
percentages were: GVK-ACSA (38.70%); Reliance-ASA (21.33%); GMR-Fraport 
                                                 





(33.03%); DS Construction-Munich (28.12%); Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP (bid not opened); 
Essel-TAV (bid not opened). The project was awarded to GVK-ACSA consortium who 
agreed to share 38.70% of the revenue for each year. The year-wise break-up of revenue 
received by Airports Authority of India (AAI) on this account is: 2007-08: Rs.3.32 
billion; and 2008-09: Rs.3.70 billion161. The minimum revenue share had been set at 5%, 
so the difference between the actual and the minimum revenue share can be a measure of 
the value for money, which was substantial at 33.70%. 
 
The project promoters are: GVK Industries Ltd (37%), Bidvest Group (27%), Airport 
Company South Africa (10%), and AAI (26%). Debt-equity ratio is 72:28. In addition of 
the annual fee (38.70% of the revenue for the year), the Joint Venture Company shall pay 
to the AAI an upfront fee of Rs 1.50 billion by the Effective Date of the Agreement.  
 
In Mumbai, international passengers pay Rs.600 and domestic passengers Rs.100 for four 
years to bridge the funding gap of Rs.15.43 billion. The airport development fee came 
into effect from March 1, 2009. The amount collected as Development Fee by MIAL is 
Rs. 1.85 billion up to end-January 2010. At the Hyderabad airport which has been built 
by the GMR Group, the airport development fee is Rs.1,000 for international passengers 
and Rs.375 for domestic passengers while in Bangalore, the fee is Rs.1,070 for 
international passengers and Rs.260 for domestic passengers. The levy of airport 
development fee after the concession was signed would clearly decrease the value for 
money of the projects (see Table 13).  
                                                 






The annual passenger handling capacity of the new Bangalore Airport is 11.5 million in 
Phase I (ultimate capacity: 50 mppa). The passenger traffic in Bangalore for the 12-
month period ending June 30, 2007 was 9.1 million.The Airport is a BOT based 
greenfield international airport and the concession period is 30 years (concession 
agreement was signed in July 2005). The 30 year period excludes construction period of 
33 months from financial close. The contract was awarded through international 
competitive bidding (2 financial bids were received). BIAL shall, in consideration for the 
grant by Government of India (GoI) of the Concession, pay to GoI a fee amounting to 4% 
of Gross Revenue annually as Concession Fee. The project partners include AAI and 
Karnataka Government (13% each), Siemens Germany (40%), Unique Zurich 
Switzerland (17%), and Larsen & Toubro India Ltd (17%). Total Project Cost is Rs.19.30 
billion. There is a state support of Rs.3.50 billion as interest free loan for 10 years. Debt-
equity ratio is 83:17.  The Airport became operational in May 2008. 
 
In Phase I, Hyderabad International Airport would be capable of handling 12 million 
passengers per annum. This phase became operational in March 2008. Ultimate capacity 
would be 40 mppa. The project was awarded through international competitive bidding (6 
financial bids were received). Project promoters are AAI and Government of Andhra 
Pradesh (13% each), GMR Group (63%), and Malaysian Airport Holding Berhard (11%). 
It is a BOOT project. The contract period is 30 years. The 30 year period excludes 
construction period of 36 months from financial close. Estimated project cost is Rs.24.78 
billion. Cash grant by Government of Andhra Pradesh is Rs.1.07 billion. There is an 
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interest-free loan of Rs. 3.15 billion with a moratorium of 15 years for payment. Debt-
equity ratio is 84:16. HIAL shall, in consideration for the grant by the GoI of the 
Concession, pay to GoI a fee amounting to 4% of Gross Revenue annually as Concession 
Fee.  
 
The risk allocation to the private partner is broadly in line with the following guidelines: 
risk should be assigned to the agency that has more control over the risk factor; the 
agency that is more able to bear the risk (less risk-averse) should be assigned the risk. 
Thus, construction, operational, commercial, and financial risks are being borne by the 
HIAL while pre-construction risk is borne by the government. 
 
We calculated the Value for Money from airport PPPs as in the table below with the 
limited data at our disposal. 
 
Table 13: Value for Money in the Airport Sector 
 Delhi Airport Mumbai Airport 
Initial Value for Money 40.99% 33.70% 
Revenue in 2007-08 Rs.8.6 billion* Rs.9.6 billion** 
Projected revenue for 2009-10*** Rs.8.6 billion Rs.10.0 billion 
Increase in user charges in 2009-10 
that is out of revenue-sharing formula 
Rs.5.5 billion Rs.2.0 billion 
Final value for Money 25% 28.1% 
* Newspaper reports (Business Standard, 20 January, 2009) 
** GVK Power and Infrastructure Limited (Annual Report 2008-09). (http://www.gvk.com/i/GVKPIL-
15th%20AR%202008-09.pdf). Revenue is for 2008-09 
***The growth rate in domestic passenger traffic in 2007, 2008, and 2009 (Jan-Oct) was 32.5%, -4.7%, and 
3.3% respectively (reply to Lok Sabha Question No. 126; replied on 11/19/2009). We have assumed that 
the revenue for the respective airports will increase in the same proportion for 2008 and assumed that the 
revenue would increase by 5% in the full year 2009-10 to arrive at the projected revenue of 2009-10. 
 
This could be an underestimate of the VfM as there were quality improvements in the 
airports. As per Operation, Management and Development Agreement executed between 
AAI and Joint Venture companies (JVCs) of Delhi and Mumbai Airports, i.e. DIAL and 
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MIAL, the JVCs have to make best efforts to ensure improvement of the airport and the 
target rating after completion of stage 2 shall be 3.75, on the scale of 0-5. Delhi Airport 
has recently been rated the 14th best airport in the world in the Airport Council 
International's airport service quality (ASQ) survey for 2010162. The Mumbai Airport has 
achieved average ASQ rating of 4.05 on the scale of 0-5 for Quarter 3 (July-September) 
of year 2009163. In addition, some facilities were delivered on time (like the Bangalore 




Indian telecom sector has experienced rapid growth in recent years. With more than 441 
million connections (April 2009), India’s telecommunication network is currently the 
third largest in the world. Tele-density has increased to 38% in April 2009 as compared 
to 1.1% in 1995 and 3.6% in 2001. This is much more than the target of 15% tele-density 
by 2010 envisaged in the New Telecom Policy 1999. About 113 million telephones, at 
the rate of more than 14 million subscribers every month, were added during the 8 
months of 2008-2009 (as compared to 2.2 million additions in the whole of the financial 
year 1995-96). Indian telecom is the fastest growing telecom sector in the world, ahead of 
even China164. The private sector is playing a major role in these developments with its 
                                                 
162 In the category of 25-40 million passengers per annum, the Delhi airport has been rated 4th, behind 
Seoul's Incheon, Singapore's Changi, and Shanghai's Pudong. Hyderabad's new airport retained its top 
position in the 5-15 mppa airport category. In 2010, Delhi Airport scored 4.49 on the survey (up from 3.02 
in 2006) while Hyderabad Airport scored 4.51. The ASQ survey comprises a list of 34 questions that 
include features like access, check-in, security, airport facilities, and airport environment. Passengers need 
to rate the airport on a scale of 1-5. (Source: Times of India dated 17 February 2011). 
 
163 Reply to Lok Sabha Question No. 1279. Replied on 11/26/2009 
164 India Infrastructure Report. 2008. Oxford University Press: New Delhi. 
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share in total telephone connections in the country increasing from 39% in 2004 to 79% 
in February 2009. Telecom tariffs, which were among the highest in the world a few 
years ago, have also dipped to be among the lowest. With increasing telecom access and 
falling rates, the benefit to the government from private sector participation in telecom 
seems to be substantial.   
 
However, low rural tele-density remains a challenge (urban tele-density in January 2009 
was 84%, compared to rural tele-density of 14%). To address the problem of low rural 
tele-density, the government has created a Universal Service Obligation Fund into which 
all telecom service providers would provide 5% revenue share. The rural areas were 
auctioned to infrastructure providers and telecom service providers on the basis of least 
subsidy demanded. The results show that the government received substantial value for 
money from privatization even in rural areas. The total amount of subsidy ‘saved’ for 
infrastructure providers segment was Rs.2.28 billion annually for five years, being the 
difference in amount between the total benchmark costs and the total bid amounts. The 
final actual subsidy to be paid by the government was nearly 71% less than the estimated 
benchmark value. This shows that privatization based on competitive bidding resulted in 
substantial value for money to the government as the winning bids were far lower than 
the benchmark165. 
 
Contingent liabilities in Indian PPPs166 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
165 India Infrastructure Report. 2008. Oxford University Press: New Delhi. 
 




The 13th Finance Commission of the Government of India has deliberated on the issue of 
liabilities created by PPPs. It differentiates between explicit liabilities (like annuity 
payments over a multi-year horizon) and implicit contingent liabilities (obligation to 
compensate the private sector partner for contingencies such as breach of obligations) and 
calls for their inclusion in the budget documents167. It emphasizes that the fiscal fallout of 
PPPs could reflect on the health of the aggregate balance sheet of the public sector and 
may create demands for enhanced budgetary support to the public sector entities 
contracting such liabilities.  
 
As per a study on Managing the Fiscal Implications of PPPs for the Government of India, 
the net present value of the expected loss to government on account of termination 
payments (the main contingent liability), after taking account of the value of the 
concession it takes over after termination, is small (about 1% of the total project cost).  
As per this study, the Indian central public sector is taking on new financial obligations as 
part of its growing program of PPPs. These include obligations to pay for services (for 
example, annuity payments in road projects) and obligations to compensate PPP 
companies for various things, including change orders, breach of public-sector 
obligations, and early contract termination for force majeure or contractor default. The 
authors of the study state that termination payments are perhaps the most useful variable 
to monitor for a number of reasons. They represent the worst case scenario – the 
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government’s maximum exposure. They are relatively easy to measure and report at the 
time the government enters into the contract. And, in contrast to some possible causes of 
payments, payments for termination for force majeure and for contractor default cannot 
be controlled by the government. The amount the contracting authority must pay depends 
on the reason for the early termination of projects. The model concession agreement for 
toll roads, for example, requires NHAI to pay 90% of the concessionaire’s outstanding 
debt in case of termination for concessionaire default.  
 
Another approach to measuring the value of contingent liabilities would be to value it 
empirically. As per the PPI database of the World Bank168, only 4 of the 306 PPI projects 
have been cancelled in India by 2007. The Government of India has paid about $2 billion 
in the case of the canceled Dabhol Power Project to buy off the stakes of the lenders and 
sponsors of the project. Assuming that the value of the assets of Dabhol Power Project is 
at least 50% of this amount, the net loss to the government could be assessed at $1 
billion. Given that the size of the PPP program in India is $96 billion, the loss on account 
of early termination of the project is roughly 1% of the size of the PPP program in India.  
 
7: Conclusion: Overall Value for Money in Indian PPPs 
 
Table 14 shows that a rough estimate of the overall value for money in Indian PPPs is 
about 30%.  
 
Table 14: A rough estimate of the overall Value for Money in Indian PPPs 
                                                 




Sector Value for Money  Total Project Cost 
(TPC) (Rs. billion) 
VfM*TPC/ TPC of all 
projects 
Road 
  Annuity-based 8% 23.54 0.28% 
  Toll-based 36.4% 35.98 1.98% 
Power 
  Sasan UMPP 44% 200 13.31% 
  Tilaiya UMPP 23% 200 6.96% 
Port 
  NSICT 0% 9.75 0.00% 
Airport 
  Delhi 25% 89.75 3.39% 
  Mumbai 28.1% 98.02 4.17% 
Telecom 
  Rural Telephony 71% 3.92 0.42% 
Weighted Average Value for Money 30.52% 
less Contingent Liabilities 1% 
Overall Weighted Average Value for Money from PPPs ~ 30% 
Note: A variety of methods have been used for calculating value for money across sectors. For the road 
sector, the discounted incremental cost of the PPP option is compared to that of traditional public 
procurement. PPP offers have been benchmarked through other methods in other sectors. Benchmarking, as 
used in this study, is the price comparison of the PPP offer against the public sector/ reserve price of 
equivalent services. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
However, this valuation is subject to a number of caveats. One, the total cost of projects 
in the sample is only 14% of the cost of all PPP projects in India. Two, while attempt has 
been made to analyze only the operational projects for calculating VfM (as in the annuity 
and toll-based projects in the road sector), the big-ticket projects in the power sector 
(contributing about two-thirds to the overall value for money) are in early stages of 
implementation. So, one cannot be sure that these projects would actually deliver on their 
promises. To the extent that there are slippages in implementation, the value for money to 
the government from PPPs would come down.  
 
Three, and more broadly, while we find that there are net benefits (value for money) to 
the government from PPP projects, and these projects perform better in terms of 
timeliness of delivery and within-cost implementation vis-à-vis the public sector, it is not 
true that the selection of projects to be implemented by the public sector and the private 
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sector is a random process. If there is a qualitative difference between the projects that 
are implemented by the public sector and the private sector, we cannot be sure that the 
'net benefits' from PPP projects are for real or merely reflecting qualitative differences 
among projects in the sense that the private sector is cherry-picking the better projects for 
implementation. This endogeneity issue169 has not been dealt in this chapter and is game 
for future research.          
 
                                                 
169 The Instrumental Variable (IV) approach addresses endogeneity concerns about the non-random 
selection of projects for private sector participation, which might lead to biased estimates. Proper IV would 
be related to project selection for implementation by the public and the private sectors, or implementation 
as toll or annuity variants with private sector participation, but not related to the error term. One possible 
IV could be a district-wise index of infrastructure development, which would be related to project selection, 
but not with the value for money that these projects generate. For districts with high index value, it can be 
assumed that they will be able to support the toll variant of private sector participation. For districts with 
low index value, annuity based variant, where the government bears the traffic risk, may be chosen. For 
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The inception of traditional privatization (or sale of state-owned enterprises to private 
agents) is usually associated with the Thatcher Government of the United Kingdom in 
early 1980s. Thatcher adopted the label 'privatization', which was originally coined by 
Peter Drucker and which replaced the term 'denationalization'171. Since then, a vast 
majority of countries across the world have adopted privatization and about $1.2 trillion 
had been raised from privatization till 2000. Most of the privatizations have occurred 
after 1990, with about $1 trillion raised between 1990 and 2000. In the same vein, 
privatization has picked up in recent years and in 2007, 51 developing countries carried 
out 236 privatization transactions, valued at US$132.6 billion. This was 26% more than 
2006 and 150% more than 2005, marking 2007 as a record year in privatization 
transactions in nominal terms172. The objectives of privatization have broadly been 
similar across countries: raise resources, improve efficiency and profitability, reduce 
government interference in enterprises, promote wider share ownership, introduce 
competition, expose state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to market discipline, and develop the 
capital market.  
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The theoretical argument for privatization is based on the fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics: under strong assumptions, a competitive equilibrium is pareto-
optimal. Welfare theory argues that privatization tends to have the greatest positive 
impact in cases where the role for government in lessening market failure is the weakest, 
i.e., for SOEs in competitive markets or markets that can readily become competitive173. 
 
The agency problems are also expected to be lesser if SOEs are privatized as the multiple 
layers of principals and agents in the public sector are substituted by agile shareholder-
owners who are expected to exercise their powers over the manager-agents through the 
market for corporate control whereby inefficient managers would be replaced by more 
efficient ones. This also implies that multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives of the 
SOEs (promote balanced regional development, employment creation and affirmative 
action, be model employers, diversify industrial activity, and progress towards self-
sufficiency through import substitution, etc174) would be forged into a unified objective of 
profit maximization. Together with this, there would be greater autonomy for SOEs with 
a lower percentage of shares with the government and less political interference in the 
day-to-day functioning of these firms. All these forces, it is felt, would tend to improve 
incentives, efficiency and profitability of enterprises after their privatization. In addition, 
the act of selling the loss-making SOEs to the private sector would generate resources for 
the public sector, instead of bleeding the state through a 'soft-budget' constraint.  
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Privatization in India was a part of the reforms package initiated in 1991 that also 
included structural changes in industrial policy, foreign trade and investment regime, 
along with a program of macroeconomic stabilization. At that point, the country was in 
grave economic crisis with inflation above 15 percent and foreign exchange reserves that 
could fund less than a fortnight's imports. There was an urgent need for conserving 
resources. It was realized that public sector companies were not generating adequate 
returns and may have strayed into activities that are not strategic and should have 
remained with the private sector. In this context, the two main objectives of privatization 
in India are: to raise resources to ease the fiscal crunch, and to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the privatized public sector companies. Therefore, this chapter of the 
dissertation would concentrate on assessing the outcomes of privatization in India in 
terms of resources raised, profitability, and efficiency. In addition, it would also try to 
assess the social impact of privatization, particularly in terms of employment in the 
privatized firm.  
 
Privatization in India took place in two main forms: partial privatization (sale of shares 
without transfer of management control), and full privatization (strategic sale leading to 
transfer of management control in the divested firm to the private sector). As compared to 
the OECD countries and the transition economies, the Indian privatization program is 
small. A total of 50 companies have been privatized in India in the period 1991 to 2008: 
36 companies have been partially privatized while 14 companies have been fully 
privatized. The latter category includes many hotels belonging to Indian Tourism 
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Development Corporation and Hotel Corporation of India. The total amount raised 
through partial and full privatization has been about $12.9 billion (at current exchange 
rates). By way of comparison, there are 242 Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) 
with a cumulative investment (historical costs) of about Rs.4.5 trillion ($91 billion) in 
India presently. These SOEs contribute about 11% to GDP (at market prices).  
 
The main objective of including this chapter in a dissertation on 'Sustaining Privatization' 
is to examine whether privatization has led to benign outcomes in a major developing 
economy and whether that would be enough to sustain it. The answer is that while some 
outcomes of privatization are benign in India (e.g., profitability and efficiency), others are 
not (e.g., employment). However, the benign outcomes of privatization on some aspects 
may not be enough to sustain traditional privatization in India owing to political 
economy reasons. Privatization requires a lot of political support for its sustenance and 
weak coalition governments may not have the political power to continue with it even 
though its utility in terms of profitability and efficiency outcomes may be well-
established. We will see that this has been the case in India especially in the period 2004-
08 when the ruling coalition was quite weak. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with literature review 
where we find that there is considerable literature on privatization in general but limited 
literature on privatization in India. In the context of privatization in India, though some 
work has been done on selected aspects of privatization, there are gaps (analysis of asset 
sales in conjunction with share issue privatization to compare the outcomes of these two 
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methods of privatization and segregation of the impact of privatization on firm 
performance from other initiatives like liberalization and deregulation of the economy). 
Section 3 interprets the history of privatization in India through models of political 
economy. This is useful because it demonstrates that political support for privatization is 
at least as important as outcomes of privatization for its sustenance. Section 4 describes 
the data and section 5 elaborates on the methodology. Section 6 analyzes the results of 
privatization. Section 7 concludes.          
 
2: Literature Review 
 
There is extensive literature on privatization in general, and that specific to developed, 
developing and transition economies. In their award-winning paper, Megginson, Nash 
and Randenborgh175, looked at pre- and post-privatization performance of 61 companies 
from 18 countries and 32 different industries during the period 1961 to 1990. They 
compared 3-year average post-privatization performance ratios to 3-year pre-privatization 
values. Their main finding is that “the mean and median profitability, real sales, operating 
efficiency, and capital investment spending of … sample firms increase significantly (in 
both statistical and economic terms) after privatization.” The results are quite robust as 
they are supported when the data is partitioned into various sub-samples [between full 
and partial privatizations, between firms operating in competitive versus noncompetitive 
(regulated) industries, between ‘control’ privatizations and ‘revenue’ privatizations, or 
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industrialized and developing country privatizations]. However, this study does not 
control for business-cycle effects. There is also the problem of selection bias as the 
sample tends to be biased towards larger firms. The authors themselves acknowledge this 
when they state that "our sample reflects the actual experience of at least the largest and 
most important recent privatizations." If only the larger and better firms are selected for 
analysis of privatization and the smaller ones are left out, there is likely to be selection 
bias and one cannot generalize about the impact of privatization on an average.     
 
Boardman and Vining (1989)176 compare the performance of private, mixed, and state-
owned enterprises using a sample of 500 largest non-US firms in 1983 (based on Fortune 
500 data). In this study, dependent variables (like profitability and efficiency measured 
by variables like Return on Sales, and Sales per Employee) are regressed against 
independent variables (sales, assets, number of employees) and dummy variables for 
market concentration, industry, country, and ownership form. They find that the 
coefficients for mixed and state-owned enterprises are negative and statistically 
significant in all equations, which indicate that, on average, mixed and state-owned 
enterprises are significantly less profitable and less efficient than private corporations 
after controlling for the factors discussed above. They conclude that the consistent 
direction and magnitude of the estimates across all equations provides robust evidence 
that state-owned enterprises and mixed enterprises are less profitable and less efficient 
than private corporations.      
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The positive economic impact of privatization is corroborated by a large number of other 
studies in different economic settings. Djankov and Murrell (2002)177, reviewing more 
than a hundred empirical studies on the privatization experience in transition economies, 
find that "the aggregate effects of privatization are positive"; structure of ownership 
matters [privatization to outsiders produces better results than privatization to insiders 
(managers and workers)]; better outcomes occur when the new owners are concentrated; 
state ownership in partially privatized firms is surprisingly effective (producing more 
restructuring than enterprise insiders and non-block-holder outsiders); increased product 
market competition has a significant effect in improving enterprise performance in 
Eastern Europe; and privatization, which is associated with hard budgets, is conducive to 
enterprise restructuring. However, the authors add that while privatization done in the 
right way, or under the right circumstances, can have positive effects, privatization can 
also be hugely detrimental. The different results of privatization across transition 
economies could partly be explained by the level of development of supportive 
institutions (courts for promoting rule of law, adoption of sound competition and 
corporate governance policies, etc).   
 
Gassner et al (2007)178, in their analysis of 302 utilities with private sector participation 
(PSP) and 928 utilities without PSP in 71 developing and transition countries in 
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electricity distribution and water and sanitation services find that PSP has a strong impact 
on the efficiency and profitability of utility operations in terms of an increase in the 
number of connections, labor productivity, and collection rates. There is also evidence of 
an improvement in the quality of service in terms of reduction in distribution losses in 
electricity and increase in hours of daily service in the water sector. However, there is a 
decline in employment subsequent to PSP. In addition, the authors find no conclusive 
evidence of a change in consumer prices as a result of PSP, highlighting “the economic 
and political difficulties to align prices with costs in a large number of developing 
countries”. 
 
As claimed by the authors, the study improves upon earlier privatization research in three 
ways. First, the analysis of PSP is disaggregated by contract types: The improvements in 
efficiency unequivocally occur in the case of divestitures (partial or full) in the case of 
electricity utilities, while such improvements occur in the case of concession contracts in 
the case of water and sewerage sector. Thus, higher degrees of private participation are 
associated with stronger gains in productivity and service improvements. Second, the 
Instrumental Variable procedure is used to extract the endogenous element of PSP. And 
finally, the Difference-in-Differences analysis has been used to remove the influence of 
factors other than private sector participation in gauging the change in the performance of 
utilities. The difference-in-differences analysis has been carried out using nearest-
neighbor matching procedure based on propensity scores. This ensures that the control 
group is restricted to those SOEs that are most similar to the utilities with PSP. If the 
utilities are not matched, one can arrive at greatly diverging results about the impact of 
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PSP on utility performance.  
 
Andres, Foster, and Guasch179 analyze the impact of privatization on the performance of 
116 electric utilities in 10 Latin American countries. Their analysis covers a longer time 
frame, and evaluates three stages - before, transition and after - allowing for the 
identification of the short- and long-run effects of privatization. They employ two 
different methodologies for assessing the impact of privatization: i) calculation of means 
and medians from each period and testing the significance of the changes between 
periods; ii) use of an econometric model that captures firm fixed effects, firm-specific 
time trends, and corrects the model for heteroscedasticity. The results suggest that 
changes in ownership generate significant improvements in labor productivity, efficiency, 
and product/service quality, and that most of those changes occur in the transition period. 
Improvements in the post transition period - beyond two years after the change in 
ownership - are much more modest. 
      
It has generally been found that the distributional impact of privatization is not benign. 
This is reflected most obviously in the decrease in employment at companies that have 
undergone PSP as we have seen, inter-alia, in the work of Gassner et al180. Indeed, 
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Kikeri181 says that” Selling state-owned enterprises with the labor force intact is not an 
option for firms and industries that have large numbers of redundant workers or difficult 
labor relations at the time of privatization.” And it is true that there is large scale labor 
redundancy at SOEs as politicians and bureaucrats use them for bestowing patronage. So, 
it is inevitable that there would be retrenchment before or following privatization.  
 
Birdsall and Nellis182 develop the argument further by saying that “At the heart of 
popular criticism is a perception that privatization is fundamentally unfair in both concept 
and implementation: it is seen as harming the poor, the disenfranchised, the workers, and 
even the middle class; throwing people out of good jobs and into poor ones or 
unemployment; raising prices for essential services; giving away national treasures – and 
all this to the benefit of the local elite, agile or corrupt politicians, and foreign 
corporations and investors. The complaint is that, even if privatization contributes to 
improved efficiency and financial performance (some question this as well), it has a 
negative effect on the distribution of wealth, income and political power.” They go on to 
suggest that the social impact of privatization is ultimately an empirical issue depending 
on initial conditions, the sale event, and the post-privatization political and economic 
environments (better distributional outcomes are associated with competition 
enhancement and better regulatory regime).   
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La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes183 (1999) come up with similar findings. They find that 
the former 218 Mexican SOEs that they study rapidly close a large performance gap with 
industry-matched private firms that had existed prior to divestment. These firms go from 
being highly unprofitable before privatization to being highly profitable thereafter: firms 
achieved a 24 percentage point increase in operating profitability, eliminating need for 
subsidies equal to 12.7% of GDP. However, the privatized firms reduce employment by 
half, but those workers who remain are paid significantly more. Real wages experience 
large increases in the post-privatization period probably because those workers who are 
retained are required to work hard and are paid accordingly. 
 
The negative social impact of privatization may cause it to be shelved prematurely. As 
Carol Graham184 puts it, “In many countries there is increasing concern that short-term 
costs will make it difficult to sustain public support for reforms long enough for them to 
yield results.” Graham advocates ‘the stakeholders approach’ to make reforms 
sustainable. “This means changing the design of the reforms so that significant parts of 
society benefit if they are carried out, for example, through the acquisition of shares in 
public companies or improvements in the education system and so that the beneficiaries 
are motivated to take steps such as voting, lobbying, and protesting to prevent the 
reversal of reforms. In essence they become stakeholders in the reform. Programs that 
merely compensate people or give away benefits at well below their market costs are far 
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less successful at generating long-term stakes in reform…”  
 
Privatization in India 
Ram Mohan185 has studied revenue privatization in India in the period 1991 – 2000. He 
has compared the profitability and efficiency ratios for private and public sector 
companies as well as for performance pre- and post-privatization. Ram Mohan finds a 
positive impact of revenue privatization on the profitability and efficiency of companies. 
Ram Mohan concludes that ‘it is now well recognized that, broadly, two conditions need 
to be satisfied for successful outcomes to result from privatization. The first is the prior 
existence of a market-friendly macroeconomic environment, supported by institutional 
and regulatory capacity, while the second is openness of the economy to competition. In 
many LDCs186, neither of these conditions may be met adequately…Under these 
circumstances, private ownership cannot be expected to produce high standards of 
performance.’ 
 
In another similar study, discussing the impact of revenue privatization in India, Nandini 
Gupta187 states that it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact on 
performance. However, she finds a positive and statistically significant impact of partial 
privatization on performance of state-owned companies in India. Gupta separates the 
political and managerial perspectives on agency issues and finds that partial privatization 
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enables stock price information on the company to improve managerial incentives and 
thus reduce agency problems, while these managers are still subject to political 
interference. In addition, Gupta finds that the effects of competition and privatization 
may be complementary, so that reducing government ownership is necessary to improve 
productive efficiency, while competitive pressures increase the allocative efficiency of 
firms. 
 
The literature on privatization in India does not deal with the impact of strategic sale 
(asset sales leading to transfer of management control in the divested firm) on enterprise 
performance rigorously. If ownership matters, the impact of strategic sale on enterprise 
performance should be analyzed. In addition, it is important to separate out the impact of 
deregulation and economic liberalization from the impact of change in ownership on 
enterprise performance as also the impact due to differences in pre-privatization attributes 
of enterprises. All these aspects can be addressed by using a difference-in-differences 
model. This chapter endeavors to fill these gaps in literature (analyzes the influence of 
strategic sale on firm performance, compares the influence of strategic sale and partial 
privatization on enterprise performance, and uses difference-in-differences method to 
separate the influence of change of ownership from other changes taking place 
simultaneously) and thus enrich the literature on privatization in general, and developing 
countries, in particular. In addition, this chapter uses firm fixed effects model to control 
for unobserved time-constant firm characteristics to isolate the impact of privatization on 




3: History of Privatization in India interpreted through Models of Political 
Economy 
 
We need to analyze privatization in terms of the models of political economy (rational 
actor, organizational behavior, and government politics models), to evaluate whether the 
process would be sustainable, notwithstanding its immense scope. The figure below 
shows the resources garnered from privatization of SOEs in India over the years. The 
vertical lines separate the resource mobilization effort chronologically by dominant 
political parties. 
 
Figure 1: Privatization revenues in India (1990-2008) 
 
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
Rational Actor Model (the ‘classical’ model) 
The Rational Actor Model (RAM) interprets governmental actions in the same way as 
that of an individual. In the classical consumer theory, an individual would choose a 
course of action that would maximize his utility and his equilibrium would occur at the 
point of tangency of the highest indifference curve given the budget constraint. As per 
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RAM, there exists an objective function for nations just like an individual. There are 
alternative courses of action and the nation chooses that course of action that maximizes 
its objective function. In other words, the RAM attempts to explain national actions based 
on the aims and calculations of governments. As would be apparent, this model assumes 
a rational, unified, national actor.  
 
We will see that RAM is consistent with the inception of the privatization policy in 1991 
and its subsequent change of course from share issue privatization to assets sales. India 
launched the privatization program in 1991 when inflation was above 15% per annum 
and the foreign exchange reserves came down to a level that could finance only about a 
fortnight’s imports. These were tough times and the government was looking for ways to 
put its public finances in order. Privatization of public sector enterprises offered an easy 
option of continuing to spend irresponsibly (like making unproductive expenditures on 
subsidies), which is financed, inter-alia, by selling the SOEs. Improving the efficiency of 
the public sector enterprises through unlocking their productive potential was only a 
subsidiary objective. It is only to be expected that difficult policy measures like 
privatization are launched in periods of grave crisis as organized labor, entrenched 
political interests and bureaucratic inertia prevent these policies from being launched in 
normal times. 
 
The privatization policy became rule-based and came to be supported by a focused 
institution with the coming in power of the right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (1998), 
whose vote bank was the rapidly growing Indian middle class. A new Department of 
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Disinvestment (DoD) was created in 1999 to deal with all matters relating to 
disinvestment (privatization of SOEs in India is called disinvestment). Subsequently, 
DoD was made a separate Ministry of Disinvestment (MODI) in 2001 [however, after the 
fall of the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) government in 2004, the Department of 
Disinvestment is one of the departments under the Ministry of Finance]. In the budget 
speech of 1998-99, it was announced that government’s shareholding, in most SOEs, 
would be brought down to 26% and subsequently the government went on to classify the 
SOEs into strategic and non-strategic segments, with privatization limited to the latter 
segment. Thus, the privatization policy became rule-based. The BJP sought to use the 
privatization policy to expand its vote bank so that the vast Indian middle class becomes 
a 'stakeholder'188 in the privatization program as the owner of discounted shares of the 
public sector enterprises. The percentage of the population who became shareholders of 
divested public sector enterprises rose exponentially during this period (1998-2004).  
 
While some effort was made to sell shares to the workers [for example, in CMC (6.07% 
of its shares sold to workers), VSNL (1.85%), HZL (1.46%), and IPCL (4.58%)] to 
reduce their opposition to privatization, it was not as widespread as in, say, Chile in the 
1980s, where many companies became entirely employee-owned. So, workers could not 
become 'stakeholders' in the Indian privatization program to the same extent as in 
countries like Chile. Similarly, the creation of a National Investment Fund in 2005 with 
corpus generated from privatization proceeds of SOEs was too little too late and did not 
contribute to increased spending on health and education, which was the intent of the 
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Fund. The frequent policy volatility experienced in divestment of public sector assets in 
India bears out that efforts to build political coalitions in its favor have been quite fragile. 
All this may have played a part in limiting popular support (and stakeholders) to 
privatization, with consequent impact on privatization policy and receipts as we shall see 
later.     
 
However, it was also realized that there would be retail interest in the shares of only the 
profitable SOEs. To be able to sell loss-making SOEs, which was also necessary to 
improve the state of public finances, it was imperative that asset sales take place whereby 
controlling interest in the company passes on to the private sector. It was thought that 
private ownership would reduce agency problems (property rights school), and re-direct 
efforts towards a single dominant objective (profit-maximization) as compared to 
multiple and often conflicting objectives that the public sector managers have to meet189, 
which would make these companies profitable. The first such transaction was that of 
Modern Foods Industries Limited (MFIL), which was sold to Hindustan Levers Limited 
in January 2000 for Rs.1.05 billion ($24.5 million). In all, 24 loss-making enterprises 
(including 19 ITDC and 3 HCI hotels, including subsidiaries of companies) were sold to 
the private sector through asset sale during this period (constituting about 75% of the 
total number of SOEs sold in the period 2000-03). However, in the era of only share issue 
privatization (1991-1999), the proportion of loss-making enterprises in the total number 
of enterprises sold was minimal (about 5%)190. 
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This broadening of the privatization policy to include asset sales was beneficial to the 
public finances in at least two ways. One, it allowed the sale of loss-making enterprises 
who would have bled government finances in the future if they had not been sold off. 
Two, it allowed the government to receive control premium from the private sector. Thus, 
in the case of Maruti Udyog Limited, the government received a control premium of Rs. 
10 billion ($204.1 million) when it transferred management control to the private sector 
in 2002-03. In some other cases though, it is doubtful whether the government was able 
to maximize its privatization receipts through asset sale given the low number of bidders 
(for example, in the case of CMC asset sale, there was only one bidder).  
 
However, while the RAM is consistent with the inception of the privatization policy, its 
evolution from share issue privatization to include asset sales, and the rise in privatization 
revenues (especially in 2003-04), it does not explain the change of course again to share 
issue privatization that has taken place now. As Allison and Zelikow put it, “the RAM 
needs to be supplemented by frames of reference that focus on the government machine – 
the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process.”191 This is what we 
turn to now.  
 
Organizational Behavior Model  
The RAM explains governmental behavior as action chosen by a unitary, rational 
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decision-maker. But, a government is not an individual. It is a vast conglomerate of 
loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders 
sit formally on top of this conglomerate. Government behavior can be understood, 
according to this model, less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large 
organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior. This model 
emphasizes the distinctive logic, capacities, culture, and procedures of the large 
organizations that constitute a government192.  
 
While RAM is consistent with the broadening of the privatization policy to include asset 
sales, more light on this shift can be shed by seeing it from the organizational behavior 
perspective. As already stated, under asset sales, the controlling interest in SOEs is 
passed on to the private sector. There was opposition to this policy shift even within the 
government. After all, how could the government of a country whose constitution 
proclaimed it to be a “sovereign socialist secular democratic republic”193 (italics mine) 
sell its assets in a way that the controlling interest would pass on to the private sector. 
Again, the first Industrial Policy Resolution of the government (1956) talked of the 
commanding heights of the economy to be in the public sector. The implication was that 
the private sector could not to be trusted with the reins of the economy. Thus, asset sale 
of public enterprises seemed to be going against the basic economic structure of the 
country.   
 
                                                 
192 Allison Graham and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc. 
 




The concerned ministries [Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises 
(MoHI&PE), Ministry of Disinvestment, Ministry of Finance, and parent ministries of 
SOEs] had differing views on the subject depending on their mandate. The MoHI&PE 
would see its turf shrink if it were to let go of SOEs to be sold to the private sector. After 
all, there would be no MoHI&PE if there are no enterprises left in the public sector. Its 
interests clashed headlong with that of the Ministry of Disinvestment, which was 
specially created in 1999 to carry-out the sale of non-strategic SOEs. The act of creating a 
separate ministry for privatization (Ministry of Disinvestment) emphasized the 
seriousness of the intent of the government.  
 
The Ministry of Finance would have liked any help it could possibly get to ease the 
resource crunch. Thus, it would be on the side of the Ministry of Disinvestment to 
promote privatization. Then, there would be parent ministries of SOEs like Ministry of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas (parent ministry of the wealthy oil sector SOEs), Ministry of 
Civil Aviation (parent ministry of national carriers like Air India and Indian Airlines), 
Ministry of Steel (parent ministry of public sector steel companies), etc. All the parent 
ministries would oppose privatization as the power of patronage would be reduced with 
dwindling number of SOEs under their control.  
 
However, the differing views on the subject were ironed out in the Cabinet headed by the 
Prime Minister, who was very committed to privatization as he expected it to pay, inter-
alia, fiscal and electoral dividends. The standard operating procedure of major 
government policies to be put up to the Cabinet for approval made this paradigm shift in 
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the privatization policy possible. Here, the Prime Minister along with his supportive 
colleagues in the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Disinvestment, was able to 
‘persuade’194 others about the necessity of widening the ambit of privatization to include 
asset sales. It also helped that the government was carrying out share-issue privatization 
for more than seven years by then. This is in keeping with the organizational behavior 
paradigm, which holds that if a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its 
organizational components must yesterday have been performing an action similar to 
today’s action.   
 
Like in most policy measures, there were gainers and losers from privatization. The 
losers of privatization are concentrated (unionized workers who would now have to 
perform to retain their jobs, politicians and bureaucrats who would no longer be able to 
use SOEs for showering patronage) while the gainers are diffused across the population 
(general public who would see that their tax contributions are no longer being wasted on 
inefficient SOEs, which is expected to have an impact on the price level in the medium 
term). However, “modest average real price declines thrill economists, but not voters.”195 
The diffused gainers would not take out rallies to support privatization while the losers 
would take action to oppose it. Thus, the time was ripe for derailing the privatization 
program of the country. 
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The courts played a decisive role in the narrowing of the domain of privatization policy 
(share-issue privatization only) from its broader domain (share-issue privatization plus 
asset sale of enterprises) after 2003. Groups who lack the political power or access to 
influence the policy-making decisions of the executive may present their policy 
objectives as legal claims in order to seek the intervention of the judiciary196. The interest 
groups approached the courts to stall the privatization process. While the Supreme Court 
upheld the privatization of a company called BALCO as being in the exclusive domain of 
the executive, it nearly stalled the privatization process through asset sale by ruling that a 
company which has come into being by parliamentary approval cannot be privatized 
without the approval of parliament. Since the parliament represented a medley of interest 
groups with no single political party holding a majority, it was a foregone conclusion that 
approval for privatization through asset sale of any company would be extremely 
difficult. Therefore, share-issue privatization (as distinct from asset sales) again became 
the flavor of the day. 
 
The de-facto reversion from a broader (asset sale plus share-issue privatization) to a 
narrower (share-issue privatization only) privatization policy because of the influence of 
organizations like courts on public policy is at variance with the predictions of the 
rational actor model. If the objective of privatization was to secure resources for the 
government, the broader form of the policy was helping it by getting rid of loss-making 
SOEs and so, the nation, as a rational actor, would have continued with it. However, the 
ruling of the courts forced the government to narrow the canvass of privatization policy 
                                                 




to share-issue privatization only.       
 
Governmental Politics Model (GPM) 
In contrast with RAM, “the Government Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather 
many actors as players: players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many 
diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of 
strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, 
organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a 
single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.”197 
 
In May 2004, a new coalition government led by the Congress Party came to power. The 
major props of the government were the left-leaning Communist parties who opposed 
privatization vociferously. Besides the impact of privatization on employment, their 
opposition to privatization was also because of what privatization has come to 
symbolize198: as an essential component of the ‘Washington Consensus’ policies, 
privatization symbolized the imperialistic power of countries like the United States, 
acting through multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, to subjugate the 
economic systems of developing countries. It did not help that one of the most prominent 
policy honchos of the present government is the Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission, who is an ex-senior staffer of the World Bank and IMF.  
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The government is led by an economist Prime Minister (with a PhD in Economics from 
Oxford) who played a major role in initiating the privatization program of the country in 
his previous avatar as the Finance Minister between 1991 and 1996, and is seen as the 
architect of India's economic reforms. The Prime Minister’s preference would be to take 
the privatization process forward by getting rid of most SOEs, other than the strategic 
ones. However, under the GPM, knowledge of the leader’s initial preference is rarely a 
sufficient guide for action as authoritative power is shared among players.  
 
The coalition comprised of, besides the Congress and the Communist parties, regional 
parties whose leaders had secured ministerial berths as a reward for supporting the 
government. The ministers protected their turfs, including the public sector enterprises 
under the control of their ministries. Thus, the choice between getting rid of poorly 
performing state-owned enterprises through privatization and securing the longevity of 
the government was clear – give short shrift to difficult policy measures like privatization 
by adopting a case-by-case approach to privatization, which may be seen from the major 
tenets of the then privatization policy199: 
 Generally, profit-making companies will not be privatized. 
 All privatizations will be considered on a transparent and consultative case-by-
case basis. 
 Public sector companies and nationalized banks will be encouraged to enter the 
capital market to raise resources and offer new investment avenues to retail 
investors. 
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The case-by-case approach to privatization gave a virtual veto to every minister for even 
share-issue privatization of SOEs. Once the Department of Disinvestment (now within 
the Ministry of Finance, downgraded from a separate Ministry of Disinvestment earlier) 
made a proposal for privatizing a company, the concerned ministers, unionized workers, 
and other interest groups, would join together to scuttle the move. As a result, the 
government, in July 2006, decided to keep all privatization decisions and proposals on 
hold, pending further review. Since then, government has sold some of its equity stake 
piggy-backing on the Initial Public Offering (IPOs) of public sector power companies, 
but privatization revenues have been small (till 2008). In other words, the diverse nature 
of the coalition government delayed the decision to privatize, which was also reflected in 
meager privatization receipts during this period200.   
  
The resultant privatization policy, as outlined above, was a compromise resulting from 
bargaining among players in the federal government. The communists would not want to 
alienate the unionized working class by subjecting them to market discipline, which 
privatization will entail. The Congress (dominant party of the coalition government) 
would give-in rather than risk the fall of the government, which could have happened if 
the communists withdrew support. This compromise allowed the public sector to raise 
money from the market by issuing new shares but forbade asset sales (de-facto) and 
transfer of management control to the private sector. This muddled version of 
privatization policy is reflected in the meager receipts from privatization from 2004 to 
                                                 




2008 (see Figure 1). There was a vicious circle of a muddled policy enabling all those 
opposed to privatization to come together to protect SOEs from privatization leading to 
meager receipts from privatization.  
 
The Congress party came back to power in mid-2009. It had a surprisingly strong 
showing and is now no more dependent on communist ('left') support, giving rise to 
expectations about major initiatives on furthering privatization. And true to this 
expectation, the actual privatization receipts in 2009-10 have been over $5 billion though 
the government has budgeted only Rs.11 billion ($243 million) from privatization in 
2009-10.  
 
Future of privatization policy  
The Rational Actor Model would call for a clear enunciation of the privatization policy. It 
would have to be rule-based to counter the possibility of vested interests mobilizing 
themselves against each privatization proposal before it took effect. There would be no 
bar on transfer of management control to the private sector (asset sales) of even profitable 
SOEs. There would also be a schedule for privatization of SOEs. Such enunciation of 
privatization policy would produce solid results in terms of revenues and would prevent 
loss-making SOEs from bleeding the government exchequer in the future.  
 
However, given the current (till 2008) political milieu, the privatization policy would be 
based on compromises among various interest groups. The result would be a muddled 
privatization policy characterized by a case-by-case approach and is not expected to 
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achieve results in terms of sustainable improvement in public finances. So, even if the 
post-privatization performance of SOEs improves significantly, the political realities 
would make it difficult to sustain privatization. This is partly because the privatization 
program in India did not create strong 'stakeholders'201, be it retail investors, or workers, 
or the masses, to be able to make the program politically sustainable. 
 
4: Data description 
The data used in the analysis has been sourced from the following sources: 
 Prowess database of the India-based market research company, Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The database provides detailed financial 
information for companies for the period 1988-89 to 2008-09202. 
 The website of the Department of Disinvestment, the nodal department in the 
Government of India which deals with privatization.  
 Public Enterprises Survey (various issues) of the Department of Public 
Enterprises, Government of India. 
 The websites of the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Economic Times, and the 
individual companies.  
 
Though there has been sale of government stake in banks, we concentrate on privatization 
of non-financial companies. As per the above sources of data, 14 companies had 
undergone strategic sale with transfer of management control, while 36 companies had 
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undergone sale through public offer or other methods. These 50 non-financial companies 
constitute the entire universe of companies that have undergone traditional privatization 
in India in the period 1990-2008.  
 
An attempt was made to gather financial data from 1989-90 to 2008-09 for each of the 
privatized companies in India. This data was located for 37 companies from the above 
data sources. 13 companies were left out because sufficient information was not 
available. This leaves a potential for selection bias as it is more likely that there would be 
insufficient information for loss-making companies, so better-performing firms would be 
over-represented in empirical analysis. This also reduces the size of the sample, limiting 
the ability to find statistically significant results and making generalizations.  
 
Most of the companies that have been privatized have undergone 'share issue 
privatization' and the government has management control both before and after the share 
issue as only minority stakes were sold. The main purpose of such privatizations was just 
to raise revenue for the government without surrendering control. There was a change in 
privatization policy in the period 2000-2003, when 14 companies were sold with transfer 
of management control to the private sector (asset sale).      
 
Some of the share issue privatizations were very large. For example, the ONGC issue that 
raised about Rs.105.6 billion ($2.2 billion) in 2003-04 was one of the largest share issues 
in India. While in some cases, the government rode piggyback on the Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) of the firms (with the government and the firms both having capital 
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inflows), many others represented revenue generating exercise for the government in 
which its stake was sold off without any capital flows to the firm itself.  
 
A look at the privatization transactions in India would make it apparent that there was 
some effort to manage the political economy so as to make the privatization process 
irreversible: 
 
 A certain percentage of the shares were reserved for the employees who were sold 
these shares at a discounted price to the prevailing price thus providing them an 
opportunity to make a capital gain immediately after allotment. For example, in 
the case of a company called CMC, the offer of shares to the employees was 
completed in June/July 2002 at a price of Rs.66 ($1.3) per share, which was about 
one-third of the asset sale price of Rs.197. In the case of VSNL, the employees 
were offered shares at Rs.47.85 (~$1) per share against the asset sale price of 
Rs.202 per share in February 2002. The objective was to get employee support for 
privatization. Another employee promotion measure was their job protection for 
at least a year following asset sale (full privatization), and subsequently the terms 
of lay off could not be worse than that provided by government. 
 
 Retail investors were provided an incentive in many cases (DCI, GAIL, IBP, 
ONGC) to get the shares at a 5% discount to the regular share price. This was 
mainly to increase the number of shareholders so that privatization gets the 




 Under-pricing of issues so that the issues are over-subscribed and the investors 
who are allocated the shares have an opportunity to make an immediate capital 
gain. Under-pricing of issues is a usual practice in privatization initial public 
offerings (PIPOs) across the world as has been shown by a number of studies203. 
 
 Restrictions on foreign ownership of the shares, mainly for political economy 
reasons. Thus, while the divestment of government equity in central SOEs started 
in 1991-92 in India, the shares were sold to foreigners through the Foreign 
Institutional Investor (FII) route and Global Depository Receipts (GDR) route 
only from 1994-95 and 1996-97 respectively. In the case of asset sales (2000-
2003), there was insufficient effort to attract foreign buyers, which may have 
reduced the privatization receipts.  
 
 The government created a National Investment Fund to which disinvestment 
proceeds were credited, the returns from which were to be used for funding 
selected social sector schemes in education, health, and employment. 
 
5: Methodology 
We have used the following methodology in carrying out the analysis: 
                                                 
203 For example, see Paudyal, K., B. Saadouni, and R. J. Briston. 1998. Privatization Initial Public 
Offerings in Malaysia: Initial Premium and Long-Term Performance. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 6. pp. 
427-51. This study examined initial and long-term returns offered to investors in 18 Privatization IPOs 
(PIPOs) and 77 private sector IPOs in Malaysia during 1984-95. The finding was that Malaysian PIPOs 
offer market-adjusted initial returns of about 104% (median 80%), significantly greater than the private 
sector IPO initial returns of 53% (median 29%).    
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 Comparison of mean and median performance parameters before and after 
privatization and testing the significance of the change. The following 
performance parameters have been used: 
o Profitability: Return on Sales = Net Income/ Sales; Return on Assets = Net 
Income/ Total Assets; Return on Equity = Net Income/ Equity. 
o Efficiency: Sales Efficiency = Sales/ Number of Employees; Net Income 
Efficiency = Net Income/ Number of Employees. 
o Output: Real Sales = Sales adjusted with the Wholesale Price Index. 
o Employment: Total Number of Employees. 
 
In addition, we also look at the following parameters to see whether there is any change 
in them following privatization:  
o Leverage: Total Debt/ Total Assets; Debt-Equity Ratio. 
o Dividend payout: Dividend Paid or Proposed (Provision)/ Sales; Dividend 
Paid or Proposed (Provision)/ Net Income.   
 
The value of these ratios was calculated over a 9-year period divided into three 3-year 
sub-periods: pre-privatization period: 4 years before privatization to 1 year before 
privatization (t-4 to t-1); transition period: 1 year before privatization to 1 year after 
privatization including the year of privatization (t-1 to t+1); and post-privatization 
period: 1 year after privatization to 4 years after privatization (t+1 to t+4). The mean of 
each performance variable is calculated for pre- and post-privatization periods for each 
partially privatized firm and fully privatized firm. We then use the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
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test (tests whether the median difference in variable values between the pre- and post-
privatization samples is zero) and t-test to see the significance of the change. The above 
analysis would help us gauge whether there has been any significant change in the levels 
of mean and median performance variables post-privatization. Since both the pre-
privatization period and the post-privatization period is 3-years long, we can think of this 
analysis as showing the change over the short-term. 
 
 We also check for robustness of our results by comparing the same pre- versus 
post-privatization performance variables for sub-samples of firms privatized 
through asset sales and firms privatized through methods other than asset sales.   
 
 As a further check on robustness of our results, we look at performance change in 
the entire period (1989-2008) for which we have data, i.e., we look at all years 
from 1989 to the year before the year of privatization for calculating the pre-
privatization experience and all years after the year of privatization to 2008 for 
assessing the post-privatization experience. The average pre-privatization period 
for companies is 7 years while the average post-privatization period for 
companies is 12 years in this time period. The longer time period for analysis 
(instead of 3 years before privatization and 3 years after privatization that we 
looked at earlier) should ensure that short-term effects of privatization are not 
interpreted as sustainable improvements. We also compare the same pre- versus 
post-privatization performance variables for sub-samples of firms privatized 




 Difference-in-differences analysis to remove the influence of factors other than 
privatization on performance (control group is the set of all firms in the same 
industry as the privatized firm). The improvement in performance after 
privatization could have happened because of any of the other changes that are 
taking place simultaneously like deregulation and liberalization of the Indian 
economy. In addition, there could be bias because of the pre-privatization 
characteristics of the divested firms and business cycles. Therefore, it would be 
necessary to use difference-in-differences analysis to say anything deterministic 
about the impact of privatization on enterprise performance. 
 
We do the difference-in-difference analysis both in terms of comparison of means 
and medians as well as OLS. We use the industry-adjusted performance variables 
(defined as firm performance variables - industry performance variables) for the 
difference-in-differences analysis. For the analysis in terms of means and 
medians, we compare the industry-adjusted performance variables over the period 
4 years before privatization to 1 year before privatization (pre-privatization 
period) with the performance over the period 1 year after privation to 4 years after 
privatization (post-privatization period) for each of the 35 firms for which we 
have data (we could not locate industries for 2 privatized firms, namely HMT and 
Engineers India Limited, from the Prowess database). We also divide the sample 
into two sub-samples according to whether they were privatized through asset 
sales or other methods as a check for robustness of our results. For the analysis in 
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terms of OLS, we examine the size, sign, and significance of the privatization 
dummy.   
 
 We use Ordinary Least Squares regression with the performance parameters as 
dependent variable after controlling for size of the firm. We also control for 
unobserved time-constant firm characteristics with firm fixed effects.  
 
 Comparison of actual privatization revenues with target and fiscal deficit. In 
addition, analysis has been done to establish whether there has been any major 
under-valuation of government equity in both asset sales and share issue 
privatization. 
 
Finally, when privatization was effected in several tranches, the initial year of 
privatization is used as the privatization date for our analysis (except for BHEL because 
substantial privatization revenue was realized only in 1994-95). 
 
The table below shows the performance measures that have been used in some of the 
important studies on privatization. As would be apparent, we have used similar measures 
for assessing performance of the privatized firms in India. 
 
Table 1: Performance measures used in some important privatization studies 
Author, sample description, study 
period, methodology 
Performance Measures 
Megginson, William L., Robert C. Nash, 
and Matthias van Randenborgh (1994). 
Compares 3-year average post-
privatization performance ratios to 3-
year pre-privatization values for 61 
firms from 18 countries and 32 
Profitability: Return on Sales = Net Income/ Sales; Return on 
Assets = Net Income/ Total Assets; Return on Equity = Net 
Income/ Equity. 
Operating Efficiency: Sales Efficiency = Sales/ Number of 




industries in the period 1961-89. Tests 
significance of median changes in post- 
versus pre-privatization periods. 
Binomial tests for percent of firms 
changing as predicted.   
Capital investment spending: Capital expenditure/ Sales 
Output = Real sales adjusted by CPI  
Employment: Total Employment = Total Number of 
Employees 
Leverage = Total debt/ Total assets 
Dividends = Cash dividends/ Sales 
Boardman, Anthony E. and Aidan R. 
Vining (1989). Compares performance 
of private, mixed, and state-owned 
enterprises using a sample of 500 largest 
non-US firms in 1983; based on Fortune 
500 data. Dependent variables were 
regressed against independent variables 
(sales, assets, number of employees) and 
dummy variables (market concentration, 
industry, country, ownership form)    
Profitability: Return on Equity, Return on Assets, Return on 
Sales, Net Income.  
Efficiency: Sales per employee; Sales per asset; Assets per 
employee. 
Frydman, Roman, Cheryl W. Gray, 
Marek Hessel, and Andrzej Rapaczynski 
(1999). Studies the impact of private 
ownership on corporate performance in 
transition economies.  
Sales revenues 
Employment 
Labor Productivity = Revenue per employee 
Material Costs per unit of revenue 
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999). 
Studies the impact of privatization on 
218 Mexican state-owned firms, 
privatized between 1983 and 1991. Also 
compares performance with industry-
matched firms. 
Profitability: Operating Income/ Sales; Operating Income/ 
Fixed Assets; Net Income/ Sales; Net Income/ Fixed Assets. 
Operating Efficiency: Cost per unit (Cost of Labor and 
Intermediate Inputs/ Sales); Log (Sales/ Fixed Assets); Log 
(Sales/ Number of Employees); Operating Income/ Number of 
Employees. 
Capital investment: Log (Fixed Assets); Log (Fixed Assets/ 
Number of Employees); Investment/ Fixed Assets; Investment/ 
Sales; Investment/ Employee. 
Total Output: Log (Real Total Sales). 
Employment and Wages: Log (Total Employment); Log 
(Blue-Collar Employment); Log (White-Collar Employment); 
Average Real Wage per Worker; Average Real Wage per Blue-
Collar Worker; Average Real Wage per White-Collar Worker.  
Prices and taxes: Index of Real Prices (Paasche); Net Taxes 
(Corporate Income Tax - Direct Subsidies); Net Taxes/ Sales. 
  
Our methodology suffers from selection bias with only 37 of the 50 firms that have been 
privatized in India being analyzed because of poor data availability. If only the better 
firms (because they are expected to have better data availability) are analyzed, one cannot 
be deterministic about the impact of privatization on performance in general. More 
specifically, we could not locate data on financial performance of the specific hotels of 
ITDC and HCI, which could have made our analysis richer because there is anecdotal 




6: Results of Privatization 
Privatization revenues 
Privatization in India is of recent origin, being initiated in 1991-92 when the country was 
in throes of an economic crisis. Since then, 36 SOEs have seen partial privatization, while 
14 SOEs have been completely privatized (strategic sale accompanied by transfer of 
management control to the private entity). The total amount raised through partial and 
full privatization has been about $12.9 billion204 (Rs. 516.09 billion converted to USD at 
current exchange rates). The table below shows the revenue raised, by method of sale. 
 
Table 2: Privatization revenues in India, by method of sale (1991-2008)  
Method of sale Number of companies* Revenue receipt (Rs. billion) 
Share issue privatization 41 352.99 
Asset sale 14 63.44 
Sale of one SOE to another 6 59.61 
Other related transactions 9 40.05 
Total 50 516.09 
* Will not add up as the same company may be represented in a number of categories 
Source: Government of India, Department of Disinvestment website (www.divest.nic.in) 
 
The predominant method of sale of SOEs that has been employed in India is share issue 
privatization (SIP), which accounts for more than two-thirds of the total privatization 
receipts. Asset sales, which were quite popular in the period 2000 to 2003, have 
accounted for only about an eighth of the total privatization receipts205. Annex table 1 
shows the details of privatization revenues (by firm/ transaction) in India.  
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205 In India, share issue privatizations represented a majority of privatization transactions as well as 
receipts. This is in contrast to worldwide trends. For example, see Megginson, William L, Robert C. Nash, 
Jeffry M. Netter, and Annette B Poulsen. 2004.  The Choice of Private versus Public Capital Markets: 
Evidence from Privatizations. The Journal of Finance, Vol. Lix, no. 6, December 2004. They have analyzed 
2,457 privatization transactions from 1977 to 2000 spread over 108 countries that raised $1.2 trillion. Out 
of this, SIPs were a minority, 931 (38%) by number of transactions but raised $744 billion (63%) of 





The table below shows year-wise privatization revenues (target, actual, and compared to 
the central government fiscal deficit).  
 









1991-92 25 30.38 363.25 8.4% 
1992-93 25 19.13 401.73 4.8% 
1993-94 35 0 602.57 0.0% 
1994-95 40 48.43 577.04 8.4% 
1995-96 70 1.68 502.53 0.3% 
1996-97 50 3.80 560.62 0.7% 
1997-98 48 9.10 732.05 1.2% 
1998-99 50 53.71 895.60 6.0% 
1999-2000 100 18.60 1047.16 1.8% 
2000-01 100 18.71 1188.16 1.6% 
2001-02 120 56.58 1409.55 4.0% 
2002-03 120 33.48 1450.72 2.3% 
2003-04 145 155.47 1232.72 12.6% 
2004-05 40 27.65 1257.94 2.2% 
2005-06 No target fixed 15.70 1464.35 1.1% 
2006-07 No target fixed 0 1425.73 0.0% 
2007-08 No target fixed 23.67 1269.12 1.9% 
2008-09 No target fixed 0 3265.15 0.0% 
Total 968.00 516.09 19645.99 2.6% 
Source: Government of India, Department of Disinvestment website (www.divest.nic.in) (accessed: 23 
August, 2009); Government of India, Ministry of Finance. Economic Survey (various issues) 
 
The following inferences can be drawn:   
 
 While privatization has been able to raise $12.9 billion, it has been able to bridge 
only about 2.6% of the central government fiscal deficit over the last 18 years. So, 
it has not been a major source of revenue for the government. In addition, there is 
considerable variation with the privatization receipt to fiscal deficit ratio in 2003-
04 being as high as 12.6% and 3 years having no privatization receipts. 
 
 To the extent that privatization receipts have been used to bridge the current fiscal 
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deficit, and not used for creating a sustainable decrease in it through reducing the 
public debt, it would have encouraged more unproductive expenditure. However, 
since average privatization receipts as a proportion of the central fiscal deficit is 
low (2.6%), this impact should be small.   
 
 To the extent that the amount raised from privatization would have to be raised by 
the government through bonds (counterfactual), the annual interest cost represents 
the saving to the government. The loss to the government is on account of the 
dividend foregone in the case of asset sales. Thus, the government raised about 
Rs.63.44 billion in the period 2000-2003 from 14 companies sold through asset 
sale. Saving on account of interest on this sum of Rs.63.44 billion is Rs.6.34 
billion, assuming an interest rate of 10%. As against this, the average dividend per 
annum received from these companies was only Rs.0.5 billion206. So, even the 
limited privatization in India seems to have produced highly positive results when 
analyzed on the basis of counterfactual.     
 
 Privatization receipts have been able to meet just over half (53%) of the target. 
There have been only four years (out of eighteen) in which the targets have been 
exceeded.  Privatization receipts in a single year (2003-04) accounts for about a 
quarter of total privatization receipts till 2008.  
 
 The above-mentioned privatization receipts may represent their direct impact on 
                                                 




government revenues. However, privatization may have more durable indirect 
effect on government revenues by reducing the need for annual subsidies to loss-
making government companies and from subsequent increased tax revenues from 
more profitable and productive private enterprises. Governments as diverse as 
Mexico, Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique received, in the first few years following 
sales, more from privatized firms in taxes than from direct proceeds of sales207.    
 
 There is considerable scope for further privatization. There were 242 central 
SOEs in the country. The value of the shares held by the government in the listed 
central SOEs (44 of the 242) as on 24 July, 2009 was over $200 billion at current 
exchange rates208. As if to emphasize the scope of privatization in the country, the 
government has prescribed the following: Revitalize the disinvestment209 program 
and plan to generate at least Rs. 250 billion per year. Complete the process of 
selling of 5-10% equity in previously identified profit making SOEs. List all 
unlisted public sector enterprises and sell a minimum of 10% of equity to the 
public. Auction all loss making SOEs that cannot be revived. For those in which 
net worth is zero, allow negative bidding in the form of debt write-off210. 
 
                                                 
207 Birdsall Nancy and John Nellis. 2003. Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impact of 
Privatization. World Development. Vol. 31 (1), 1617-1633.  
208 For listed SOEs, see Government of India, Department of Disinvestment (Ministry of Finance). 2007. 
White Paper on Disinvestment of Central Public Sector Enterprises. New Delhi. The share price was 
obtained from Bombay Stock Exchange website (www.bseindia.com). 
 
209 Privatization in India is referred to as disinvestment. 
 




There is the issue of under-pricing of shares, which implies that government received less 
in privatization revenues in trying to make privatization politically palatable. Under-
pricing of issues helps in their over-subscription and the investors who are allotted the 
shares have an opportunity for an immediate capital gain, which makes privatization 
more politically acceptable: when retail investors are offered shares at a discount, they 
are likely to support the initiative, thus generating political support for privatization. 
More formally, the allocation of underpriced shares is an inducement for median-class 
voters to align their interests with those of the market-oriented government211 at the cost 
of some revenues. 
 
Under-pricing is a usual practice in privatization initial public offerings (PIPOs) across 
the world as has been shown by a number of studies. In a study on Malaysian 
privatization IPOs, for example, Paudyal212 et al found that Malaysian PIPOs offer 
market-adjusted initial returns of about 104% (median 80%), significantly greater than 
the private sector IPO initial returns of 53% (median 29%). This study examined initial 
and long-term returns offered to investors in 18 PIPOs and 77 private sector IPOs in 
Malaysia during 1984-95. In addition, this study found the extent of over-subscription to 
be a significant explanatory variable for high initial returns from IPOs.  
 
The table below shows that average over-subscription in privatization offers for sale in 
                                                 
211 Jones, Steven L, William L. Megginson, Robert C. Nash, Jeffry M. Netter. 1999. Share issue 
privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends. Journal of Financial Economics 53 (1999) 
217-253. 
 
212 Paudyal, K., B. Saadouni, and R. J. Briston. 1998. Privatization Initial Public Offerings in Malaysia: 




India was about 8.7 and the average discount for retail bidders was 3.75%. Both these 
factors imply that government received less in privatization revenues than what it could 
have, and could be interpreted as the price of making the initiative politically acceptable. 
A rough estimate of the revenue loss is 23.3%, which is on the lower side compared to 
the Malaysian study outlined above but comparable to some other studies213. But, this is 
with the caveat that some of these offers for sale are seasoned offerings rather than IPOs 
and so may have been priced much closer to the market price.  
 
Table 4: Under-pricing of privatization offer for sale - illustrative cases 
Company name Bid date Floor price per 
share/ price 
band (Rs.) 











MUL IPO June 2003 115 8.92 125 164.05 0% 
IPCL Feb 2004 170 4.9 170 NA 5% 
CMC Feb 2004 475 9.6 485 564.80 5% 
DCI Feb-Mar 
2004 
385-400 17.78 400 588.70 5% 
GAIL Feb-Mar 
2004 
185 6.71 195 230.15 5% 
IBP Feb-Mar 
2004 
620 2.66 620 Merged 5% 
ONGC Mar 2004 680-750 5.88 750 788.80 5% 
NTPC IPO Oct 2004 52-62 13.14 62 75.55 0% 
Source: Government of India, Department of Disinvestment (Ministry of Finance). 2007. White Paper on 
Disinvestment of Central Public Sector Enterprises. New Delhi; Bombay Stock Exchange website 
(www.bseindia.com). 
 
The low estimate of revenue loss due to under-pricing in the case of Indian privatizations 
appears credible from the experience of $1.25 billion NHPC IPO that took place in 
August 2009. NHPC IPO had a Price to Earnings Ratio (PE ratio, an important valuation 
parameter) of 38.3, which is very high, and was priced at Rs.36 per share. The NHPC 
share closed at Rs.36.70, showing a first day gain of just about 2%. The table below 
                                                 
213 Jones, Steven L, William L. Megginson, Robert C. Nash, Jeffry M. Netter. 1999. Share issue 
privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends. Journal of Financial Economics 53 (1999) 
217-253. In this study, the mean (median) level of under-pricing was 34.1% (12.4%) for the initial SIPs and 
9.4% (3.3%) for seasoned SIPs. The sample size for this study consisted of 630 share issue privatizations 
(SIPs) spread across 59 countries with total proceeds of over $446 billion during the period 1977-1997. 
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shows the PE Ratio of the recent SOE share issues in India, which also shows the high 
level of PE ratios of many of these issues. 
 
Table 5: Price to Earnings Ratio in recent Indian SOE share issues 
Company PE ratio Company PE ratio 
NHPC 38.3 NTPC 9.2 
PTC 29.6 Power Finance Corp  9.0 
CMC 15.3 GAIL 8.8 
Power Grid Corp 14.7 MUL 7.3 
ONGC 12.3 DCI 6.8 
REC 9.6   
Source: Economic Times, September 3, 2009    
 
Similarly, when employees were issued shares at a price lower than the market price, 
there was a cost to the government, which could be interpreted as the price of making 
them a 'stakeholder' in the privatization program of the government. The average level of 
discount allowed for gaining the support of the employees appears to be substantial 
(~73%) in the table below. The table also makes a rough estimation of this cost to the 
government.  
 
Table 6: Estimated cost to the government on account of sale of shares to employees at discounted 
prices  
Company Number of 
employees 
Average number 
of shares allotted 
per employee 









CMC 3,208 287 66 197 120.40 
VSNL 2,991 1,760 47.85 202 811.50 
HZL 2,848 2,173 10 40.50 188.80 
IPCL 12,272 927 57 231 1,978.50 
Total 21,319    3,099.20 
Source: Government of India, Department of Disinvestment (Ministry of Finance). 2007. White Paper on 
Disinvestment of Central Public Sector Enterprises.      
 
However, given that the government received over Rs.88,141.60 million from 
privatization of these companies over the period 1990-2008, the cost to the government 
on account of selling shares to the employees at discounted prices does not appear 




In order to calculate the possible loss to the government on account of asset sale, we look 
at the valuation of these companies through various methods and compare such valuation 
to the actual sale price. From the table, it is apparent that there is very little evidence of 
undervaluation except in the case probably of PPL. However, one criticism that is leveled 
is that leaving out foreign investors in asset sales reduced the number of bidders and 
would have adversely affected revenue generation. We have not been able to establish the 
authenticity of this criticism. 
 
Table 7: Valuation of companies sold through asset sale 











  BV AVM CC DCF    







51 5144 5515 
CMC 2001-2002 727.4 375.8 1025.3 2134.9 51 1088.8 1520 
HTL 2001-2002 574.7 527.9 403.2 524.4 74 388 550 
VSNL 2001-2002 40185 53010 58710 48735 25 12183.8 14392.5 
IBP 2001-2002 6080 4450 9720-
13820 
11240 33.8 3770 11536.8 
PPL 2001-2002 489 2062.5-
4950 
NA 1118 74 1760.9 1517 




26 3531.7 4450 
IPCL 2002-2003 25544 36737 36489 32518 26 8450 14908.4 




NA 135 72 120 181.8 
Note: 1. BV - Book Value; AVM - Asset Valuation Method; CC - Comparable Companies or Transaction 
Multiple; DCF - Discounted Cash Flow. 2. Indian Financial Year is from April - March. 3. Does not 
contain information on individual hotels of ITDC and HCI. 
Source: Government of India, Department of Disinvestment (Ministry of Finance). 2007. White Paper on 
Disinvestment of Central Public Sector Enterprises.      
 
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that there has been little under-valuation of 
SOEs in privatization transactions relating to both share-issue privatizations and asset 
sales. 
  
Other results of privatization 
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We discuss the changes in various performance parameters in the full sample of 
privatized firms in India in Table 8. We also discuss the changes in the parameters of two 
sub-samples, i.e., partially privatized firms and compare them with firms that have seen 
asset sale (strategic sale with change in management control) in Table 9. The results 
show that there is an increase in profitability, efficiency, and real output following 
privatization. Employment, on the other hand, decreases after privatization. Other 
significant results are: an increase in dividend payout and a decrease in leverage post-
privatization.   
 
Profitability change 
The profitability of public sector companies is poor because, inter-alia, they have 
multiple objectives like serving as a model employer, promoting employment and 
balanced regional development, etc. In the early years of Indian independence, public 
sector companies were not supposed to make profits. After privatization, these multiple 
objectives have given way to the pre-dominant objective of profit maximization. While 
there are other objectives like sales maximization (managerialism), profit maximization 
becomes the pre-dominant objective even after share issue privatization as one the 
determinants of share prices is the profitability of the company. That this happens in 
practice is apparent from the weight assigned to profitability in the annual Memorandum 
of Understanding signed by BHEL, a public sector company that has been partially 
privatized, with its parent ministry, which increased from 30% in the early 1990s to 50% 




We use three indices of profitability, i.e., Return on Sales (PAT/ Sales), Return on Assets 
(PAT/ Total Assets), and Return on Equity (PAT/ Equity). The first one of these indices 
is the best as both the numerator and the denominator consist of flows and thus would be 
more appropriate to reflect the current achievements of the firm, while the other two 
indices have stock variables in the denominator. The stock variables are more likely to be 
influenced by past actions and therefore are less preferable for measuring the current 
achievements of the firm.  
 





























37 0.0382 0.0752 0.0370 1.99b 67.6 2.14
b Return on sales 
 (0.0432) (0.0564) (0.0132)    
37 0.0357 0.0414 0.0057 1.65c 64.9 1.81
c Return on assets 
 (0.0310) (0.0619) (0.0309)    
37 1.1600 1.6574 0.4974 2.33b 70.3 2.47
b 
Return on equity  (0.3242) (0.6014) (0.2772)    
EFFICIENCY 
31 2.9098 4.3576 1.4478 4.11a 87.1 4.13
a 
Sales efficiency  (0.5615) (1.1498) (0.5883)    
31 0.1545 0.5825 0.4280 2.93a 77.4  3.05
a Net income 
efficiency  (0.0303) (0.1176) (0.0873)    
OUTPUT 
37 2960.7 4328.9 1368.2 3.35a 78.4 3.45a Real sales 
 (917.1) (880.3) (-) (36.8)    
EMPLOYMENT 
31 20920 19793 (-) 1127 2.18b 71.0 2.33b Total 
employment  (8925) (8603) (-) (322)    
LEVERAGE 
37 0.3015 0.2514 (-) 0.0501 2.33b 70.3 2.47b Debt to assets 
 (0.2295) (0.1772) (-) 0.0523    
37 1.0606 0.5672 (-) 0.4934 3.35a 78.4 3.45a Debt to equity 
 (0.7750) (0.3733) (-) 0.4017    
DIVIDENDS 
37 0.0099 0.0215 0.0116 2.97a 70.3 2.47b Dividends to sales 
 (0.0027) (0.0100) (0.0073)       
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37 0.1332 0.1859 0.0527  1.90c 62.2 1.48 Dividend to net 
income  (0.0909) (0.1292) (0.0383)    
a Indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
b Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
c indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Table 8 shows that the mean return on sales nearly doubles and the median return on 
sales increases by over 30% after privatization. Even the median change in return on 
sales is significant at the 5% level. More than two-thirds of the privatized firms 
experience an increase in return on sales and this proportion of firms experiencing a 
change in the predicted direction is also significant at the 5% level. Similarly, the return 
on assets and return on equity of privatized firms also experience a significant increase 
after privatization. The mean return on equity increases by about 43% emphasizing the 
importance of the objective of profit maximization on firm and managerial behavior post-
privatization. 
 
Table 9 compares the changes in performance variables in the sub-samples of firms that 
have undergone asset sales vis-à-vis those that have been privatized through other 
methods. While the returns increase after privatization in both the sub-samples for each 
of the profitability indices (except mean return on assets for firms that have been 
privatized through asset sale), the increase is not significant, reflecting the small size of 
the sub-samples. In contrast, the firms experienced a significant increase in profitability 
after privatization for each of the profitability indices for the full sample (see Table 8).      
 
 
Table 9: Comparison of Performance Changes for Privatization Through Methods Other Than Asset 































RETURN ON SALES 
24 0.0704 0.0994 0.0290 1.43 66.7 1.63 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0524) (0.0782) (0.0258) 
   
13 (-) 0.0182 0.0367 0.0549 1.11 69.2 1.39 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale 
 (0.0369) (0.0510) (0.0141)    
RETURN ON ASSETS 
24 0.0446 0.0587 0.0141 1.02 62.5 1.22 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0410) (0.0652) (0.0242) 
   
13 0.0265 0.01 (-)0.0165 0.55 61.5 0.83 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.0289) (0.0519) (0.023)    
RETURN ON EQUITY 
24 1.4760 1.5022 0.0262 1.43 66.7 1.63 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.3539) (0.6717) (0.3178) 
   
13 1.2467 1.3666 0.1199 1.11  69.2 1.39 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.3551) (0.3703) (0.0152)    
SALES EFFICIENCY 
20 2.6721 3.1832 0.5111 3.01a 85.0 3.13
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.5556) (0.7740) (0.2184) 
   
11 4.2947 6.1606 1.8659 1.84c 81.8 2.11
b Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.7928) (3.4281) (2.6353)    
NET INCOME EFFICIENCY 
20 0.2033 0.5795 0.3762 2.52b 80.0 2.68
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0339) (0.1398) (0.1059) 
   
11 0.3208 0.6902 0.3694 0.60 63.6 0.90 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.0513) (0.1351) (0.0838)    
REAL SALES 
24 3920.7 5684.3 1763.6 2.72a 79.2 2.86
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(1088.7) (1119.5) (30.8) 
   
13 1449.5 1760.4 310.9 0.55 61.5 0.83 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (569.4) (495.0) (-) (74.4)    
EMPLOYMENT 
20 29434 28243 (-) 1191 1.12 65.0 1.34 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(17991) (15896) (-) (2095) 
   
11 5251 3482 (-) 1769 3.29a 100.0 3.32
a Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (2903) (2322) (-) (581)    
DEBT TO ASSETS 
24 0.3075 0.2342 (-) 0.0733 2.72a 79.2 2.86
a Privatization Through 




13 0.2671 0.2805 0.0134 38.5 0.55 0.83 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.1494) (0.1718) (0.0224)    
DEBT TO EQUITY  
24 1.0657 0.9696 (-) 0.0961 3.16a 83.3 3.27
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale 
(0.9342) (0.4567) (-) (0.4775) 
    
Privatization Through 
Asset Sale 
1.0013 (-)0.1801 (-) 1.1814 0.55 61.5 0.83 13 
 (0.1133) (0.08) (-)(0.0333)    
DIVIDEND TO SALES 
24 0.0117 0.0286 0.0169 3.54a 83.3 3.27
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0038) (0.0148) (0.0110) 
   
13 0.0091 0.0107 0.0016 0.00 46.2 0.28 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.0054) (0.0047) (-)(0.0007)    
DIVIDEND TO NET INCOME 
24 0.1301 0.2239 0.0938 3.01a 79.2 2.86
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0792) (0.1759) (0.0967) 
   
13 0.1704 0.1208 (-)0.0496 0.29 30.8 -1.94 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.1551) (0.0882) (-)(0.0669)    
a Indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
b Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
c indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Efficiency change  
By concentrating on the pre-dominant objective of profit maximization, the firm is 
expected to become more efficient in utilizing its resources (including human resources). 
In the Indian privatization story also, efficiency improvement is an important objective. 
Thus, the then Minister of Disinvestment of the Government of India, in a suo motu 
statement made in both Houses of Parliament on 9 December 2002, stated that “The main 
objective of disinvestment is to put national resources and assets to optimal use and in 
particular to unleash the productive potential inherent in our public sector enterprises."214 
This implies that efficiency improvement of privatized SOEs is an important objective.  
                                                 
214 Department of Disinvestment (Ministry of Finance, Government of India). 2007. White Paper on 





We measure efficiency change by using the following indices: sales efficiency (real sales/ 
number of employees) and net income efficiency (net income/ number of employees). 
The first measure can also be interpreted as a measure of labor productivity as it reflects 
the average contribution of each employee to real sales. Both these measures show a 
significant improvement after privatization. This is true of mean and median change in 
efficiency, as also the proportion of firms experiencing change in the predicted direction. 
In fact, the improvement in sales efficiency shows the most significant results across all 
our performance measures.  
 
This positive change is also reflected in the sub-samples, with both sales efficiency and 
net income efficiency improving after privatization. While the increase is significant for 
both our sub-samples for sales efficiency, in the case of income efficiency, the increase is 
significant only in the case of firms that have been privatized by methods other than asset 
sale, reflecting the small size of the other sub-sample. It is also significant to note that 
sales efficiency improves the most in the case of asset sales in absolute terms reflecting 
the ability of asset sales in unshackling the productive potential of these enterprises. 
 
Output change                   
Improvement in productive efficiency would be reflected in higher level of output being 
produced with the same level of inputs. Thus, one would expect to see improvement in 
output subsequent to privatization. We use real sales (sales adjusted with wholesale price 
index) as an index of output change. However, it may be noted that some of the observed 
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output gains may reflect redistribution away from customers that obtained the SOE’s 
output at very low prices because of corruption or sheer incompetency215. However, we 
have no way to quantify the importance of this factor in our sample. 
 
Mean yearly real sales increase by about 50% after privatization (though the median sales 
experience a slight decrease for our sample of firms). About four-fifths of the firms 
experience an increase in real sales after privatization and this is significant at the 1% 
level of statistical significance. The significant increase in real sales post-privatization is 
also reflected in the sub-samples (with the caveat that the number of firms sold through 
asset sale may be small to produce significant results).  
 
It is also important to note that the average size of the firms undergoing assets sales is 
much smaller (and less profitable) than those privatized through methods other than asset 
sale. This could be reflecting the more difficult political economy problems associated 
with asset sales, whereby it is easier to privatize the smaller and less profitable firms 
using this method compared to the larger firms.             
 
Employment change 
Perhaps the most politically problematic aspect of privatization is the impact it has on 
employment at the firm level. Since the public sector is also seen as an instrument for 
promoting employment, the public sector firms are generally over-manned. So, it is 
expected that they would shed jobs once they are privatized so as to become profitable, 
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efficient, and competitive. The impact of privatization on employment is the main reason 
for it to be universally opposed across countries by the trade unions.   
 
In India, employment impact of privatization is a more sensitive issue than in many other 
countries. Only 2.7% (constituted by 1.8 percentage points in the public sector and 0.9 
percentage points in the private sector) of the 1.03 billion population (2001 census 
figures) is  employed in the organized sector. There has been hardly any growth in 
employment in the organized sector of the economy in the last 16 years as Figure 2 below 
shows. In fact, the public sector has shed jobs (4.6%) while the private sector has added a 
little more than the number of jobs lost in the public sector (14.2%) to produce a small 
net increase in jobs (less than 1%) in the organized sector over the last 16 years. 
Therefore, losing a public sector job, which frequently occurs following privatization, is a 
very sensitive matter in the country. The figure below shows the growth of employment 
in the organized sectors in India since 1991. 
 



















Total Public sector Private sector 
 
Note: 1. Coverage in construction, particularly on private account, is known to be inadequate; 2. 
Employment in private sector relates to non-agriculture establishments in private sector employing 10 or 
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more persons. Employment in public sector relate to all establishments irrespective of size; 3. May not add-
up due to rounding off. 
 
Source: Government of India (Ministry of Finance). Economic Survey 2008-09    
 
We use the average employment figures as the index for assessing employment change in 
the privatized firms. We find that both the mean and median employment in the 
privatized firms decreases after privatization. The median decrease in employment is 
significant as also the proportion of firms that experience an employment decrease (over 
70 percent). This decrease in employment occurs even though the typical shareholders' 
agreement in the case of asset sales in India includes clauses designed to protect 
employment after privatization. These clauses relate to protection of jobs of the 
employees at least for a year, and subsequently, the terms of lay off, if that becomes 
necessary, cannot be worse than the terms of lay off provided by government. Given the 
significant decrease in employment in privatized firms in general, there is reason why 
trade unions, as a particularly vocal interest group in a democracy, oppose privatization.    
 
However, it is not that every firm that undergoes privatization sheds jobs: in the case of 
about 30 percent of the privatized firms in India, there was an actual increase in 
employment after privatization. So, while there is a tendency towards reduction in labor 
force in the over-manned public sector firms, employment may not necessarily decrease 
if the output from these firms increases so much that it neutralizes the increase in labor 
productivity to produce an actual increase in employment subsequent to privatization. 
 
We get the same result of a decrease in employment after privatization in both our sub-
samples of firms. However, there is one result that stands out: each and every one of the 
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firms that was divested through asset sale saw a decrease in employment and this 
proportion was obviously highly significant. For this sub-sample, even with a small 
sample-size, the decrease in employment subsequent to privatization is highly significant. 
This also explains why the asset sale variant of privatization is especially opposed by the 
trade unions and why it is politically more problematic.    
 
Other significant results of privatization relate to decrease in leverage post-privatization 
and increase in dividend payout ratio.   
 
Leverage change    
Privatization is likely to result in a decrease in leverage of firms. Public sector enterprises 
have lower access to equity capital for which they have to solely depend on the 
government, where there is a perpetual resource crunch. So, SOEs are perforce dependent 
on debt for funding their capital requirements. There is also a moral hazard problem 
because of low risk of bankruptcy in SOEs (government will not let them fail, or the 'soft 
budget policy regime'), which leads banks to keep on financing them without required 
due diligence. All these things change when a SOE is privatized, causing leverage to 
decrease after divestiture.     
 
We measure leverage using the debt to total assets ratio and debt to equity ratio. There is 
a significant decline in both these ratios after divestiture for our entire sample of firms as 
Table 8 shows. Over 70% of the privatized firms show a change in the predicted 




In the sub-samples too, the decrease in leverage is highly significant for firms that have 
undergone privatization through methods other than asset sale. For firms that have been 
privatized through asset sale, though the direction of change is essentially as per 
prediction, the results are not significant because of the small sample size.   
 
Dividend change 
It is expected that dividend payout will increase after privatization as the firms become 
more responsive to their owners. We measure dividend change through two measures: 
Dividend to Sales ratio [Dividend paid or proposed (i.e., provision)/ Sales] and Dividend 
to Net Income [Dividend paid or proposed (i.e., provision)/ PAT]. Both these measures 
show an increase in dividend payout. In the case of the Dividend to Sales ratio, the mean 
(median) improved from 0.99% (0.27%) in the pre-privatization period to 2.15% (1%) in 
the post-privatization period. The difference in the medians is significant at the 1% level 
of statistical significance. Over 70% of the firms in our sample show an increase in 
dividend payout based on this measure, which is a significant proportion. We get similar 
results (though weaker) for the second measure of dividend payout that we use.   
 
In the case of the sub-samples, both the measures of dividend change demonstrate 
significantly higher dividends after privatization for firms that have been divested by 
methods other than asset sale. In the case of asset sale, the mean dividend to net income 
ratio decreases after privatization possibly because the new owners re-deploy the firms' 




The above findings can be summarized intuitively. With the increase in real output and a 
decrease in employment, the labor productivity and efficiency improves, resulting in a 
significant improvement in profitability in the post-privatization period.    
 
Performance changes over longer time period 
As a robustness check to our results, we look at performance change in the entire period 
(1989-2008) for which we have data, i.e., we look at all years from 1989 to the year 
before the year of privatization for calculating the pre-privatization experience and all 
years after the year of privatization to 2008 for assessing the post-privatization 
experience. The average pre-privatization period for companies is 7 years while the 
average post-privatization period for companies is 12 years in this time period. The 
longer time period for analysis (instead of three years before privatization and three years 
after privatization that we looked at in the previous section) should ensure against 
interpreting short-term effects of privatization as sustainable improvements. The results 
are in Table 10 below. 
 




























36 0.0469 0.0773 0.0304 0.18 52.8 0.33 Return on 
sales  (0.0377) (0.0603) (0.0226)    
37 0.0337 0.0378 0.0041 0.66 56.8 0.82 Return on 
assets  (0.0370) (0.0632) (0.0262)    
37 1.0812 1.7887 0.7075 3.01a 75.7 3.12
a Return on 




36 2.7746 6.3177 3.5431 5.20a 100 6.00
a Sales 
efficiency  (0.9655) (2.3378) (1.3723)    
36 0.1260 0.8590 0.7330 4.11a 81.5 4.33
a Net income 
efficiency  (0.0588) (0.3094) (0.2506)    
OUTPUT 
37 2734.3 5923.3 3188.9 3.72a 81.1 3.78a Real sales 
 (914.9) (1311.7) (396.8)    
EMPLOYMENT 
36 18708 15276 (-) 3432 (-) 2.53a 72.2 (-) 2.67a Total 
employment  (8377) (5855) (-) 2522    
LEVERAGE 
37 0.3052 0.2435 (-)0.0618 (-) 2.67a 73.0 (-) 2.79a Debt to 
assets  (0.2700) (0.1981) (-)0.0719    
32 0.9956 0.6843 (-)0.3113 (-) 2.70a 75.0 (-) 2.83a Debt to 
equity  (0.8692) (0.3641) (-)0.5051    
DIVIDENDS 
37 0.0088 0.0265 0.0177 3.43a 75.7 3.12a Dividends to 
sales  (0.0031) (0.0138) (0.0107)    
37 0.1185 0.2187 0.1002 2.75a 70.3 2.47b Dividend 
Payout  (0.0856) (0.2552) (0.1696)    
a Indicates significance at the 1 percent level     
b Indicates significance at the 5 percent level     
c indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
The most significant finding that emerges from the above table is that the results found 
earlier for a shorter time period are robust. Thus, the improvement in efficiency and real 
output post-privatization is significant at the 1% level of statistical significance. 
Similarly, the decrease in employment and leverage after privatization is significant. 
Dividends also increase significantly after privatization both as a proportion of sales and 
net income. The profitability ratios improve after privatization, but the improvement is 
significant only for return on equity216.  
 
                                                 
216 While carrying out the analysis for profitability, we have disregarded a company that is an extreme 
outlier so as not to vitiate the results. Thus, we have not considered HTL for return on sales, as its post-
privatization return on sales was less than (-) 337%. While carrying out the analysis for leverage, we 
disregard companies that have a negative debt-equity ratio after privatization (as well as one extreme 
outlier, HMT, whose post-privatization debt-equity ratio increases to 16.7), as their inclusion would have 




Table 11 shows the results of the analysis after breaking up the sample into sub-samples 
of privatization through asset sale and through methods other than asset sales. The 
direction of change is consistent for both the subsamples: privatization improves 
efficiency, real output, and dividend payout, while it decreases employment and leverage. 
There is a tendency towards improvement in profitability, though only one ratio (return 
on equity) produces significant results. Because of the small sample size for companies 
that have been sold through asset sales, very few of the ratios generate significant results 
for that sub-sample.  
 
Table 11: Comparison of Performance Changes for Privatization through Methods Other Than 





























RETURN ON SALES 
24 0.0660 0.0950 0.0290 0.20 54.2 0.41 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0453) (0.0630) (0.0177) 
   
12 0.0058 0.0481 0.0423 0.29 58.3 0.58 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale 
 (0.0270) (0.0603) (0.0333)    
RETURN ON ASSETS 
24 0.0413 0.0582 0.0169 0.61 58.3 0.82 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0388) (0.0654) (0.0266) 
   
13 0.0214 0.0041 (-) 0.0173 0.00 53.8 0.28 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.0370) (0.0593) (0.0223)    
RETURN ON EQUITY 
24 1.4098 2.0136 0.6038 1.85c 70.8 2.04
b Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.3288) (1.5908) (1.262) 
   
13 0.7283 1.6056 0.8773 1.11 69.2 1.39 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.2254) (1.1265) (0.9011)    
SALES EFFICIENCY 
24 2.8395 6.6124 3.7729 4.26a 100.0 4.90
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(1.2598) (2.3378) (1.078) 
   
12 2.9412 5.6349 2.6937 2.73a 91.7 2.89
a Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.6265) (2.6088) (1.9823)    
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NET INCOME EFFICIENCY 
24 0.1574 1.0142 0.8568 3.72a 87.5 3.67
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.1006) (0.4827) (0.3821) 
   
12 0.1401 0.5888 0.4487 2.07b 83.3 2.31
b Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.0390) (0.3387) (0.2997)    
REAL SALES 
24 3708.9 8113.2 4404.3 2.72a 79.2 2.86
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(1242.3) (1469.4) (227.1) 
   
13 1052.5 1873.9 821.4 1.11 69.2 1.39 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (561.3) (697.8) (136.5)    
EMPLOYMENT 
24 25419 20812 (-) 4607 1.85c 70.8 2.04
b Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(10351) (11419) (1068) 
   
12 5237 3653 (-) 1584 1.45 75.0 1.73
c Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (3692) (3150) (-) (542)    
DEBT TO ASSETS 
24 0.3163 0.2057 (-) 0.1106 2.72a 79.2 2.86
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.3207) (0.1994) (-) (0.1213) 
   
13 0.2755 0.3124 0.0369 0.55 61.5 0.83 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.2217) (0.1181) (-) (0.1036)    
DEBT TO EQUITY  
23 1.0749 0.8316 (-) 0.2433 2.11b 73.9 2.29
b Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(1.0000) (0.4800) (-) (0.5200) 
   
9 0.7660 0.3057 (-) 0.4603 0.66 66.7 1.00 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.8692) (0.3641) (-)(0.5051)    
DIVIDEND TO SALES 
24 0.0103 0.0340 0.0237 3.72a 87.5 3.67
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0057) (0.0191) (0.0134) 
   
13 0.0075 0.0140 0.0065 0.00 46.2 0.28 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.0044) (0.0034) (-) (0.0010)    
DIVIDEND TO NET INCOME 
24 0.1244 0.2623 0.1379 2.72a 79.2 2.86
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0864) (0.2874) (0.2010) 
   
13 0.1245 0.1367 0.0122 0.60 38.5 0.83 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.1280) (0.1222) (-) (0.0058)    
a Indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
b Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
c indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
From the above table, it is also apparent that firms that undergo asset sales are smaller 
and less profitable both in mean and median terms than firms that undergo privatization 
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through other methods, possibly reflecting the political problems of privatizing the bigger 
and the more profitable SOEs through asset sale.   
 
With a longer time period, the conclusion about the employment impact of asset sale 
would have to change. To reiterate, we had earlier found that all firms that underwent 
asset sale shed employees in the short-run. In contrast, in the longer time period, CMC, 
IPCL, and VSNL which underwent asset sale went on to increase employment.  In the 
longer term, their real output increased disproportionately, and so, they had to hire more 
workers. In the other 10 companies for which we have data, employment shrunk after 
asset sale because the real output growth was not as much. So, even with asset sales, 
decrease in employment is not a foregone conclusion: in the longer time period, there 
may be an actual increase in employment in at least some of the firms that experience a 
sharp surge in output causing them to hire more workers even with rising labor 
productivity. 
 
Difference-in-Differences analysis  
Difference-in-differences analysis is necessary to remove the influence of factors other 
than privatization on performance (control group is the set of all Indian firms in the same 
industry as the privatized firm). The improvement in performance after privatization 
could have happened because of any of the other changes that are taking place 
simultaneously with privatization like deregulation and liberalization of the Indian 
economy. Privatization is very often only one component of a larger deregulation 
package (relaxation of price controls, de-licensing of both imports and capacity, 
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encouragement to foreign direct investment, and trade liberalization, etc), as in India, that 
tends to stimulate economies and improve firm performance. In addition, there could be 
bias because of the pre-privatization characteristics of the divested firms. Finally, 
difference-in-differences analysis removes the influence of business cycles on 
performance. Therefore, it would be necessary to use difference-in-differences analysis to 
say anything deterministic about the impact of privatization per se on enterprise 
performance. We calculate the industry-adjusted ratio (firm ratio - industry ratio) for all 
the performance variables for the difference-in-differences analysis217. While in the 
Tables 12 and 13, the analysis is in terms of comparison of means and medians, in Table 
14, It Is In OLS format. Here the results are much more modest as shown in the table 
below. 
 





























35 (-)0.0184 (-)0.0001 0.0183 (-) 1.36 37.1 (-)1.52 Return on 
sales  (0.0050) (-)(0.0028) (-)(0.0078)    
35 (-)0.0019 0.0042 0.0061 0.34 54.3 0.51 Return on 
assets  (0.0014) (0.0176) (0.0162)    
35 0.3390 0.9192 0.5802 1.70c 65.7 1.86
c Return on 
equity  (0.0207) (0.2268) (0.2061)    
OUTPUT 
35 (-)11110.7 (-)17734.0 (-)6623.3 (-)4.11a 8.6 (-)4.90a Real sales 
 (-)(3176.6) (-)(6304.1) (-)(3127.5)    
LEVERAGE 
35 (-)0.0691 (-)0.0573 0.0118 0.34 54.3 0.51 Debt to 
assets  (-)(0.0752) (-)(0.0882) (-)0.0130    
DIVIDENDS 
Dividends to 35 (-)0.0042 (-)0.0021 0.0021 (-)0.34 45.7 (-)0.51 
                                                 
217 Our sample size decreases to 35 firms for this analysis as we could not locate industries for 2 privatized 
firms, namely HMT and Engineers India Limited, from the Prowess database. 
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sales  (-)(0.0038) (-)(0.0039) (-)(0.0001)    
33 (-)0.0827 (-)0.0219 0.0608  0.35 54.5 0.54 Dividend 
Payout  (-)(0.0345) (-)(0.0288) (0.0057)       
a Indicates significance at the 1 percent level     
b Indicates significance at the 5 percent level     
c indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
Note: ‘N’ refers to only the privatized firms and not the total number of firms in the industry. 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Most industry-adjusted profitability ratios improve after privatization and so do mean 
dividends. This mirrors the findings above (when we do not adjust the firm performance 
variables with industry performance variables). However, very few of the changes are 
statistically significant. We were not able to carry out industry-adjusted analysis for 
efficiency because of absence of industry data for employment.   
 
One result that is highly significant is that the real output relative to the industry 
improved in only 3 of the 35 firms. Thus, while privatization was associated with a 
significant increase in real output as we saw in the previous section, the industry output 
increased even more. This would imply that the mean proportion of the industry output 
constituted by the output of the privatized firms decreased after privatization. So, the fear 
that privatization would be associated with exploitation of monopoly power (and to that 
extent would have negative impact on consumers) does not follow from our data. This is 
in line with the findings of La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes for Mexican privatization that 
monopoly power does not play an important role in explaining the increased profitability 
of privatized firms218. 
 
                                                 
218 La Porta, Rafael and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes. 1999. Benefits of Privatization - Evidence from 




The table below shows the results of the analysis for the sub-samples. 
 
Table 13: Comparison of Performance Changes for Privatization Through Methods Other Than 





























RETURN ON SALES 
22 0.0167 0.0141 (-)0.0026 (-)1.94c 27.3 (-)2.13
b Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0065) (0.0014) (-)(0.0051) 
   
13 (-)0.0747 (-)0.0162 0.0585 0.55 61.5 0.83 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale 
 (-)(0.0334) (-)(0.0160) (0.0174)    
RETURN ON ASSETS 
22 0.0116 0.0155 0.0039 0.21 54.5 0.43 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0079) (0.0208) (0.0129) 
   
13 (-)0.0143 (-)0.0397 (-) 0.0254 (-)0.55 46.2 (-)0.28 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (-)(0.0064) (-)(0.0017) (0.0047)    
RETURN ON EQUITY 
22 0.4343 0.7207 0.2864 1.50 68.2 1.71
c Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(0.0909) (0.4488) (0.3579) 
   
13 0.8539 0.6256 (-)0.2283 0.00 53.8 0.28 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (0.0461) (0.2268) (0.1807)    
REAL SALES 
22 (-)11411.7 (-)15787.8 (-)4376.1 (-)3.72a 0.09 (-)3.84
a Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(-)(3257.2) (-)(5237.6) (-)(1980.4) 
   
13 (-)10897.9 (-)22649.8 (-)11751.9 (-)2.92a 0.08 3.05
a Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (-)(4257.7) (-)(6417.1) (-)(2159.4)    
DEBT TO ASSETS 
22 (-)0.0737 (-)0.1017 (-) 0.0280 0.64 59.1 0.85 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(-)(0.0560) (-)(0.1007) (-) (0.0447) 
   
13 (-)0.0652 0.0110 0.0762 (-)1.11 30.8 (-)1.39 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (-)(0.1766) (-)(0.0931) (0.0835)    
DIVIDEND TO SALES 
22 (-)0.0012 0.0048 0.0060 0.00 50.0 0.00 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(-)(0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0028) 
   
13 (-)0.0094 (-)0.0111 (-)0.0017 (-)0.55 46.2 (-)0.28 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (-)(0.0107) (-)(0.0099) (0.0008)    
DIVIDEND TO NET INCOME 
20 0.0307 (-)0.0143 (-)0.0450 0.67 60.0 0.89 Privatization Through 
Methods Other Than 
Asset Sale  
(-)(0.0295) (-)(0.0238) (0.0057) 
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13 (-)0.1530 (-)0.1094 0.0436 (-)0.55 46.2 (-)0.28 Privatization Through 
Asset Sale  (-)(0.0496) (-)(0.1092) (-)(0.0596)    
a Indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
b Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
c indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
Note: ‘N’ refers to only the privatized firms and not the total number of firms in the industry. 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
In the table above, most of the profitability ratios change in the predicted direction (8 out 
of 12), across sub-samples. Like in the industry-adjusted table for the full sample, one 
result that is highly significant is that very few firms increased their real output relative to 
the industry. Thus, while privatization was associated with increase in real output, the 
industry output increased much more for both sub-samples of privatized firms. None of 
the other results are statistically significant. 
 
We do a modified difference-in-differences analysis in OLS format. 'Treatment group' is 
the set of firms privatized in India. 'Control group' is the industry to which the privatized 
firm belongs. The modification to the traditional difference-in-difference method is that 
in the absence of data from industry-matched firms, we use the whole industry to which 
the privatized firm belongs as the control variable. We difference the firm-specific value 
with the industry mean on both the LHS and in the RHS for each time period in the data 
set. We estimate the following equation: 
 
yit = β0 + β1itDipriv + β2itsales + β3itassets  + uit     [1] 
 
where yit is the differenced performance variable (firm specific value - industry specific 
value) for company i at time t, Dipriv is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for all years 
after privatization and 0 for all years before privatization for company i, sales are the 
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differenced sales of company i in year t, assets are the differenced assets of company i in 
year t, βs are the corresponding coefficients, and uit is the idiosyncratic error.  
 
Table 14: OLS Regression Results for Difference-in-Differences analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Return on sales 
(differenced) 
Return on assets 
(differenced) 










Controls Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.14 0.30 0.42 
F-Statistic 1.82 0.76 6.26 
Observations 621 621 621 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Note: 'Treatment group' is the set of firms privatized in India. 'Control group' is the industry to which the 
privatized firm belongs. For the ‘Treatment group’, data relates to 37 Indian State-Owned Enterprises 
privatized through share issues or asset sales since 1991. For the ‘Control group’, data relates to the 
industry comprising of varying number of firms (ranging from 176 firms for the industrial machinery 
industry to 12 firms for the crude oil and natural gas industry) to which the privatized firm belongs. Data 
has been sourced from the Prowess database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. Industry group 
for 2 firms privatized in India could not be found. Values in the table report Ordinary Least Squares 
regression results with firm fixed effects. 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
The results of the difference-in-differences analysis are ambiguous. Privatization dummy 
has a negative and significant coefficient for return on sales, while it is positive and 
significant for return on equity. These results corroborate the results found earlier on the 
basis of difference-in-difference comparison of mean and median. We could not do 
analysis for the impact of privatization on efficiency through the difference-in-differences 
method because of lack of employment data for the Control group. 
 
Linear Regression with Firm Fixed Effects 
 
The equation that we estimate is: 
 




where yit is the performance variable for company i at time t, Dipriv is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for all years after privatization and 0 for all years before privatization 
for company i, sales are the sales of company i in year t, assets are the assets of company 
i in year t, employees are the number of employees in company i in year t, βs are the 
corresponding coefficients, and uit is the idiosyncratic error. The unobserved company 
fixed effect is absorbed in the dummy variable.  
 
Table 15 below shows the OLS Regression Results with Firm Fixed Effects. In our 
analysis, privatization is a dummy variable with a value of '0' for the entire time period 
before the year of privatization and a value of 1 for the entire time period after the year of 
privatization. This is an unbalanced panel as some firms have missing data on some of 
the variables for certain years. It is apparent that privatization has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on return on sales, return on equity, sales efficiency, and 
net income efficiency, while it has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
employment. Thus, following privatization, return on sales increases by 3.2 percentage 
points, return on assets increases by 1.5 percentage points, while return on equity 
increases by a whopping 51.8 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Similarly, there was an 
improvement in efficiency. We find that the sales efficiency increases by about Rs.2 
million ($40,000219) per employee and net income efficiency increases by over Rs.0.6 
million ($12,000) per employee following privatization, other things remaining the same. 
Employment decreases by a significant 2,827 employees following privatization, ceteris 
paribus. We do not compare the results of privatization through asset sale with 
                                                 
219 Assuming an exchange rate of $1 = Rs.50. 
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privatization through methods other than asset sale because of the small sample size of 
companies privatized through asset sale.  
    
Table 15: OLS Regression Results with Firm Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







































R-squared 0.42 0.32 0.44 0.80 0.70 0.96 
F-Statistic 1.82 2.52 8.80 103.29 29.44 11.19 
Observations 537 537 537 537 537 537 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Note: Model results with privatization as a dummy variable taking a value of '0' for the entire time period 
before the year of privatization and a value of ‘1’ for the entire time period after the year of privatization. 
Data relate to 37 Indian SOEs privatized through share issues or asset sales since 1991 and has been 
sourced mainly from the Prowess database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. Values in the 
table report Ordinary Least Squares regression results with firm fixed effects to control for unobserved 
time-constant SOE characteristics. 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
The firm fixed effects control for unobserved time-constant firm characteristics. It is 
significant to note that even with controls, which control for the size of the firms and firm 
fixed effects, the consistent direction of change across equations implies that privatization 
does have a positive impact on performance of firms in terms of profitability and 
efficiency, and a negative impact on employment. This confirms our findings above 
based on summary statistics. 
 
Comparison of performance of privatization through asset sale with that of 
privatization through share issue privatization: An example  
 
In the Indian privatization saga, two aluminum producing companies have been 
privatized, one through asset sale (BALCO) and the other through share issue 
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privatization (NALCO). This is an unnatural experiment because these companies were 
not picked up randomly for privatization through a particular method. However, even 
then, we may use their performance parameters to compare the outcomes of different 
methods of privatization. We compare the industry-adjusted performance of these two 
companies before and after privatization to see whether there is a differential impact of 
the method of privatization on the performance of these companies. 
 
Table 16: Comparison of industry-adjusted privatization performance of BALCO and NALCO 
Performance 
Variable 
BALCO NALCO Better 
performance 
 Before After Before After  
Return on Sales 
(short-term) 
(-) 4.2% (-) 6.0% (-) 1.7% 7.2% NALCO 
Return on Sales 
(long-term) 
1.3% (-) 6.2% (-) 0.4% 9.6% NALCO 
Return on Assets 
(short-term) 
(-) 0.6% (-) 3.1% (-) 4.0% 0.4% NALCO 
Return on Assets 
(long-term) 
(-) 1.9% (-) 3.4% (-) 3.0% 3.6% NALCO 
Return on Equity 
(short-term) 
(-) 32.4% (-) 85.3% (-) 11.5% (-) 13.0% NALCO 
Return on Equity 
(long-term) 
(-) 15.4% (-) 122.3% (-) 8.8% (-) 33.8% NALCO 
Firm as share of 
industry (short-
term) 
11.8% 7.3% 26.9% 28.3% NALCO 
Firm as share of 
industry (long-
term) 
13.6% 10.2% 27.9% 23.6% Even 
Note: 1. Short-term refers to four years to one year (t-4 to t-1) before privatization and one year to four 
years (t+1 to t+4) after privatization; 2. Long-term refers to 1989 to all years before privatization and all 
years after privatization to 2008. Since BALCO was privatized in the year 2000-01, long-term (before) 
would refer to 1989 to 1999 and long-term after would refer to 2001 to 2009. 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
As is apparent from the above table, the performance of NALCO has been better 
compared to the performance of BALCO post-privatization. This would imply that the 





Results of this study compared to those of others 
Most results of privatization that have been obtained in this study (study of privatization 
in India) are in consonance with those obtained in other studies as seen in Table 17 
below. However, one result that stands out in the case of India is the loss of employment 
in the short-run in all firms undergoing asset sale. As already mentioned, this makes 
privatization through asset sale especially contentious in India.  
 
In addition, Boardman and Vining (1989) opine that partial privatization may be worse, 
especially in terms of profitability, than complete privatization or continued state 
ownership. This finding does not find support in many of the other studies including this 
one (e.g., see case study of BALCO and NALCO above). Partial privatization enables the 
monitoring of the actions of managers through the stock market and may be reducing the 
agency costs, thus producing benign profitability and efficiency outcomes. 
   
Table 17: Comparison of Findings of Some Privatization Studies 
Study Main Findings 
Megginson William 
L., Robert C. Nash, 
and Matthias van 
Randenborgh 
(1994). 
1. Significant increases in profitability, output per employee (adjusted for inflation), 
capital spending, and total employment. 
2. Financial policies of these former SOEs begin to resemble the lower leverage and 
higher dividend payout ratios typically associated with private, entrepreneurial 
companies. 
3. Results are generally robust when data are partitioned into various subsamples.  
4. There is greater performance improvement for the group of firms that experience 
50 percent or greater turnover in directors than for the group of firms experiencing 
less dramatic changes in directors after privatization.   
La Porta, Rafael and 
Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes (1999). 
1. Privatization in Mexico is followed by a 24-percentage-point increase in the 
mean ratio of operating income to sales as privatized firms catch up with industry-
matched control groups. 
2. Privatized firms reduce employment by half, but those workers who remain are 
paid significantly more. Real wages experience large increases in the post-
privatization period probably because those workers who are retained are required 
to work and are paid accordingly. 
3. Transfers from laid-off workers are an important source of increased 
profitability. 
4. Survey respondents believed that the firing of the old management is one of the 
most important success factors. 
Boardman, Anthony 1. Coefficients for mixed and state-owned enterprises are negative and statistically 
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E. and Aidan R. 
Vining (1989). 
significant in all equations, which indicate that, on average, mixed and state-owned 
enterprises are significantly less profitable and less efficient than private 
corporations after controlling for firm size, market concentration, industry, and 
country. 
2. Partial privatization may be worse, especially in terms of profitability, than 
complete privatization or continued state ownership. 
Ram Mohan, TT 
(2005) 
1. Post-privatization profitability improved in 21 out of 36 firms studied in India.  
2. The amounts raised through privatization have been paltry.  
Gupta, Nandini 
(2005) 
1. Partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and 
investment in India. 
2. Partial privatization leads to an increase in the productivity of labor and output 
without layoffs.  
This study of 
privatization in India 
1. Privatization leads to significant improvement in profitability, efficiency, and 
real output of firms. It also leads to decline in leverage and increase in dividend 
payout. 
2. The impact of privatization on employment is negative in general, and more 
severe in the case of asset sale. This makes privatization a very sensitive issue in 
the country.  
3. The results are robust when the data are partitioned according to whether the 
firms have been privatized through asset sale or otherwise. 
 
Many studies, especially in transition countries, have shown that privatization to 
outsiders produces better results than privatization to insiders (managers and workers)220. 
Frydman et al221, also find that the performance effects are significantly different 
depending on the type of owners to whom control is transferred during the privatization 
process. In the case of Mexico, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes opine that firing of the old 
management is one of the most important success factors in privatization. Arguably, 
management change can occur most frequently in the case of asset sales. However, we 
have already seen that privatization through asset sale does not necessarily produce better 
results in India (see Table 16). Important considerations while evaluating the methods of 
privatization in India are: asset sales were popular only in the period 2000-2003 and even 
during this period, there was insufficient interest to court foreigners to bid for SOEs. 
                                                 
220 For example, see Djankov Simeon and Peter Murrell. 2002. Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A 
Quantitative Survey. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XL 
221 Frydman, Roman, Cheryl W. Gray, Marek P. Hessel, and Andrzej Rapaczynski. 1999. When Does 
Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition 




While both these factors would have decreased the potential receipts from privatization, 
they could also have restricted the improvements in profitability and efficiency post-
privatization.  
      
Avenues for future research 
The social impact of privatization on employees and consumers needs to be studied more 
rigorously for India. If privatization is associated with job losses in the company 
undergoing privatization and price increases, then a judgment on the overall outcome of 
privatization would have to counter-balance the profitability and efficiency increases due 
to privatization with its ill-effects on employees and consumers due to job losses and 
price increases. In addition, the economy-wide impact on employment should be 
examined to see whether the profitability and efficiency increases at the firm level 
translate to employment gains for the economy to compensate for the job losses at the 
firm-level.   
 
Another interesting area would be the study of Chinese SOE performance. The Chinese 
SOEs improved performance through a combination of greater autonomy and better 
incentives through a contract-responsibility system. Chinese privatization, mostly, has 
involved transfer of ownership of only the smaller SOEs, while the larger ones 
representing a substantial proportion of state ownership over business enterprises 
remained in government hands. So, an interesting question for analysis would be whether 
managerial incentives and turnover can be a substitute for privatization for generating the 




We have not dealt with the issue of endogeneity222 explicitly: why were the privatized 
firms dealt with in this study were the ones chosen for privatization? Though we have 
used difference-in-differences analysis and firm fixed effects in an effort to get unbiased 
estimates of the impact of privatization on firm performance, it is also necessary to fully 
understand the determinants of privatization and whether there was something 
unobservable and potentially time varying that led the government to choose these firms 
for privatization that might have made the results sanguine. Similar issues of endogeneity 
arise in the case of firms selected for asset sale as compared to partial privatization. The 
issue of endogeneity223 has not been adequately addressed in this study and is game for 
future research.   
 
Then there is the issue of selection bias. Though 50 companies were privatized in India in 
the period 1990-2008, we have analyzed the performance of only 37 of them and the 
balance 13 companies were left out because of insufficient information. This leaves a 
potential for selection bias as it is more likely that there would be insufficient information 
for poorly performing companies, so better-performing firms would be over-represented 
in the analysis. This also reduces the size of the sample, limiting the ability to find 
statistically significant results and making generalizations. So, the next stage of analysis 
should emphasize data collection and analysis of the entire universe of privatized SOEs 
                                                 
222 Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. 2000. Unnatural experiments? Estimating the Incidence of 
Endogenous Policies. The Economic Journal. Vol. 110, No. 467.  
 
223 Privatization pressure on the government (based on its fiscal deficit for that year) may serve as an 
Instrumental Variable for privatization dummy in equation [2] to get an unbiased estimate of the impact of 




in India.   
 
7: Conclusion  
 
This chapter examines the impact of privatization on firm level performance in India. The 
finding is that privatization leads to significant improvement in profitability, efficiency, 
and real output of firms. In addition, it provides some fiscal boost to the government 
through privatization receipts. It also leads to decline in leverage and increase in dividend 
payout. However, the impact on employment is negative, especially after asset sales in 
the short-run. The results are robust when the data are partitioned according to whether 
the firms have been privatized through asset sale or not. Thus, the positives from 
privatization in terms of productivity, efficiency, and real output (and the negative in 
terms of employment) occur even in the case of partial privatization through share issue 
privatization.  
 
One result that stands out is that in all cases of asset sale, there has been a loss of 
employment (in the short term). In the Indian context, where less than 3% of the 
population is employed in the organized sector, it would appear that partial privatization 
may be a better strategy as job losses associated with asset sales may make the social 
discontentment unmanageable for any kind of reform, given poor availability of social 
security nets. 
 




                                                
arsenal rather than being dogmatic about one or the other method. Though not examined 
in this chapter, the size of the company and its profitability status should be important 
considerations in deciding the method of sale [whether partial privatization through share 
issues or full privatization through asset sale]. For example, to prevent a loss-making 
company to continue bleeding the state, government should be open to the option of asset 
sale of the company as is apparent from the cases of Jessop and Company Limited and 
Lagan Engineering Company Limited that have turned the corner after asset sale224. With 
their loss making status at the time of privatization and given their small-size, they were 
eminently suitable for asset sales. By the same token, the partial privatization of ONGC 
in 2003-04 was appropriate given its size and profitability status. The positive changes in 
its profitability and efficiency since partial privatization demonstrate the effectiveness of 
this method in motivating positive change.        
 
However, the positive outcomes of privatization in terms of profitability and efficiency 
may not be enough to sustain privatization in India because of political economy reasons. 
Privatization requires a lot of political support for its sustenance and weak coalition 
governments may not have the political power to continue with it even though its utility 
in terms of profitability and efficiency outcomes may be well-established. We have seen 
that this was the case in India especially in the period 2004-08 when the ruling coalition 
was quite weak. 
 
224 The return on equity improved from -62.5 percent (short-run, pre-privatization) to +37 percent (short-
run, post-privatization) and -63.2 percent (long-run, pre-privatization) to +26.9 percent (long-run, post-
privatization) in the case of Jessop & Company Limited. Corresponding numbers in the case of Lagan 
Engineering Company Limited were -34 percent, and +4 percent in the short-run, and -12.5 percent and 






Annex Table 1: Privatization revenues (by firm) in India, 1990 – 2008 
Company Name Industry Issue Date Receipts 
(in Rs. m) 
Receipts 




     Before Issue After 
Issue  
Andrew Yule & 
Company Limited 
Medium and Light 
Engineering 
1991-92     9.6% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were  
sold in bundles. 
1999-2000 2,754.2 64.1   Capital reduction and special dividend Bharat Aluminium 
Company Limited 
Aluminium and 
aluminium products 2000-01 5,515.0 122.6 100% 49% Asset Sale in 2000-01 
Heavy Engineering 1991-92   100% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in bundles. Bharat Earth Movers 
Limited  1994-95 482.7 15.6 80.00% 60.1%  
Medium and Light 
Engineering 
1991-92 
  100% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in bundles. 
Bharat Electronics 
Limited 
 1994-95 471.7 15.2 80% 75.86%  
1991-92   100% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in bundles. 
1992-93 82.1 3.2 80% 79.54%  
Bharat Heavy Electricals 
Limited 
Heavy Engineering 
1994-95 3,013.4 97.2 79.46% 67.72%  
Petroleum 1991-92   100% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in bundles. Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation Limited  1992-93 3,311.8 127.4 80% 70%  
Petroleum 1991-92   100% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in bundles. 
 1992-93 454.0 17.5 80% 74.60%  
Bongaigaon Refinery & 
Petrochemicals Limited 
 2000-01 1,488.0 33.1   74.46% equity divested to IOC 
Chennai Petroleum 
Corporation Limited 
Petroleum 2000-01 5,093.3 113.2   51.81% equity divested to IOC 
1991-92   100% 83.31% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in bundles. 
2001-02 1,520.0 32.3 83.31% 32.31% Asset sale 
2002-03 60.7 1.2 32.31% 26.25% 6.06% sold to employees 
CMC Limited Computer software 
2003-04 1,904.4 40.5 26.25% 0%  
1994-95 997.1 32.2 100% 80%  
1995-96 141.2 4.4 80% 76.92%  




1998-99 2,216.5 54.1   Domestic issue 
1991-92   100% 98.56% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in bundles. Dredging Corporation of 
India 
Transportation 




Company Name Industry Issue Date Receipts 
(in Rs. m) 
Receipts 




     Before Issue After 
Issue  
Engineers India Limited Industrial Development 
& Technical 
Consultancy Services 
1994-95 675.3 21.8 100% 94.01% 
 
Fertilizer 1991-92     1.54% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
Fertilizers & Chemicals 
Travancore Limited 
 1992-93 13.0 0.5 97.46% 97.35%  
1994-95 1,941.2 62.6 100% 96.63%  
1998-99 6,718.6 163.9   includes cross-holding of Rs. 4,900.80 m by ONGC,  
IOC 
1999-2000 9,450.0 219.8   GDR issue 
GAIL (India) Limited Petroleum 
2003-04 16,273.6 346.2 67.35% 57.35%  
Hindustan Cables Limited Medium and Light 
Engineering 
1991-92     3.64% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
Hindustan Copper Limited Minerals and Metals 1992-93 80.7 3.1 100% 98.88%  




1991-92     20% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
1991-92 
  100% 80% 
SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1992-93 3,318.5 127.6 80% 70%  
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation 
Limited 
Petroleum 
1994-95 5,631.1 181.6 69.72% 60.25%  
Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. 
Ltd. 
Consumer Goods 1991-92     16.05% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
Hindustan Teleprinters Limited Medium and Light 
Engineering 
2001-02 550.0 11.7 100% 26% 
Asset Sale 
1991-92 
  100% 80% 
SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1992-93 815.5 31.4 80.04% 75.93%  
2002-03 4,450.0 90.8 75.92% 49.92% Asset Sale in 2002-03 
2002-03 61.9 1.3 49.92% 48.45% 1.47% sold to employees 
Hindustan Zinc Limited Mineral and Metals 
2003-04 3,238.8 68.9 48.45% 29.53%  
1991-92     5.43% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
HMT Limited Medium and Light 
Engineering 
1992-93 233.8 9.0 95.14% 90.32%  
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Company Name Industry Issue Date Receipts 
(in Rs. m) 
Receipts 




     Before Issue After 
Issue  
Tourist services 2001-02 1,595.1 33.9 100% 0% Asset Sale Hotel Corporation of India Limited 
 2002-03 830.0 16.9    
Petroleum 2001-02 11,536.8 245.5 59.8% 26% Asset Sale in 2001-02 IBP Company Limited 
 2003-04 3,506.6 74.6 26% 0% IBP merged with IOC in June 2007 
1994-95 10,336.5 333.4 99.88% 96.08%  
1998-99 12,089.6 294.9   Cross-holding by ONGC 
Indian Oil Corporation Limited Petroleum 
1999-2000 1,627.9 37.9   Cross holding by ONGC 
1991-92 
    
20% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
2002-03 14,908.4 304.3 59.95% 33.95% Asset sale 
2003-04 12,028.5 255.9 33.95% 5%  




2004-05 648.1 14.4 5.00% 0% 4.58% sold to employees 




1991-92     0.27% shares sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
Tourist services 1994-95 519.9 16.8 100% 90%  
 2001-02 1,319.5 28.1 89.97% 0% Asset sale in 2001-02   
 2001-02 394.1 8.4   Lease-cum-management contract  
India Tourism & Development 
Corporation Limited (18 hotels) 
 2002-03 2,728.1 55.7 89.97% 0% Asset sale in 2002-03 
1991-92   100.00% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
Indian Telephone Industries 
Limited 
Medium and Light 
Engineering 
1992-93 156.3 6.0 79.72% 77.79%  
Jessop & Co Ltd Heavy Engineering 2003-04 181.8 3.9 99% 27% Asset sale 
Petroleum 1991-92     10.01% equity sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
Kochi Refineries Limited 
 2000-01 6,591.0 146.5 55.04% 0% 55.04% of equity divested to BPCL; KRL merged with  
BPCL in Sept 2006 
Kudremukh Iron Ore Company 
Limited 
Minerals  1994-95 114.0 3.7 100% 99.03% 
 
Lagan Jute Machinery Company 
Limited 
Heavy Engineering 2000-01 25.3 0.6 100% 26% Asset Sale in 2000-01 
Madras Refineries Limited Petroleum 1991-92     20% equity sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  




Company Name Industry Issue Date Receipts 
(in Rs. m) 
Receipts 




     Before Issue After 
Issue  
1991-92   100% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1994-95 13,221.7 426.5 80% 67.18%  
1995-96 1,359.0 42.5 67.18% 65.73%  




1997-98 9,100.0 252.8   GDR issue 
2002-03 10,000.0 204.1  45.79% Control premium given by Suzuki Motor Co. 
2003-04 9,933.4 211.3 45.79% 18.28% IPO 
2005-06 15,676.0 356.3 18.28% 10.28% 8% sold to FIs  
2005-06 20.8 0.5 10.28% 10.27% 0.01% sold to employees 
Maruti Udyog Limited Transportation 
Services 
2006-07 23,669.4 526.0 10.27% 0% Sold to FIs and mutual funds 
Minerals & Metals Trading 
Corporation 
Trading and marketing 
services 
1991-92   100% 99.33% 0.67% equity sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
1999-2000 1,054.5 24.5 100% 26% Asset sale  Modern Food Industries (India) 
Limited 
Bakery products 
2002-03 440.7 9.0 26% 0% Residual sale of equity 
1991-92 
  100% 
97.28% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1992-93 2,442.0 93.9 97.28% 87.20%  




1994-95 1.0 0.0 87.19% 87.15%  
1991-92 
  100% 97.72% 
SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1992-93 7.2 0.3 97.72% 97.66%  
National Fertilizers Limited Fertilizer 
1994-95 2.8 0.1 97.66% 97.65%  
National Mineral Development 
Corporation Limited 
Minerals 1992-93 178.8 6.9 100% 98.38% 
 
National Thermal Power 
Corporation Limited 
Power Generation 2004-05 26,840.7 596.5 100% 94.75% 
 
Coal and Lignite 1991-92     5% equity sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
Neyveli Lignite Corporation 
Limited 




Company Name Industry Issue Date Receipts 
(in Rs. m) 
Receipts 




     Before Issue After 
Issue  
Petroleum 1994-95 10,515.2 339.2   2% sold 
 1995-96 51.6 1.6   0.2 m shares sold 
 1998-99 24,849.60 606.1   Cross-holding by GAIL, IOC 
 1999-2000 2,964.80 68.9   Cross-holding by GAIL, IOC 
Oil & Natural Gas Corporation 
Limited 
 2003-04 105,584.0 2,246.5 84.11% 74.11%  
Paradeep Phosphates Limited Fertilizers 2001-02 1,517.0 32.3 100% 26% Asset sale in 2001-02 
Fertilizers 1991-92     5.64% equity sold. SOE-wise receipts not available as  
shares were sold in bundles. 
Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers 
Limited 
 1992-93 303.6 11.7   1.85% equity sold. 
1991-92   100% 80% SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 




1994-95 280.8 9.1 81.49% 80.12%  
1991-92 
  100% 92.02% 
SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1992-93 22.5 0.9 92.02% 91.02%  
State Trading Corporation of India 
Limited 
Trading and Marketing 
services 
2001-02 400.0 8.5   Special dividend 
1991-92 
  100% 95% 
SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1992-93 7,001.0 269.3 95.01% 89.49%  
1994-95 226.6 7.3 89.45% 89.04%  
Steel Authority of India Limited Steel 
1995-96 133.0 4.2 89.04% 88.93%  
1991-92 
  100% 80% 
SOE-wise receipts not available as shares were sold in  
bundles. 
1996-97 3,796.7 108.5 82.02%  GDR issue 
1998-99 7,836.8 191.1   GDR issue 
1999-2000 750.0 17.4   Domestic issue 
2001-02 22,500.0 478.7   Dividend and dividend tax 
2001-02 14,392.5 306.2 52.97% 27.97% Asset Sale  
Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited Telecommunication 
services 
2001-02 251.9 5.4 27.97% 26.12% 1.85% sold to employees 
   484,337.6
a 11,533b    
a Total receipts from disinvestment excludes Rs.30,380 m received in 1991-92 (SOE-wise receipts are not available for this year as shares were sold in bundles). Total may not correspond  




were sold in bundles).  
Source: Government of India, Department of Disinvestment website (www.divest.nic.in); Government of India, Department of Disinvestment. 2007. White Paper on Disinvestment of  
Central Public Sector Enterprises; Ram Mohan, TT. 2005. Privatisation in India: Challenging Economic Orthodoxy. New York: Routledge Curzon; Naib, Sudhir. 2004. Disinvestment in  
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